Tag Archives: string theory

Quantum Apologetics and Quantum Theology

As an atheist, I started out frustrated by how little interest religious people had in debating their beliefs. Much of that was probably to do with how obnoxious it was to be “debated” by a socially awkward ten-year-old. But as I appreciate now, defending religious beliefs is just not a core activity for most religious people, even the experts. While there are many theologians who study the doctrines of their various religions, only a few engage in apologetics: arguments designed to convince people on the outside. The rest work within a particular religion, working out its implications.

There’s a similar, less-often-noticed behavior when it comes to interpretations of quantum mechanics.

Much like religions, there are many different interpretations of quantum mechanics, from people who envision a fundamentally undetermined world to those who picture a vast multiverse of all possibilities, to people who think quantum mechanics needs to be supplemented with faster-than-light signals, deterministic rules, or even consciousness. And as there isn’t yet any broad consensus for any of these options, you’d be forgiven for assuming that these people are trying their hardest to convince others that their interpretation is right.

But most of the work these people do is “quantum theology”, not “quantum apologetics”. The average paper connected to a quantum interpretation isn’t designed to convince people with different interpretations. It starts out with an interpretation in place, and tackles a more detailed question of what the interpretation should actually mean in practice. This work can be quite valuable and impressive…provided you’re already convinced. But if you’re not, and you see someone glowingly praise a paper on say the many-worlds interpretation, you might mistakenly think they’re on the cusp of closing the question of which interpretation is right, and not merely solving a technical issue within many-worlds.

Are there other areas of science with this pattern?

Let’s talk about string theory.

Physicists really started getting excited about string theory around forty years ago. Some people hear that number and wonder what happened. Have string theorists been looking for evidence for forty years and not found any? Isn’t that a huge waste of time?

That would be “string apologetics”. And these days, string apologetics is not actually that common. It’s a priority for some, to be sure, but most string theorists aren’t working on proving string theory. It’s clearly not an easy thing to do, and as a result, most people don’t spend their time on it.

Realizing that, some people assume that string theorists are actually practicing “string theology”, and get mad all over again. If string theorists are just assuming string theory and spending their time figuring out the “string versions” of known facts, then many would also deride their work as pointless.

But actually, string theology is also not very common. There are certainly some people who work to figure out the “string version” of this or that, or do research that only makes sense assuming string theory. But most of the string theory community doesn’t do that either.

Instead, they do something that, to continue the analogy, you might call “string pastoral care”.

Most theologians aren’t apologists, but similarly, most priests don’t spend their time doing theology. They use their training to advise their congregations on how to live their lives, solving day-to-day problems with some religious inspiration.

Similarly, most people these days who call themselves string theorists are working on more general questions about the types of theories used in particle physics. They’re doing this making use of their background in string theory, as an inspiration for solutions, a source of mathematical tools to solve problems, and a motivation for which questions are the most interesting. But if string theory turns out to be false, most of these peoples’ work will still be useful. It’s “string pastoral care”, used to solve problems for the people around them, not “string theology”.

Do you know any other fields that this applies to? Let me know in the comments!

Amplitudes 2026, Part II

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This is a continuation of my conference coverage from last week. The same warnings apply: this is much more technical than my usual posts, readers beware!

Last week I covered the talks from Monday through Wednesday, so I’ll jump right in here with Thursday morning, where the first speaker was Francesco Riva, who after a brief ad for his new board game Tutti Quantum gave a review of positivity constraints, first-principles restrictions on quantum field theories based on their behavior at high energies. After covering some of the research program’s successes like arguments against Galileons and massive gravity, he talked about how new methods allow one to take into account the possibility of loops of massless particles, essentially by invoking a formal version of the idea that real experiments have finite size. He was followed by Grant Remmen, who talked about his work deriving string theory-like amplitudes from increasingly minimal assumptions. While one can always quibble with the assumptions they impose, I do find it encouraging that they are now managing to do this game with both gravity and gauge theory, and with five-particle amplitudes, not just four.

