Tag Archives: mathematics

An AI Apocalypse, but Just for You

For Halloween, I like to talk about spooky scenarios. And these days, the most trendy one is an AI apocalypse.

You can run into a wild range of ideas for how AI could go wrong, of varying plausibility. They go from hacks shutting down key infrastructure or engineered viruses, to taking over nuclear arsenals and sending out armies of killer robots, all the way to nanotech that devours the world and flawlessly manipulative plans that end up filling space with computers simulating hell at the speed of light.

And of course, on the other end, the possibility that banks suddenly become convinced that the investments underpinning AI companies’ trillion dollar evaluations aren’t going to pay, collapsing the economy.

So, lots of things to be scared of this year!

But in all of those scenarios, at least we suffer together. If civilization cracks like an egg, everyone who survives has to adapt and figure out a new path forward. And if everyone’s dead, well, everyone’s dead. There’s something oddly comforting about that.

That’s not guaranteed, though.

I occasionally see quotes from “100+ reactions to 100+ solutions”, a compilation of thoughts by mathematicians about OpenAI’s recent claim to have solved hundreds of difficult open problems in mathematics. For the most part, these people aren’t writing about an AI apocalypse that sweeps civilization into a new form. They’re writing about what AI seems to be capable of in mathematics, right now, and wondering how they personally will withstand it.

Picture a world where you’ve defined yourself around something. Maybe you’re competitive, someone who wants to be the best in the world. Maybe you just want something of your own, accomplishments that came from you, not anyone else. Either way, it’s something you love, something you chose a strange and difficult path to pursue.

Then, that identity falls apart. For the competitive, you’re not the best anymore, not at the kind of thing you were doing, you’ll never be the best at that again. For the rest, your sense of ownership is less secure. Someone could hear about that problem you’re tinkering with, decide to tackle it on a whim, and jump so far ahead that you’d never be able to catch up on your own merits.

And if there isn’t a wider collapse, you’re facing this on your own. You might have to find a new job, though in a world where universities still need math classes that seems unlikely. But you will have to find a new purpose. You’d have to become a different kind of mathematician, at minimum, one more dedicated to something the AI can’t do and less dedicated to the things that happened to define your style of mathematics. Your friends in other fields will never quite understand. Your friends outside of academia will understand even less.

If we thread the needle between the apocalypses of powerful AI and an economic bubble that pops so hard that companies can’t host the models anymore, we end up with a series of quieter, more personal AI apocalypses, people who feel like their own world is ending, and have to figure out how to go on. For now, that’s the possibility many mathematicians are considering. We’ll see how many others consider it in the years to come.

It Got to My Field

For the folks who found this blog from Anthropic’s site, welcome!

For everyone else, I’d better give some context.

Last month, I had a blog post titled “It Only Counts When AI Gets to My Field”. The title was a joke, the content less so. I said that if some of the longstanding problems of my old research field got solved by AI, then I’d sit up and take notice.

The post turned out to be a bit of a self-fulfilling prophecy, after some folks at Anthropic read it and decided to tackle one of the outstanding problems I mentioned. They then invited me to write a post about it on their science blog.

The post is here. I recommend reading it, then coming back. The rest of this post will be a little Q&A.

Q: At the end of that post, it says Anthropic paid you for your time. Can we trust what you wrote?

A: When I agreed to write the post, I made it clear that I was going to give my own opinion, not write an ad for Anthropic. They could propose light edits, but that’s it. And I avoided signing anything with them, not even an NDA, so I could freely tell you if they pushed my boundaries.

They didn’t push my boundaries. They asked me to clarify a few things, and to give more detail on the science. I didn’t change the message or the takeaways.

The reason I asked them to pay me is that, as a freelance writer, I don’t have a salary to fall back on. Time I spend on a project like that post is time I’m not spending on journalistic projects, so if I worked on it for free I’d essentially be using my vacation time for it. The rate I’m charging them is roughly in the middle of what I’d have gotten paid if I used that time on journalism: a bit more than I would have made working for the lower-paying outlets, a bit less than I would have made with the higher-paying ones.

I’m also not expecting this to be the start of a longer-term business relationship or anything like that. So overall, I don’t think I’m incentivized to lie on their behalf. You can trust me.

Q: How confident are you that they did what they said they did?

A: I didn’t get the feeling they were lying. But I didn’t start out skeptical.

I haven’t seen the logs from the LLM, or anything like that. That’s the kind of thing I would dig into if I were more suspicious of their story. If there’s a reason to be suspicious, I’ll ask.

But so far, I don’t feel that I have much reason to be suspicious. They were able to look up details on the fly when I asked them, they didn’t seem to have a polished message they were trying to push past me. And more importantly, as I’ll mention in a bit, I don’t think anything they described is all that outlandish. It lines up, largely, with the capabilities I’d expect their Claude Science platform to have.

It’s also relevant that they didn’t use an internal model for this. It means that scientists will likely be trying out similar problems soon, so if it does turn out they exaggerated something, people are going to figure out quite quickly.

Q: So how big is this? We just saw AI solve a Millennium problem, after all.

A: This was a lot easier than a Millennium problem. But it was also a lot cheaper.

The problem they solved is one with a clear recipe, honed and explained over multiple papers. It’s something I expected to be hard to do without access to a lot of computer power, so I thought it would need to be approached with a novel technique, in order to avoid using that computer power.