Paul Heslop then covered applications of bootstrap techniques to non-supersymmetric theories, where analytic superspace still finds a way to be useful. Tomasz Taylor covered progress in calculating Yang-Mills amplitudes in de Sitter space. Andrea Puhm and Nima Arkani-Hamed don’t have slides online yet: Puhm’s title suggests her talk was part of the celestial holography field, while Nima’s was likely similar to his talk at Lancefest, where he talked about calculations of amplitudes in the limit of a very large number of loops (represented in the field with a capital L) or very large numbers of particles (represented in the field with a lower-case n). Given the different context, I’m guessing he left out the self-effacing jokes where he was “little n” and Lance was “big L”, though I’m hoping he at least mentioned his students had been checking their results against what they called the “lanswer”.

The evening ended with a gong show, which for the non-initiated is a series of short student talks with a strict time limit (hence the gong). I’m not quite so intrepid as to read all of the slides for these, commenters who attended are welcome to highlight special examples.

Friday began with a talk by Agnese Bissi, who reviewed the connection between holographic correlators and amplitudes in AdS space. I liked her emphasis on this as a lab to find nice new representations of amplitudes, and her summary at the end of the current frontiers. Axel Kleinschmidt followed with a talk on one-loop string amplitudes, where he and his collaborators have gotten gradually more proficient at manipulating the rich structure of elliptic functions that make an appearance. Piotr Tourkine talked about his work using the S-matrix bootstrap to find scattering amplitudes in higher dimensions, a context where accounting for thresholds presented a new challenge. This is a problem people are approaching with genuine supercomputers, he quoted one calculation at 100,000 CPU hours. Lauren Williams is one of a small community of mathematicians who have been intrigued by the amplituhedron, her talk was a walk through a series of conjectures, some made by physicists, some by mathematicians, most with counterexamples found in the last few years.

Finally, Zvi Bern closed the conference with a talk on the frontier of amplitudes-based gravitational wave calculations, referring to it, probably to David Kosower’s annoyance, as 5PM. Some parts of this frontier have been calculated, but a few have proved hard going, bottlenecked by immensely challenging integrals, which go beyond the capabilities of publicly available codes. The new integrals have a variety of strange functions, including the elliptics and Calabi-Yaus I spent time on in my own career, as well as Heun integrals, which I imagine I will have to learn more about from the slides of Elliptics & beyond ’26, as I don’t remember people talking about them when I was in the field. New integration strategies have led to improvements in the public codes and seem to be making good progress, but Zvi highlighted that ideally they want to not need supercomputers at all, as they’ll need to go higher in loops to see effects from, for example, the deformability of neutron stars.

Amplitudes 2027 will be in Munich, with the summer school in Mainz under Stefan Weinzierl’s capable hands. I’m looking forward to seeing what the state of the art looks like then!

At Lancefest

An AI Opinions Chart

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You ever read something and suddenly a whole classification scheme lights up in your head?

A thread on X from “stringking42069” showed me a combination of opinions I hadn’t seen before. stringking42069 is a pro-string theory commentator with a macho gym bro memer gimmick. He’s openly contemptuous of many physicists who describe themselves as string theorists, arguing that only a smaller number really deserve the name.

To be clear, none of that is the new combination. Long-time readers of this blog will remember a frequent commenter with a very similar attitude, if much less tendency to use the word “bro”.

The new thing, from my perspective, is how he thinks about AI. As he explains in that thread, he sees AI as great at certain kinds of physics calculations, ones where the methods and goals are mostly known and the challenge is working out the math. He doesn’t expect it to be able to contribute real creativity or judgement, the messy decision-making that physicists use to decide what is worth building in the first place.

Others with that perspective tend to argue that this will be a boon for scientists, who AI will free up to do creative work, multiplying their output. The difference is, stringking42069 thinks a lot of scientists are not doing creative work in the first place, including most of the people making extensive use of AI. So if anything he’s happy to see them go, and only pissed that they’re sucking up resources and attention on the way out, and discouraging students who could be joining the parts of the field that do real creative work.

It made me realize that there are two axes to thinking about AI in physics.

On the one hand, there’s where you think AI capabilities are. Is AI going to lead to “a nation of geniuses in a data center”, an AI-powered super-(cyber-)Ed Witten for everything and everyone? Is AI great at routine work and coding, but will never be able to do anything really creative or novel? Or is AI total hype, almost always a waste of time?