In the end, it didn’t need that. As I mention in the post, another group got most of the result at around the same time, with a much smaller amount of AI assistance.

It’s not an easy recipe, to be clear. I think other people will be surprised that a reasonably affordable program like Claude Science can do this without a lot of guidance. I’m not surprised, mostly, because I’ve been paying enough attention to what people have been doing with these things, and carrying out this kind of recipe consistently is actually something the good science AIs can do right now. If you haven’t been following as closely, that’s going to be a lot more surprising.

So maybe the best way to answer this is: instead of paying $15 million to solve one of the most famous problems in mathematics, they paid $1,000 or so to make a significant next step in an ongoing research program in theoretical physics. This doesn’t tell you much about whether AI can achieve field-defining breakthroughs, but it tells you a lot about the kinds of things a theoretical physicist with $1000 spare budget can do right now.

(As an aside, it feels crazy to me that 90% or more of the compute cost was from the LLM, not the calculation itself. On the one hand, it feels nuts to essentially use ten times more computer power to do this than would have been needed if a human had done the coding. On the other hand, I’ve applied for grants that budgeted more than that per year for travel costs, and spending this kind of money on getting a result seems a lot more useful than spending it on airfare.)

Q: Isn’t it reckless to publicly post a problem for AI like that?

A: I posted my challenge before OpenAI announced their Navier-Stokes result. At that point, there had been a few awkward surprises, but for the most part AI companies had a pattern of talking to an academic first before trying to solve a problem. It’s what they did back in March.

I expected that was what they’d do this time, and got more than a little blindsided when they just solved the problem on their own and reached out to Lance afterwards. I’m lucky that Lance doesn’t seem mad at me about it, it would have been quite understandable if he was.

I did tell them that if they wanted to tackle any of the other problems in that post, they should reach out to one of the scientists involved first, before attempting it. In addition to being polite, it’s a way to make sure that they understand the problem correctly and have a plan to verify the result. They happened to pick a challenge that was particularly easy to verify, but it didn’t have to go that way.

Q: Any thoughts about AI’s future impact on science?

A: If there’s a problem you can’t solve, but you think someone with expertise in another field or better programming skills could, then it’s probably solvable with AI.

A lot of problems don’t fall into that category. I’ve seen people talking online about AI solving quantum gravity, but solving quantum gravity is a question of which bullets you’re willing to bite, not a question of technical skill. That doesn’t mean AI will never be able to address it, but if so it will come from some sort of superpersuader aspect, not merely scientific capabilities.

And of course, some fields do require experiments. People are increasingly building AI-powered labs. I’ll leave it to people from actual experimental fields to think about the potential there.

Q: Can you say something explicit about the bigger risks from AI, now?

A: As I mention in the post, I didn’t learn that much about the bigger questions from this. I’m still not an expert.

But there’s one thing I think is worth emphasizing:

This technology is clearly getting more effective over time. I don’t think they could have done this six months ago. If you’re trying to predict what will happen next, you shouldn’t just assume this is the most powerful it will get, or the cheapest. If you think there’s a limit, you need to argue for it.

Edit: One more thing I should mention, now that I’ve confirmed she’s ok with it: the idea for my challenge came from some discussions at Lancefest, a conference in honor of Lance back in June, and particularly from Anastasia Volovich, whose talk declared the nine-loop calculation “a benchmark – or a ‘challenge’ – against which any “AI takeover” should be measured”.

Amplitudes 2026

This week was Amplitudes, my old subfield’s big yearly conference. This year, it’s at Queen Mary University of London.

I’m too busy to attend these days, now that nobody is paying me a salary to do that sort of thing. But it’s still a good chance to keep up with the field, which helps me find stories. And I know I have a few readers who are interested. So I read the slides when I can, and fill you all in.

As of writing this, I’ve read through slides from the first few days of talks. I’ll likely post on the rest next week. As usual when I’m conference-blogging, this post will be quite a bit more technical than my average post, so readers beware: I’ll be mentioning a lot of amplitude-ish ideas without much explanation. I’m happy to explain in the comments if you’re curious, though!

Before I launch into talking about the content, I should mention something I’ve heard about the venue. Apparently this year registration filled up surprisingly quickly. The rumor is that the folks at Queen Mary weren’t able to find a venue with enough space to host the full community, leading to a smaller conference than usual. As the Amplitudes subfield grows, I suspect this will be more and more of a challenge. I remember back when I was organizing in 2021, rooms that could hold enough people were shockingly expensive to book. I wouldn’t be surprised if this becomes more of an issue going forward.

David Kosower opened the conference with a review of the state of the art in amplitudes for gravitational waves. I enjoyed an early slide showing how LIGO has increased in precision over the last ten years, which really helped illustrate the value that good theoretical predictions can bring as the experiment gets better. I also appreciated his attempt to get people to stop saying “post-Minkowskian” and start using a more normal term like Relativistic Perturbation Theory, though based on the other talks it doesn’t look like it’s catching on. After covering the overall state of the art (currently around four loops) he talked about his own work looking for ways to more directly get waveforms for orbiting black holes out of an amplitudes-style calculation, a theme his collaborator Donal O’Connell covered in more detail later that day. (The trick, apparently, is background fields!) Other gravitational wave-related talks came from Gustav Jakobsen, who covered four-loop results using the worldline method, Graham Brown, who explained how to calculate the Magnusian Jakobsen mentioned (it’s the log of the amplitude, basically), Canxin Shi, who talked about how a concept called Stratonovich-Weyl quantization helps explain structures that keep showing up in classical observables, Giulia Isabella, who covered a way to get six-loop contributions to gravitational waves via a wave equation, Lara Bohnenblust, who showed how to get strong-field information from a shockwave limit, and Gang Chen, whose slides were brief enough that I didn’t really get a clear idea of what he was up to. Rounding out the day were two talks that didn’t involve gravitational waves: Zihan Zhou, reporting on work with Nima on a water wave polytope called the hydrotope that they found a general formula for with help from Claude (the AI, not Duhr, to steal a recurring joke from Lancefest), and Michael Ruf, who probably snuck in due to the fact that he has done a lot of work with gravitational waves, but was reporting on a QCD calculation using a tool called Scorpio.