On the other hand, there’s another axis: misanthropy about science. For some of the people arguing about AI online, most scientists are good people trying their best to do worthwhile things. For others, most scientists are complacent and cliquish, wasting time and money on ideas that are going nowhere and forcing the real geniuses out of the field.

Put those together, and you get the table below:

	Thinks academia is mostly fine	Misanthrope
AI geniuses are coming	The practice of science will change. We’ll play at science like chess, and have fun trying to read and understand amazing AI insights.	Soon all scientists will be out of a job when the public notices AI can do it all better. Then the real breakthroughs will come.
AI can do routine work	AI frees scientists to focus on what we do best: creativity. We should think carefully about how to train junior scientists now, though.	AI is comparable to bad scientists who only do derivative work. If they leave, we real paradigm-changers could inherit the field.
AI is complete hype	Most scientists don’t use AI. AI is worrying because it misleads students and the public, who should listen to real scientists.	Scientists are shilling for AI companies, as you should expect for people who waste the public’s money on reputation games.

This classification is missing a lot, of course. One important question is not just what AI can do in principle, but what it can do cost-effectively, and whether anyone is actually willing to pay for it. A point where I agree with stringking42069 is that companies get a lot of good PR out of building AI physicists right now, and that PR benefit won’t be relevant forever. I’m also leaving out the more general questions of AI’s effect on society, for example people who think AI geniuses will lead to the end of the world as we know it.

But I suspect if you look at this table, you can already start matching the scientists you see on social media. I’ve seen examples of all of these in the wild (though the bottom-left is somewhat rare, as far as I can tell). Where do you fall?

Breakthrough Prize 2026

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Because of last week’s “bonus info” post, I’m only now getting around to commenting on this year’s Breakthrough Prizes in Fundamental Physics. While I don’t comment on them every year, I know enough about several of this year’s winners that I figured a post would be helpful.

For those who haven’t heard of it, the Breakthrough Prizes are a bit like the Nobel, if it was created by a 21st century rich person instead of a 19th century one. They give out more money, and instead of an organization like the Swedish Academy of Sciences they pick winners via a committee of past winners. They’re more flexible in structure than the Nobel, with extra prizes for early-career researchers and a tendency to reward accomplishments that are either entirely theoretical or solid experimental work that doesn’t show a new discovery, both of which are things the Nobel Prize is structured to avoid. They’ve also shown willingness to reward large collaborations, rather than following the Nobel’s informal rule to only give the award to three people at a time.

This last was on display this year in their main award in physics this year, for the muon g-2 collaborations. The award is going to collaborations of scientists and engineers at three different particle colliders, for work done over a span of over fifty years to measure the magnetic properties of the muon. These measurements have shown a tantalizing discrepancy with predictions that inspired many to conjecture new physics. However, in the last few years it’s looked more and more like the discrepancy was due to an imprecise prediction, and better methods seem to be converging to the experimental value. At this point, smart money is that there is no disagreement with the Standard Model here, but as always in science there’s a chance some mystery remains.

The Breakthrough Prize also offered a special, out-of-schedule prize to David Gross. Already a Nobel laureate, Gross had a crucial role in our understanding of the force of quantum chromodynamics that binds protons and neutrons together. He was also a major founding figure in string theory, and since the Breakthrough Prize is more comfortable recognizing theoretical contributions they get to mention this as well. Gross is also known in the community for his personality, which tends to fill up any room he’s in. I can only imagine the conversations that led to Breakthrough’s decision to add a special prize for him this year.

Breakthrough is also adding a new recurring prize, the Vera Rubin New Frontiers Prize, honoring women who make important contributions to physics within two years of their PhD. The prize is a bit smaller than the exiting early-career New Horizons in Physics Prizes, presumably because it goes to even younger researchers. This year’s winner is from my old field, scattering amplitudes. Carolina Figueiredo is part of the latest evolution of the research program behind the amplituhedron. The new framework of “surfaceology” seems like a promising geometry-flavored way to understand particle physics calculations in more realistic theories, and unlike its predecessors may have some practical value eventually as well. Congrats Carolina!

Finally, the New Horizons in Physics Prizes are for impressive early-career researchers. I don’t know much about the first recipient, Benjamin Safdi, who works on searches for axions and axion-like particles, today’s most trendy dark matter candidate. I know a bit more about the work done by Clay Córdova, Thomas Dumitrescu, Shu-Heng Shao, and Yifan Wang, having met several of them in my physics career. They work on what are called generalized symmetries, concepts which go beyond the usual idea of how symmetry is supposed to work by involving more complicated tensors. I saw these crop up a fair bit in talks, but they were distant enough from my area that I never had a particularly clear grasp of what people were doing with them. I know even less about the work of the last three, Dillon Brout, J. Colin Hill, Mathew Madhavacheril, Maria Vincenzi, Daniel Scolnic, and W. L. Kimmy Wu, on cosmological measurements, but I was friends with Mathew in grad school and am impressed that he’s now working on cosmology given how little cosmology research there was at Stony Brook at the time.

On Theories of Everything and Cures for Cancer

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Some people are disappointed in physics. Shocking, I know!

Those people, when careful enough, clarify that they’re disappointed in fundamental physics: not the physics of materials or lasers or chemicals or earthquakes, or even the physics of planets and stars, but the physics that asks big fundamental questions, about the underlying laws of the universe and where they come from.

Some of these people are physicists themselves, or were once upon a time. These often have in mind other directions physicists should have gone. They think that, with attention and funding, their own ideas would have gotten us closer to our goals than the ideas that, in practice, got the attention and the funding.

Most of these people, though, aren’t physicists. They’re members of the general public.

It’s disappointment from the general public, I think, that feels the most unfair to physicists. The general public reads history books, and hears about a series of revolutions: Newton and Maxwell, relativity and quantum mechanics, and finally the Standard Model. They read science fiction books, and see physicists finding “theories of everything”, and making teleporters and antigravity engines. And they wonder what made the revolutions stop, and postponed the science fiction future.

Physicists point out, rightly, that this is an oversimplified picture of how the world works. Something happens between those revolutions, the kind of progress not simple enough to summarize for history class. People tinker away at puzzles, and make progress. And they’re still doing that, even for the big fundamental questions. Physicists know more about even faraway flashy topics like quantum gravity than they did ten years ago. And while physicists and ex-physicists can argue about whether that work is on the right path, it’s certainly farther along its own path than it was. We know things we didn’t know before, progress continues to be made. We aren’t at the “revolution” stage yet, or even all that close. But most progress isn’t revolutionary, and no-one can predict how often revolutions should take place. A revolution is never “due”, and thus can never be “overdue”.

Physicists, in turn, often don’t notice how normal this kind of reaction from the public is. They think people are being stirred up by grifters, or negatively polarized by excess hype, that fundamental physics is facing an unfair reaction only shared by political hot-button topics. But while there are grifters, and people turned off by the hype…this is also just how the public thinks about science.

Have you ever heard the phrase “a cure for cancer”?

Fiction is full of scientists working on a cure for cancer, or who discovered a cure for cancer, or were prevented from finding a cure for cancer. It’s practically a trope. It’s literally a trope.

It’s also a real thing people work on, in a sense. Many scientists work on better treatments for a variety of different cancers. They’re making real progress, even dramatic progress. As many whose loved ones have cancer know, it’s much more likely for someone with cancer to survive than it was, say, twenty years ago.

But those cures don’t meet the threshold for science fiction, or for the history books. They don’t move us, like the polio vaccine did, from a world where you know many people with a disease to a world where you know none. They don’t let doctors give you a magical pill, like in a story or a game, that instantly cures your cancer.

For the vast majority of medical researchers, that kind of goal isn’t realistic, and isn’t worth thinking about. The few that do pursue it work towards extreme long-term solutions, like periodically replacing everyone’s skin with a cloned copy.

So while you will run into plenty of media descriptions of scientists working on cures for cancer, you won’t see the kind of thing the public expects is an actual “cure for cancer”. And people are genuinely disappointed about this! “Where’s my cure for cancer?” is a complaint on the same level as “where’s my hovercar?” There are people who think that medical science has made no progress in fifty years, because after all those news articles, we still don’t have a cure for cancer.

I appreciate that there are real problems in what messages are being delivered to the public about physics, both from hypesters in the physics mainstream and grifters outside it. But put those problems aside, and a deeper issue remains. People understand the world as best they can, as a story. And the world is complicated and detailed, full of many people making incremental progress on many things. Compared to a story, the truth is always at a disadvantage.