Tuesday had more of a QCD theme. Thomas Gehrmann gave the day’s opening review talk, where he pointed out that to get 1% precision for predictions for the LHC, we’ll likely need three-loop calculations. He pointed out the important role IR real emission calculations and improvements in parton distribution functions need to play, and pointed out that collider physics isn’t just the LHC: between reanalyses of older electron-positron collider data and the upcoming electron-ion collider and FCC, there are even more contexts where high-precision QCD will matter. Simone Zoia talked about one aspect of the current state of the art, five-particle processes involving massive particles, where the functions get strange and elliptical and one has to think hard about the methods one uses (for example, do you want canonical differential equations, or almost-canonical? Bulirsch-Stoer or AMFlow for numerics?) He also included an excellent Laplace quote, “Nature Laughs at the Difficulties of Integration”. Yang Zhang talked about a different calculational frontier, covering progress in the planar limit and with no masses, but for two-loop six-particle and three-loop five-particle scattering. The talk included some nice branding, like an “epsilon collaboration” proposing an algorithm to find epsilon forms for any Feynman integral and a program called Effortless to find symbol letters. Yang Zhang is also a skilled amateur photographer, and he mentions taking the conference photo for Amplitudes five times before. Personally, I’m surprised it’s only been five times! Dmitry Chicherin presented results bootstrapping QCD amplitudes. This was a dream of mine back in my hexagon function days, and while they aren’t quite at the point of being useful (my understanding is they’re still only getting the leading transcendentality, and none of the amplitudes they’re finding are new) it’s still pretty cool that this is even possible now. Bo Feng proposed what he claims is a general algorithm to find generating functions for IBP reduction. It’s not clear to me whether his setup bypasses the computational difficulties in existing methods (mostly involving solving large systems of equations), or whether it shifts the issue elsewhere, though. Pierre Vanhove’s talk also involved QCD, though at an effective field theory mediated step removed, with chiral perturbation theory, a theory of low-energy QCD that he used to shore up the lower energy ranges of lattice calculations for contributions to the muon anomalous magnetic moment (a natural calculation to involve him due to the presence of novel elliptic integrals). Overall, the QCD talks impressed me with the wide range of software packages mentioned, some of which already existed when I was in the field but many of which are new. I do wonder if this is just a result of many research paths maturing at the same time, or if people are finding it easier to write packages with tools like Claude Code.

The remaining three Tuesday talks were more mathematical or theoretical in focus. Henrik Johansson talked about black hole Compton scattering in N=8 supergravity, where it’s possible to use the wave equation to extract all-loop results. Cristian Vergu reported on his progress with Landau analysis. It’s been really fun watching this grow from a small reading group at NBI to what appears to be at this point quite a deep understanding, including a picture of how to understand amplitude singularities with quite a lot of breadth and detail, and the persistent hope that this could allow one to manipulate singular quantities without needing dimensional regularization. Michael Borinsky gave an update on tropicalization, where he showcased a theorem he proved demonstrating a way to compute certain classes of amplitudes in polynomial time in the loop order, even when the number of Feynman diagrams increases factorially. The examples he talked through were impressive, but I’m still a bit skeptical this could work for the Standard Model. I’d want to talk to him about it to figure it out, anyway!

Wednesday was a short day, as is tradition, to give people some time for tourism in the afternoon. Alexander Zhiboedov began the day with a talk on energy correlators in N=4 super Yang-Mills at finite coupling, where he is now able to do a bootstrap with two-sided bounds to hone in on the actual quantity even outside of the planar limit. Arthur Lipstein and Daniel Baumann both talked about cosmological correlators, the former with amplitudeologists’ favorite toy model of the conformally coupled scalar and the latter with Yang-Mills and gravity in de Sitter space. Dave Dunbar closed the day with a historical talk, walking through the milestone amplitudes papers before the Amplitudes conference existed. It’s the kind of talk he could have given at Lancefest the week before if others hadn’t already covered the material!

I’ll cover the rest of the conference (Thursday and Friday) in next week’s post, so see you then!

ArXiv Will Ban You for Hallucinated References

Thomas Dietterich, Chair of the Computer Science section of the preprint server arXiv.org, recently clarified the site’s policies towards “hallucinated” citations and other signs of careless use of AI in a post on X. If your paper contains a citation to a paper that doesn’t actually exist, or has other signs you didn’t read it before posting like leftover commentary (the example he gave was “here is a 200 word summary; would you like me to make any changes?”), then you can get banned from the arXiv for one year. Even after that year you’d be on a kind of “probation”, and would need to show that your next few papers had been accepted by peer-reviewed journals first before posting them.