Bonus Info For “Cosmic Paradox Reveals the Awful Consequence of an Observer-Free Universe”

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I had a piece in Quanta Magazine recently, about a tricky paradox that’s puzzling quantum gravity researchers and some early hints at its resolution.

The paradox comes from trying to describe “closed universes”, which are universes where it is impossible to reach the edge, even if you had infinite time to do it. This could be because the universe wraps around like a globe, or because the universe is expanding so fast no traveler could ever reach an edge. Recently, theoretical physicists have been trying to describe these closed universes, and have noticed a weird issue: each such universe appears to have only one possible quantum state. In general, quantum systems have more possible states the more complex they are, so for a whole universe to have only one possible state is a very strange thing, implying a bizarrely simple universe. Most worryingly, our universe may well be closed. Does that mean that secretly, the real world has only one possible state?

There is a possible solution that a few groups are playing around with. The argument that a closed universe has only one state depends on the fact that nothing inside a closed universe can reach the edge. But if nothing can reach the edge, then trying to observe the universe as a whole from outside would tell you nothing of use. Instead, any reasonable measurement would have to come from inside the universe. Such a measurement introduces a new kind of “edge of the universe”, this time not in the far distance, but close by: the edge between an observer and the rest of the world. And when you add that edge to the calculations, the universe stops being closed, and has all the many states it ought to.

This was an unusually tricky story for me to understand. I narrowly avoided several misconceptions, and I’m still not sure I managed to dodge all of them. Likewise, it was unusually tricky for the editors to understand, and I suspect it was especially tricky for Quanta’s social media team to understand.

It was also, quite clearly, tricky for the readers to understand. So I thought I would use this post to clear up a few misconceptions. I’ll say a bit more about what I learned investigating this piece, and try to clarify what the result does and does not mean.

Q: I’m confused about the math terms you’re using. Doesn’t a closed set contain its boundary?

A: Annoyingly, what physicists mean by a closed universe is a bit different from what mathematicians mean by a closed manifold, which is in turn more restrictive than what mathematicians mean by a closed set. One way to think about this that helped me is that in an open set you can take a limit that takes you out of the set, which is like being able to describe a (possibly infinite) path that takes you “out of the universe”. A closed set doesn’t have that, every path, no matter how long, still ends up in the same universe.

Q: So a bunch of string theorists did a calculation and got a result that doesn’t make sense, a one-state universe. What if they’re just wrong?

A: Two things:

First, the people I talked to emphasized that it’s pretty hard to wiggle out of the conclusion. It’s not just a matter of saying you don’t believe in string theory and that’s that. The argument is based in pretty fundamental principles, and it’s not easy to propose a way out that doesn’t mess up something even more important.

That’s not to say it’s impossible. One of the people I interviewed, Henry Maxfield, thinks that some of the recent arguments are misunderstanding how to use one of their core techniques, in a way that accidentally presupposes the one-state universe.

But even he thinks that the bigger point, that closed universes have only one state, is probably true.

And that’s largely due to a second reason: there are older arguments that back the conclusion up.

One of the oldest dates back to John Wheeler, a physicist famous for both deep musings about the nature of space and time and coining evocative terms like “wormhole”. In the 1960’s, Wheeler argued that, in a theory where space and time can be curved, one should think of a system’s state as including every configuration it can evolve into over time, since it can be tricky to specify a moment “right now”. In a closed universe, you could expect a quantum system to explore every possible configuration…meaning that such a universe should be described by only one state.

Later, physicists studying holography ran into a similar conclusion. They kept noticing systems in quantum gravity where you can describe everything that happens inside by what happens on the edges. If there are no edges, that seems to suggest that in some sense there is nothing inside. Apparently, Lenny Susskind had a slide at the end of talks in the 90’s where he kept bringing up this point.

So even if the modern arguments are wrong, and even if string theory is wrong…it still looks like the overall conclusion is right.

Q: If a closed universe has only one state, does that make it deterministic, and thus classical?

A: Oh boy…

So, on the one hand, there is an idea, which I think also goes back to Wheeler, that asks: “if the universe as a whole has a wavefunction, how does it collapse?” One possibility is that the universe has only one state, so that nobody is needed to collapse the wavefunction, it already is in a definite state.

On the other hand, a universe with only one state does not actually look much like a classical universe. Our universe looks classical largely due to a process called decoherence, where small quantum systems interact with big quantum systems with many states, diluting quantum effects until the world looks classical. If there is only one state, there are no big systems to interact with, and the world has large quantum fluctuations that make it look very different from a classical universe.

Q: How, exactly, are you defining “observer”?

A: A few commenters helpfully chimed in to talk about how physics models observers as “witness” systems, objects that preserve some record of what happens to them. A simple example is a ball sitting next to a bowl: if you find the ball in the bowl later, it means something moved it. This process, preserving what happens and making it more obvious, is in essence how physicists think about observers.

However, this isn’t the whole story in this case. Here, different research groups introducing observers are doing it in different ways. That’s, in part, why none of them are confident they have the right answer.

One of the approaches describes an observer in terms of its path through space and time, its worldline. Instead of a detailed witness system with specific properties, all they do is pick out a line and say “the observer is there”. Identifying that line, and declaring it different from its surroundings, seems to be enough to recover the complexity the universe ought to have.

The other approach treats the witness system in a bit more detail. We usually treat an observer in quantum mechanics as infinitely large compared to the quantum systems they measure. This approach instead gives the observer a finite size, and uses that to estimate how far their experience will be from classical physics.

Crucially, both approaches aren’t a matter of defining a physical object, and looking for it in the theory. Given a collection of atoms, neither team can tell you what is an observer, and what isn’t. Instead, in each approach, the observer is arbitrary: a choice, made by us when we use quantum mechanics, of what to count as an observer and what to count as the rest of the world. That choice can be made in many different ways, and each approach tries to describe what happens when you change that choice.

This is part of what makes this approach uncomfortable to some more philosophically-minded physicists: it treats observers not as a predictable part of the physical world, but as a mathematical description used to make statements about the world.

Q: If these ideas come from AdS/CFT, which is an open universe, how do you use them to describe a closed universe?

A: While more examples emerged later, initially theorists were thinking about two types of closed universes:

First, think about a black hole. You may have heard that when you fall into a black hole, you watch the whole universe age away before your eyes, due to the dramatic differences in the passage of time caused by the extreme gravity. Once you’ve seen the outside universe fade away, you are essentially in a closed universe of your own. The outside world will never affect you again, and you are isolated, with no path to the outside. These black hole interiors are one of the examples theorists looked at.

The other example are so-called “baby universes”. When physicists use quantum mechanics to calculate the chance of something happening, they have to add up every possible series of events that could have happened in between. For quantum gravity, this includes every possible arrangement of space and time. This includes arrangements with different shapes, including ones with tiny extra “baby universes” which branch off from the main universe and return. Universes with these “baby universes” are another example that theorists considered to understand closed universes.

Q: So wait, are you actually saying the universe needs to be observed to exist? That’s ridiculous, didn’t the universe exist long before humans existed to observe it? Is this some sort of Copenhagen Interpretation thing, or that thing called QBism?

You’re starting to ask philosophical questions, and here’s the thing:

There are physicists who spend their time thinking about how to interpret quantum mechanics. They talk to philosophers, and try to figure out how to answer these kinds of questions in a consistent and systematic way, keeping track of all the potential pitfalls and implications. They’re part of a subfield called “quantum foundations”.

The physicists whose work I was talking about in that piece are not those people.

Of the people I interviewed, one of them, Rob Myers, probably has lunch with quantum foundations researchers on occasion. The others, based at places like MIT and the IAS, probably don’t even do that.

Instead, these are people trying to solve a technical problem, people whose first inclination is to put philosophy to the side, and “shut up and calculate”. These people did a calculation that ought to have worked, checking how many quantum states they could find in a closed universe, and found a weird and annoying answer: just one. Trying to solve the problem, they’ve done technical calculation work, introducing a path through the universe, or a boundary around an observer, and seeing what happens. While some of them may have their own philosophical leanings, they’re not writing works of philosophy. Their papers don’t talk through the philosophical implications of their ideas in all that much detail, and they may well have different thoughts as to what those implications are.