At the risk of saying the obvious, this is a good idea! arXiv isn’t peer review, it isn’t meant to judge the value of the papers it hosts. But it still needs to be a useful place for scientists to post their papers, which is why they try to keep spam and irrelevant content to a minimum. If you don’t actually endorse the content of a paper, you shouldn’t post it in the first place.

That said, the whole existence of hallucinated citations on arXiv feels a little silly. It makes sense for academic journals and preprint servers in other fields. But arXiv was the first site of its kind for a reason. Its users, physicists, mathematicians, and computer scientists, don’t need much hand-holding when it comes to computers. Papers submitted to arXiv aren’t typically written in Word, they’re written in a document-writing language called LaTeX, that lets users make decently-formatted papers without help from a journal. Physicist-written code may be terrible by any reasonable criteria…but it exists, much more universally than for example biologist-written code.

This extends to citations. In my old field, there is a database called INSPIRE that updates automatically from arXiv. Click on a paper, and a handy “cite” link gives you standardized citations in several formats, ready to copy and paste into your LaTeX code. Nearly every citation in my papers is copied from there. The ones that aren’t are either from other fields where I didn’t know of that style of database, or things that haven’t been published (this can be manuscripts in preparation, or personal communications).

All of this, though, feels like a lot less than what the field could be doing. In a world where almost everyone posts their papers to the same website, and almost everyone has at least a rudimentary understanding of programming…why are people still writing citations in free-form text in the first place? Why aren’t citations built in to the submitted papers on arXiv, automatically linked to the papers they cite? Why don’t we have a setup where, except for a small number of “special” citations, every citation is built so that it automatically goes to a real paper, and gives a clear error message if it doesn’t? In short, why are hallucinated citations even possible?

Look, I’m naive, I get that. I believe in automation, not in the modern context of LLMs and other heuristics, but in setting clear procedures and building clear rules. The world doesn’t work that way! The clear rules are always more contentious than you expect, the fuzzy human-led version always the only choice people can agree on.

But still. Citations. There has to be a better system, right?

ArXiv to Leave Cornell

Yes, I’m late to the party on this one.

A few weeks ago, arXiv.org announced that it will be leaving Cornell, the university that currently manages it, and establishing its own nonprofit.

arXiv is a crucial part of the infrastructure for physics, mathematics, computer science, and a few related fields. Researchers post papers to arXiv as what are called “preprints” before the papers are submitted to a journal. In practice, nobody ends up reading the journal versions: the arXiv is free to access, and typically reflects better what the paper’s authors want the paper to look like. So in practice, arXiv is how researchers in these fields communicate, which makes its role enormously important.

If you’re from another field, you might wonder how something like arXiv is financially sustainable. The answer is that it works better than you’d think, but not perfectly. They’ve been supported by philanthropy, in addition to Cornell, and while there have apparently been budget shortfalls and drama behind the scenes, But nonetheless, arXiv has stayed in continuous operation since 1991.

The move to an independent nonprofit is supposed to make it easier for arXiv to get philanthropic funding, which otherwise needed to be filtered through Cornell in ways that were sometimes opaque or didn’t give donors the control they wanted.

While it wasn’t mentioned in the announcements, I suspect another motivation is security. Universities are fixed in place, and that makes them easier to pressure. For an organization that wants to process scientific output in an unbiased way, the link to Cornell represented a vulnerability. It’s not a vulnerability that has mattered yet, and likely didn’t seem like it would ever matter. But it wouldn’t surprise me if they’re more worried now that someone might try to pressure Cornell in order to change how arXiv operates. For critical scientific infrastructure, it’s important to be as independent of those kinds of pressure as possible.

Hypothesis: If AI Is Bad at Originality, It’s a Documentation Problem

Recently, a few people have asked me about this paper.

A couple weeks back, OpenAI announced a collaboration with a group of amplitudes researchers, physicists who study the types of calculations people do to make predictions at particle colliders. The amplitudes folks had identified an interesting loophole, finding a calculation that many would have expected to be zero actually gave a nonzero answer. They did the calculation for different examples involving more and more particles, and got some fairly messy answers. They suspected, as amplitudes researchers always expect, that there was a simpler formula, one that worked for any number of particles. But they couldn’t find it.

Then a former amplitudes researcher at OpenAI suggested that they use AI to find it.

“Use AI” can mean a lot of different things, and most of them don’t look much like the way the average person talks to ChatGPT. This was closer than most. They were using “reasoning models”, loops that try to predict the next few phrases in a “chain of thought” again and again and again. Using that kind of tool, they were able to find that simpler formula, and mathematically prove that it was correct.

A few of you are hoping for an in-depth post about what they did, and its implications. This isn’t that. I’m still figuring out if I’ll be writing that for an actual news site, for money, rather than free, for you folks.

Instead, I want to talk about a specific idea I’ve seen crop up around the paper.

See, for some, the existence of a result like this isn’t all that surprising.

Mathematicians have been experimenting with reasoning models for a bit, now. Recently, a group published a systematic study, setting the AI loose on a database of minor open problems proposed by the famously amphetamine-fueled mathematician Paul Erdös. The AI managed to tackle a few of the problems, sometimes by identifying existing solutions that had not yet been linked to the problem database, but sometimes by proofs that appeared to be new.

The Erdös problems solved by the AI were not especially important. Neither was the problem solved by the amplitudes researchers, as far as I can tell at this point.