So while I suspect I know the answers they would give to some of these questions, I’m not sure.

Instead, how about I tell you what I think?

I’m not a philosopher, I can’t promise my views will be consistent, that they won’t suffer from some pitfall. But unlike other people’s views, I can tell you what my own views are.

To start off: yes, the universe existed before humans. No, there is nothing special about our minds, we don’t have psychic powers to create the universe with our thoughts or anything dumb like that.

What I think is that, if we want to describe the world, we ought to take lessons from science.

Science works. It works for many reasons, but two important ones stand out.

Science works because it leads to technology, and it leads to technology because it guides actions. It lets us ask, if I do this, what will happen? What will I experience?

And science works because it lets people reach agreement. It lets people reach agreement because it lets us ask, if I observe this, what do I expect you to observe? And if we agree, we can agree on the science.

Ultimately, if we want to describe the world with the virtues of science, our descriptions need to obey this rule: they need to let us ask “what if?” questions about observations.

That means that science cannot avoid an observer. It can often hide the observer, place them far away and give them an infinite mind to behold what they see, so that one observer is essentially the same as another. But we shouldn’t expect to always be able to do this. Sometimes, we can’t avoid saying something about the observer: about where they are, or how big they are, for example.

These observers, though, don’t have to actually exist. We should be able to ask “what if” questions about others, and that means we should be able to dream up fictional observers, and ask, if they existed, what would they see? We can imagine observers swimming in the quark-gluon plasma after the Big Bang, or sitting inside a black hole’s event horizon, or outside our visible universe. The existence of the observer isn’t a physical requirement, but a methodological one: a restriction on how we can make useful, scientific statements about the world. Our theory doesn’t have to explain where observers “come from”, and can’t and shouldn’t do that. The observers aren’t part of the physical world being described, they’re a precondition for us to describe that world.

Is this the Copenhagen Interpretation? I’m not a historian, but I don’t think so. The impression I get is that there was no real Copenhagen Interpretation, that Bohr and Heisenberg, while more deeply interested in philosophy than many physicists today, didn’t actually think things through in enough depth to have a perspective you can name and argue with.

Is this QBism? I don’t think so. It aligns with some things QBists say, but they say a lot of silly things as well. It’s probably some kind of instrumentalism, for what that’s worth.

Is it logical positivism? I’ve been told logical positivists would argue that the world outside the visible universe does not exist. If that’s true, I’m not a logical positivist.

Is it pragmatism? Maybe? What I’ve seen of pragmatism definitely appeals to me, but I’ve seen my share of negative characterizations as well.

In the end, it’s an idea about what’s useful and what’s not, about what moves science forward and what doesn’t. It tries to avoid being preoccupied with unanswerable questions, and as much as possible to cash things out in testable statements. If I do this, what happens? What if I did that instead?

The results I covered for Quanta, to me, show that the observer matters on a deep level. That isn’t a physical statement, it isn’t a mystical statement. It’s a methodological statement: if we want to be scientists, we can’t give up on the observer.

Post on the Weak Gravity Conjecture for FirstPrinciples.org

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I have another piece this week on the FirstPrinciples.org Hub. If you’d like to know who they are, I say a bit about my impressions of them in my post on the last piece I had there. They’re still finding their niche, so there may be shifts in the kind of content they cover over time, but for now they’ve given me an opportunity to cover a few topics that are off the beaten path.

This time, the piece is what we in the journalism biz call an “explainer”. Instead of interviewing people about cutting-edge science, I wrote a piece to explain an older idea. It’s an idea that’s pretty cool, in a way I think a lot of people can actually understand: a black hole puzzle that might explain why gravity is the weakest force. It’s an idea that’s had an enormous influence, both in the string theory world where it originated and on people speculating more broadly about the rules of quantum gravity. If you want to learn more, read the piece!

Since I didn’t interview anyone for this piece, I don’t have the same sort of “bonus content” I sometimes give. Instead of interviewing, I brushed up on the topic, and the best resource I found was this review article written by Dan Harlow, Ben Heidenreich, Matthew Reece, and Tom Rudelius. It gave me a much better idea of the subtleties: how many different ways there are to interpret the original conjecture, and how different attempts to build on it reflect on different facets and highlight different implications. If you are a physicist curious what the whole thing is about, I recommend reading that review: while I try to give a flavor of some of the subtleties, a piece for a broad audience can only do so much.