But I get the impression the amplitudes problem was a bit more interesting than the Erdös problems. The difference, so far, has mostly been attributed to human involvement. This amplitudes paper started because human amplitudes researchers found an interesting loophole, and only after that used the AI. Unlike the mathematicians, they weren’t just searching a database.

This lines up with a general point, one people tend to make much less carefully. It’s often said that, unlike humans, AI will never be truly creative. It can solve mechanical problems, do things people have done before, but it will never be good at having truly novel ideas.

To me, that line of thinking goes a bit too far. I suspect it’s right on one level, that it will be hard for any of these reasoning models to propose anything truly novel. But if so, I think it will be for a different reason.

The thing is, creativity is not as magical as we make it out to be. Our ideas, scientific or artistic, don’t just come from the gods. They recombine existing ideas, shuffling them in ways more akin to randomness than miracle. They’re then filtered through experience, deep heuristics honed over careers. Some people are good at ideas, and some are bad at them. Having ideas takes work, and there are things people do to improve their ideas. Nothing about creativity suggests it should be impossible to mechanize.

However, a machine trained on text won’t necessarily know how to do any of that.

That’s because in science, we don’t write down our inspirations. By the time a result gets into a scientific paper or textbook, it’s polished and refined into a pure argument, cutting out most of the twists and turns that were an essential part of the creative process. Mathematics is even worse, most math papers don’t even mention the motivation behind the work, let alone the path taken to the paper.

This lack of documentation makes it hard for students, making success much more a function of having the right mentors to model good practices, rather than being able to pick them up from literature everyone can access. I suspect it makes it even harder for language models. And if today’s language model-based reasoning tools are bad at that crucial, human-seeming step, of coming up with the right idea at the right time? I think that has more to do with this lack of documentation, than with the fact that they’re “statistical parrots”.

School Facts and Research Facts

As you grow up, teachers try to teach you how the world works. This is more difficult than it sounds, because teaching you something is a much harder goal than just telling you something. A teacher wants you to remember what you’re told. They want you to act on it, and to generalize it. And they want you to do this not just for today’s material, but to set a foundation for next year, and the next. They’re setting you up for progress through a whole school system, with its own expectations.

Because of that, not everything a teacher tells you is, itself, a fact about the world. Some things you hear from teachers are liked the scaffolds on a building. They’re facts that only make sense in the context of school, support that lets you build to a point where you can learn other facts, and throw away the school facts that got you there.

Not every student uses all of that scaffolding, though. The scaffold has to be complete enough that some students can use it to go on, getting degrees in science or mathematics, and eventually becoming researchers where they use facts more deeply linked to the real world. But most students don’t become researchers. So the scaffold sits there, unused. And many people, as their lives move on, mistake the scaffold for the real world.

Here’s an example. How do you calculate something like this?

3+4\div (3-1)\times 5

From school, you might remember order of operations, or PEMDAS. First parentheses, then exponents, multiplication, division, addition, and finally subtraction. If you ran into that calculation in school, you could easily work it out.

But out of school, in the real world? Trick question, you never calculate something like that to begin with.

When I wrote this post, I had to look up how to write \div and \times. In the research world, people are far more likely to run into calculations like this:

3+5\frac{4}{3-1}

Here, it’s easier to keep track of what order you need to do things. In other situations, you might be writing a computer program (or an Excel spreadsheet formula, which is also a computer program). Then you follow that programming language’s rules for order of operations, which may or may not match PEMDAS.

PEMDAS was taught to you in school for good reason. It got you used to following rules to understand notation, and gave you tools the teachers needed to teach you other things. But it isn’t a fact about the universe. It’s a fact about school.

Once you start looking around for these “school facts”, they show up everywhere.

Are there really “three states of matter”, solid, liquid, and gas? Or four, if you add plasma? Well, sort of. There are real scientific definitions for solids, liquids, gases, and plasmas, and they play a real role in how people model big groups of atoms, “matter” in a quite specific sense. But they can’t be used to describe literally everything. If you start asking what state of matter light or spacetime is, you’ve substituted a simplification that was useful for school (“everything is one of three states of matter”) for the actual facts in the real world.

If you remember a bit further, maybe you remember there are two types of things, matter and energy? You might have even heard that matter and antimatter annihilate into energy. These are also just school facts, though. “Energy” isn’t something things are made of, it’s a property things have. Instead, your teachers were building scaffolding for understanding the difference between massive and massless particles, or between dark matter and dark energy. Each of those uses different concepts of matter and energy, and each in turn is different than the concept of matter in its states of solid, liquid, and gas. But in school, you need a consistent scaffold to learn, not a mess of different definitions for different applications. So unless you keep going past school, you don’t learn that.

Physics in school likes to work with forces, and forces do sometimes make an appearance in the real world, for example for engineers. But if you’re asking a question about fundamental physics, like “is gravity really a force?”, then you’re treating a school fact as if it was a research fact. Fundamental physics doesn’t care about forces in the same way. It uses different mathematical tools, like Lagrangians and Hamiltonians, to calculate the motion of objects in systems, and uses “force” in a pop science way to describe fundamental interactions.

If you get good enough at this, you can spot which things you learned in school were likely just scaffolding “school facts”, and which are firm enough that they may hold further. Any simple division of the world into categories is likely a school fact, one that let you do exercises on your homework but gets much more complicated when the real world gets involved. Contradictory or messy concepts are usually another sign, showing something fuzzy used to get students comfortable rather than something precise enough for professionals to use. Keep an eye out, and even if you don’t yet know the real facts, you’ll know enough to know what you’re missing.