I Have a Theory

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“I have a theory,” says the scientist in the book. But what does that mean? What does it mean to “have” a theory?

First, there’s the everyday sense. When you say “I have a theory”, you’re talking about an educated guess. You think you know why something happened, and you want to check your idea and get feedback. A pedant would tell you you don’t really have a theory, you have a hypothesis. It’s “your” hypothesis, “your theory”, because it’s what you think happened.

The pedant would insist that “theory” means something else. A theory isn’t a guess, even an educated guess. It’s an explanation with evidence, tested and refined in many different contexts in many different ways, a whole framework for understanding the world, the most solid knowledge science can provide. Despite the pedant’s insistence, that isn’t the only way scientists use the word “theory”. But it is a common one, and a central one. You don’t really “have” a theory like this, though, except in the sense that we all do. These are explanations with broad consensus, things you either know of or don’t, they don’t belong to one person or another.

Except, that is, if one person takes credit for them. We sometimes say “Darwin’s theory of evolution”, or “Einstein’s theory of relativity”. In that sense, we could say that Einstein had a theory, or that Darwin had a theory.

Sometimes, though, “theory” doesn’t mean this standard official definition, even when scientists say it. And that changes what it means to “have” a theory.

For some researchers, a theory is a lens with which to view the world. This happens sometimes in physics, where you’ll find experts who want to think about a situation in terms of thermodynamics, or in terms of a technique called Effective Field Theory. It happens in mathematics, where some choose to analyze an idea with category theory not to prove new things about it, but just to translate it into category theory lingo. It’s most common, though, in the humanities, where researchers often specialize in a particular “interpretive framework”.

For some, a theory is a hypothesis, but also a pet project. There are physicists who come up with an idea (maybe there’s a variant of gravity with mass! maybe dark energy is changing!) and then focus their work around that idea. That includes coming up with ways to test whether the idea is true, showing the idea is consistent, and understanding what variants of the idea could be proposed. These ideas are hypotheses, in that they’re something the scientist thinks could be true. But they’re also ideas with many moving parts that motivate work by themselves.

Taken to the extreme, this kind of “having” a theory can go from healthy science to political bickering. Instead of viewing an idea as a hypothesis you might or might not confirm, it can become a platform to fight for. Instead of investigating consistency and proposing tests, you focus on arguing against objections and disproving your rivals. This sometimes happens in science, especially in more embattled areas, but it happens much more often with crackpots, where people who have never really seen science done can decide it’s time for their idea, right or wrong.

Finally, sometimes someone “has” a theory that isn’t a hypothesis at all. In theoretical physics, a “theory” can refer to a complete framework, even if that framework isn’t actually supposed to describe the real world. Some people spend time focusing on a particular framework of this kind, understanding its properties in the hope of getting broader insights. By becoming an expert on one particular theory, they can be said to “have” that theory.

Bonus question: in what sense do string theorists “have” string theory?

You might imagine that string theory is an interpretive framework, like category theory, with string theorists coming up with the “string version” of things others understand in other ways. This, for the most part, doesn’t happen. Without knowing whether string theory is true, there isn’t much benefit in just translating other things to string theory terms, and people for the most part know this.

For some, string theory is a pet project hypothesis. There is a community of people who try to get predictions out of string theory, or who investigate whether string theory is consistent. It’s not a huge number of people, but it exists. A few of these people can get more combative, or make unwarranted assumptions based on dedication to string theory in particular: for example, you’ll see the occasional argument that because something is difficult in string theory it must be impossible in any theory of quantum gravity. You see a spectrum in the community, from people for whom string theory is a promising project to people for whom it is a position that needs to be defended and argued for.

For the rest, the question of whether string theory describes the real world takes a back seat. They’re people who “have” string theory in the sense that they’re experts, and they use the theory primarily as a mathematical laboratory to learn broader things about how physics works. If you ask them, they might still say that they hypothesize string theory is true. But for most of these people, that question isn’t central to their work.

Bonus Material for “How Hans Bethe Stumbled Upon Perfect Quantum Theories”

4 gravitons

Stories about physics from someone who's been there