Energy Is That Which Is Conserved

In school, kids learn about different types of energy. They learn about solar energy and wind energy, nuclear energy and chemical energy, electrical energy and mechanical energy, and potential energy and kinetic energy. They learn that energy is conserved, that it can never be created or destroyed, but only change form. They learn that energy makes things happen, that you can use energy to do work, that energy is different from matter.

Some, between good teaching and good students, manage to impose order on the jumble of concepts and terms. Others end up envisioning the whole story a bit like Pokemon, with different types of some shared “stuff”.

Energy isn’t “stuff”, though. So what is it? What relates all these different types of things?

Energy is something which is conserved.

The mathematician Emmy Noether showed that, when the laws of physics are symmetrical, they come with a conserved quantity. For example, because the laws of the physics are the same from place to place, momentum is conserved. Similarly, because the laws of physics are the same from one time to another, Noether’s theorem states that there must be some quantity related to time, some number we can calculate, that is conserved, even as other things change. We call that number energy.

If energy is that simple, why are there all those types?

Energy is a number we can calculate. It’s a number we can calculate for different things. If you have a detailed description of how something in physics works, you can use that description to calculate that thing’s energy. In school, you memorize formulas like \frac{1}{2}m v^2 and m g h. These are all formulas that, with a bit more knowledge, you could calculate. They are the things that, for a something that meets the conditions, are conserved. They are things that, according to Noether’s theorem, stay the same.

Because of this, you shouldn’t think of energy as a substance, or a fuel. Energy is something we can do: we physicists, and we students of physics. We can take a physical system, and see what about it ought to be conserved. Energy is an action, a calculation, a conceptual tool that can be used to make predictions.

Most things are, in the end.

Some Dumb AI Ideas

Sometimes, when I write a post about AI, I’ve been sitting on an idea for a long time. I’ve talked to experts, I’ve tried to understand the math, I’ve honed my points and cleared away clutter.

This is not one of those times. The ideas in this post almost certainly have something deeply wrong with them. But hopefully they’re interesting food for thought.

My first dumb idea: instruction tuning was a mistake.

I’m drawing the seeds of this one from a tumblr post by nostalgebraist, someone known for making a popular bot trained on his tumblr posts in the early days before GPT became ChatGPT.

AIs like ChatGPT are based on Large Language Models, insanely complicated mathematical formulas that predict, given part of a text, what the rest of that text is likely to look like. In the early days, this was largely how they were used. Loosely described nostalgebraist’s bot, called nostalgebraist-autoresponder, began with a list of tumblr posts and asks and determines what additional posts would best fit in.

If you think about it, though, ChatGPT doesn’t really work like that. ChatGPT has conversations: you send it messages, it sends you responses. The text it creates is a dialogue, with you supplying half the input. But most texts aren’t dialogues, and ChatGPT draws on a lot of non-dialogue texts to make its dialogue-like responses.

The reason it does this is something called instruction tuning. ChatGPT has been intentionally biased, not to give the most likely completion to a task in general, but to give completions that fit this dialogue genre. What I didn’t know until I read nostalgebraist’s post was that this genre was defined artificially: AI researchers made up fake dialogues with AI, cheesy sci-fi conversations imagining how an AI might respond to instructions from a user, and then biased the Large Language Model so that rather than giving the most likely text in general, it gives a text that is more likely to look like these cheesy sci-fi conversations. It’s why ChatGPT sounds kind of like a fictional robot: not because sci-fi writers accurately predicted what AI would sound like, but because AI was created based on sci-fi texts.

For nostalgebraist, this leads into an interesting reflection of how a sci-fi AI should behave, how being warped around a made-up genre without history or depth creates characters which act according to simple narratives and express surprising anxiety.

For myself, though, I can’t help but wonder if the goal of dialogue itself is the problem. Dialogue is clearly important commercially: people use ChatGPT because they can chat with it. But Large Language Models aren’t inherently chatbots: they produce plausible texts, of any sort you could imagine. People seem to want a machine that can, for example, answer scientific questions as part of a conversation. But most competent answers to scientific questions aren’t conversations, they’re papers. If people stuck with the “raw” model, producing excerpts of nonexistent papers rather than imitating a dialogue with a non-existent expert, wouldn’t you expect the answers to be more accurate, with the model no longer biased by an irrelevant goal? Is the need to make a sell-able chatbot making these AIs worse at everything else people are trying to use them for?

I’m imagining a world where, instead of a chatbot, OpenAI built an “alternate universe simulator”. You give it some context, some texts or parts of texts from a universe you made up, and it completes them in a plausible way. By imagining different universes, you can use it to answer different questions. Such a gimmick would get fewer customers, and fewer investors, it would probably do worse. But I have to wonder if the actual technology might have been more useful.

My second idea is dumber, to the point where I mostly know why it doesn’t work. But thinking about it might help clarify how things work for people unused to AI.

I saw someone point out that, unlike something like Wikipedia, AI doesn’t give you context. You shouldn’t trust Wikipedia, or a source you find on Google, blindly. If you want to, you can look through the edit history on Wikipedia, or figure out who wrote a page you found on Google and how. If ChatGPT tells you something, by default you don’t know where that knowledge came from. You can tell it to search, and then you’ll get links, but that’s because it’s using Google or the like behind the scenes anyway. You don’t know where the model is getting its ideas.

Why couldn’t we get that context, though?

Every text produced by a Large Language Model is causally dependent on its training data. Different data, different model, different text. That doesn’t mean that each text draws from one source, or just a few sources: ChatGPT isn’t copying the training data, at least not so literally.

But it does mean that, if ChatGPT says something is true, you should in principle be able to ask which data was most important in making it say that. If you leave a piece of data out of the training, and get similar answers, you can infer that the response you got doesn’t have much to do with that piece of data. But if you leave out a text in training, and now ChatGPT gives totally different responses to the same question…then there’s a pretty meaningful sense that it got the information from that source.

If this were the type of non-AI statistical model people use in physics, this would be straightforward. Researchers do this all the time: take one experiment out of the data, see how their analysis changes, and thereby figure out which experiments are most important to check. One can even sometimes calculate, given a model, where you should look.

Unfortunately, you can’t do this with ChatGPT. The model is just too big. You can’t calculate anything explicitly about it, the giant mathematical formulas behind it are so complicated that the most you can do is get probabilities out case by case, you can’t “unwind” them and see where the numbers come from. And you can’t just take out sources one by one, and train the model again: not when training takes months of expensive computer time.

So unlike with the previous idea, I understand even on a technical level why you can’t do this. But it helped me to be able to think about what I would like to do, if it were possible. Maybe it helps you too!

Amplitudes 2025 This Week

Summer is conference season for academics, and this week held my old sub-field’s big yearly conference, called Amplitudes. This year, it was in Seoul at Seoul National University, the first time the conference has been in Asia.

(I wasn’t there, I don’t go to these anymore. But I’ve been skimming slides in my free time, to give you folks the updates you crave. Be forewarned that conference posts like these get technical fast, I’ll be back to my usual accessible self next week.)

There isn’t a huge amplitudes community in Korea, but it’s bigger than it was back when I got started in the field. Of the organizers, Kanghoon Lee of the Asia Pacific Center for Theoretical Physics and Sangmin Lee of Seoul National University have what I think of as “core amplitudes interests”, like recursion relations and the double-copy. The other Korean organizers are from adjacent areas, work that overlaps with amplitudes but doesn’t show up at the conference each year. There was also a sizeable group of organizers from Taiwan, where there has been a significant amplitudes presence for some time now. I do wonder if Korea was chosen as a compromise between a conference hosted in Taiwan or in mainland China, where there is also quite a substantial amplitudes community.

One thing that impresses me every year is how big, and how sophisticated, the gravitational-wave community in amplitudes has grown. Federico Buccioni’s talk began with a plot that illustrates this well (though that wasn’t his goal):

At the conference Amplitudes, dedicated to the topic of scattering amplitudes, there were almost as many talks with the phrase “black hole” in the title as there were with “scattering” or “amplitudes”! This is for a topic that did not even exist in the subfield when I got my PhD eleven years ago.

With that said, gravitational wave astronomy wasn’t quite as dominant at the conference as Buccioni’s bar chart suggests. There were a few talks each day on the topic: I counted seven in total, excluding any short talks on the subject in the gong show. Spinning black holes were a significant focus, central to Jung-Wook Kim’s, Andres Luna’s and Mao Zeng’s talks (the latter two showing some interesting links between the amplitudes story and classic ideas in classical mechanics) and relevant in several others, with Riccardo Gonzo, Miguel Correia, Ira Rothstein, and Enrico Herrmann’s talks showing not just a wide range of approaches, but an increasing depth of research in this area.

Herrmann’s talk in particular dealt with detector event shapes, a framework that lets physicists think more directly about what a specific particle detector or observer can see. He applied the idea not just to gravitational waves but to quantum gravity and collider physics as well. The latter is historically where this idea has been applied the most thoroughly, as highlighted in Hua Xing Zhu’s talk, where he used them to pick out particular phenomena of interest in QCD.

QCD is, of course, always of interest in the amplitudes field. Buccioni’s talk dealt with the theory’s behavior at high-energies, with a nice example of the “maximal transcendentality principle” where some quantities in QCD are identical to quantities in N=4 super Yang-Mills in the “most transcendental” pieces (loosely, those with the highest powers of pi). Andrea Guerreri’s talk also dealt with high-energy behavior in QCD, trying to address an experimental puzzle where QCD results appeared to violate a fundamental bound all sensible theories were expected to obey. By using S-matrix bootstrap techniques, they clarify the nature of the bound, finding that QCD still obeys it once correctly understood, and conjecture a weird theory that should be possible to frame right on the edge of the bound. The S-matrix bootstrap was also used by Alexandre Homrich, who talked about getting the framework to work for multi-particle scattering.

Heribertus Bayu Hartanto is another recent addition to Korea’s amplitudes community. He talked about a concrete calculation, two-loop five-particle scattering including top quarks, a tricky case that includes elliptic curves.

When amplitudes lead to integrals involving elliptic curves, many standard methods fail. Jake Bourjaily’s talk raised a question he has brought up again and again: what does it mean to do an integral for a new type of function? One possible answer is that it depends on what kind of numerics you can do, and since more general numerical methods can be cumbersome one often needs to understand the new type of function in more detail. In light of that, Stephen Jones’ talk was interesting in taking a common problem often cited with generic approaches (that they have trouble with the complex numbers introduced by Minkowski space) and finding a more natural way in a particular generic approach (sector decomposition) to take them into account. Giulio Salvatori talked about a much less conventional numerical method, linked to the latest trend in Nima-ology, surfaceology. One of the big selling points of the surface integral framework promoted by people like Salvatori and Nima Arkani-Hamed is that it’s supposed to give a clear integral to do for each scattering amplitude, one which should be amenable to a numerical treatment recently developed by Michael Borinsky. Salvatori can currently apply the method only to a toy model (up to ten loops!), but he has some ideas for how to generalize it, which will require handling divergences and numerators.

Other approaches to the “problem of integration” included Anna-Laura Sattelberger’s talk that presented a method to find differential equations for the kind of integrals that show up in amplitudes using the mathematical software Macaulay2, including presenting a package. Matthias Wilhelm talked about the work I did with him, using machine learning to find better methods for solving integrals with integration-by-parts, an area where two other groups have now also published. Pierpaolo Mastrolia talked about integration-by-parts’ up-and-coming contender, intersection theory, a method which appears to be delving into more mathematical tools in an effort to catch up with its competitor.

Sometimes, one is more specifically interested in the singularities of integrals than their numerics more generally. Felix Tellander talked about a geometric method to pin these down which largely went over my head, but he did have a very nice short description of the approach: “Describe the singularities of the integrand. Find a map representing integration. Map the singularities of the integrand onto the singularities of the integral.”

While QCD and gravity are the applications of choice, amplitudes methods germinate in N=4 super Yang-Mills. Ruth Britto’s talk opened the conference with an overview of progress along those lines before going into her own recent work with one-loop integrals and interesting implications of ideas from cluster algebras. Cluster algebras made appearances in several other talks, including Anastasia Volovich’s talk which discussed how ideas from that corner called flag cluster algebras may give insights into QCD amplitudes, though some symbol letters still seem to be hard to track down. Matteo Parisi covered another idea, cluster promotion maps, which he thinks may help pin down algebraic symbol letters.

The link between cluster algebras and symbol letters is an ongoing mystery where the field is seeing progress. Another symbol letter mystery is antipodal duality, where flipping an amplitude like a palindrome somehow gives another valid amplitude. Lance Dixon has made progress in understanding where this duality comes from, finding a toy model where it can be understood and proved.

Others pushed the boundaries of methods specific to N=4 super Yang-Mills, looking for novel structures. Song He’s talk pushes an older approach by Bourjaily and collaborators up to twelve loops, finding new patterns and connections to other theories and observables. Qinglin Yang bootstraps Wilson loops with a Lagrangian insertion, adding a side to the polygon used in previous efforts and finding that, much like when you add particles to amplitudes in a bootstrap, the method gets stricter and more powerful. Jaroslav Trnka talked about work he has been doing with “negative geometries”, an odd method descended from the amplituhedron that looks at amplitudes from a totally different perspective, probing a bit of their non-perturbative data. He’s finding more parts of that setup that can be accessed and re-summed, finding interestingly that multiple-zeta-values show up in quantities where we know they ultimately cancel out. Livia Ferro also talked about a descendant of the amplituhedron, this time for cosmology, getting differential equations for cosmological observables in a particular theory from a combinatorial approach.

Outside of everybody’s favorite theories, some speakers talked about more general approaches to understanding the differences between theories. Andreas Helset covered work on the geometry of the space of quantum fields in a theory, applying the method to a general framework for characterizing deviations from the standard model called the SMEFT. Jasper Roosmale Nepveu also talked about a general space of theories, thinking about how positivity (a trait linked to fundamental constraints like causality and unitarity) gets tangled up with loop effects, and the implications this has for renormalization.

Soft theorems, universal behavior of amplitudes when a particle has low energy, continue to be a trendy topic, with Silvia Nagy showing how the story continues to higher orders and Sangmin Choi investigating loop effects. Callum Jones talks about one of the more powerful results from the soft limit, Weinberg’s theorem showing the uniqueness of gravity. Weinberg’s proof was set up in Minkowski space, but we may ultimately live in curved, de Sitter space. Jones showed how the ideas Weinberg explored generalize in de Sitter, using some tools from the soft-theorem-inspired field of dS/CFT. Julio Parra-Martinez, meanwhile, tied soft theorems to another trendy topic, higher symmetries, a more general notion of the usual types of symmetries that physicists have explored in the past. Lucia Cordova reported work that was not particularly connected to soft theorems but was connected to these higher symmetries, showing how they interact with crossing symmetry and the S-matrix bootstrap.

Finally, a surprisingly large number of talks linked to Kevin Costello and Natalie Paquette’s work with self-dual gauge theories, where they found exact solutions from a fairly mathy angle. Paquette gave an update on her work on the topic, while Alfredo Guevara talked about applications to black holes, comparing the power of expanding around a self-dual gauge theory to that of working with supersymmetry. Atul Sharma looked at scattering in self-dual backgrounds in work that merges older twistor space ideas with the new approach, while Roland Bittelson talked about calculating around an instanton background.


Also, I had another piece up this week at FirstPrinciples, based on an interview with the (outgoing) president of the Sloan Foundation. I won’t have a “bonus info” post for this one, as most of what I learned went into the piece. But if you don’t know what the Sloan Foundation does, take a look! I hadn’t known they funded Jupyter notebooks and Hidden Figures, or that they introduced Kahneman and Tversky.