Tag Archives: particle physics

Breakthrough Prize 2026

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Because of last week’s “bonus info” post, I’m only now getting around to commenting on this year’s Breakthrough Prizes in Fundamental Physics. While I don’t comment on them every year, I know enough about several of this year’s winners that I figured a post would be helpful.

For those who haven’t heard of it, the Breakthrough Prizes are a bit like the Nobel, if it was created by a 21st century rich person instead of a 19th century one. They give out more money, and instead of an organization like the Swedish Academy of Sciences they pick winners via a committee of past winners. They’re more flexible in structure than the Nobel, with extra prizes for early-career researchers and a tendency to reward accomplishments that are either entirely theoretical or solid experimental work that doesn’t show a new discovery, both of which are things the Nobel Prize is structured to avoid. They’ve also shown willingness to reward large collaborations, rather than following the Nobel’s informal rule to only give the award to three people at a time.

This last was on display this year in their main award in physics this year, for the muon g-2 collaborations. The award is going to collaborations of scientists and engineers at three different particle colliders, for work done over a span of over fifty years to measure the magnetic properties of the muon. These measurements have shown a tantalizing discrepancy with predictions that inspired many to conjecture new physics. However, in the last few years it’s looked more and more like the discrepancy was due to an imprecise prediction, and better methods seem to be converging to the experimental value. At this point, smart money is that there is no disagreement with the Standard Model here, but as always in science there’s a chance some mystery remains.

The Breakthrough Prize also offered a special, out-of-schedule prize to David Gross. Already a Nobel laureate, Gross had a crucial role in our understanding of the force of quantum chromodynamics that binds protons and neutrons together. He was also a major founding figure in string theory, and since the Breakthrough Prize is more comfortable recognizing theoretical contributions they get to mention this as well. Gross is also known in the community for his personality, which tends to fill up any room he’s in. I can only imagine the conversations that led to Breakthrough’s decision to add a special prize for him this year.

Breakthrough is also adding a new recurring prize, the Vera Rubin New Frontiers Prize, honoring women who make important contributions to physics within two years of their PhD. The prize is a bit smaller than the exiting early-career New Horizons in Physics Prizes, presumably because it goes to even younger researchers. This year’s winner is from my old field, scattering amplitudes. Carolina Figueiredo is part of the latest evolution of the research program behind the amplituhedron. The new framework of “surfaceology” seems like a promising geometry-flavored way to understand particle physics calculations in more realistic theories, and unlike its predecessors may have some practical value eventually as well. Congrats Carolina!

Finally, the New Horizons in Physics Prizes are for impressive early-career researchers. I don’t know much about the first recipient, Benjamin Safdi, who works on searches for axions and axion-like particles, today’s most trendy dark matter candidate. I know a bit more about the work done by Clay Córdova, Thomas Dumitrescu, Shu-Heng Shao, and Yifan Wang, having met several of them in my physics career. They work on what are called generalized symmetries, concepts which go beyond the usual idea of how symmetry is supposed to work by involving more complicated tensors. I saw these crop up a fair bit in talks, but they were distant enough from my area that I never had a particularly clear grasp of what people were doing with them. I know even less about the work of the last three, Dillon Brout, J. Colin Hill, Mathew Madhavacheril, Maria Vincenzi, Daniel Scolnic, and W. L. Kimmy Wu, on cosmological measurements, but I was friends with Mathew in grad school and am impressed that he’s now working on cosmology given how little cosmology research there was at Stony Brook at the time.

A Window on Absolutely Everything

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It’s often said that in quantum physics, everything that can happen will happen.

One way this comes up is in something called a path integral, used to calculate the probabilities of quantum events. If you want to find what happens to a particle traveling from point A to point B, you have to add up a contribution for every path, no matter how windy, that goes between A and B. These contributions mostly cancel out, and matter less the further they are from a straight line, so the straight-line path is, for the most part, a good description of what happens. But in principle, all of the other paths matter too.

The same thing happens in quantum field theory, in more elaborate form. Instead of a path from one place to another, the paths are from one configuration of quantum fields to another, via all the different ways fields can in principle interact. We are almost never able to take account of all these possibilities mathematically, so we have to approximate, organizing the interactions into more and more complicated pictures called Feynman diagrams, each with a smaller and smaller effect.

In principle, these diagrams need to contain every single combination of interactions that might result in the end-state we’re interested in. These combinations can have a Rube Goldberg flavor, with one field activating another, which activates another, only to all cancel out in the end. Because of this, any field that exists, any particle no matter how rare, can matter, if only a little.

And from that, physicists can learn something.

Because absolutely everything matters, physicists get to reason about absolutely everything that exists.

The best example involves something called an anomaly. These aren’t the anomalies of experimental physics, unexpected results that have a tendency to go away with better measurements. Instead of something unexpected, a theorist’s anomaly is something impossible.

Anomalies are combinations of particles that, if they were to show up together in a sum of Feynman diagrams, would break the rules that the theory was made with in the first place. If they show up, they’re a sign of an inconsistent theory, one that doesn’t obey its own rules and thus doesn’t make sense.

In order to have a theory without anomalies, different calculations involving different particles need to cancel. For example, it might be that the charge of different particles has to add up to zero. This means that if you’ve only discovered a few particles, and their charges don’t add up to zero, then you know you’re missing one. There is an extra particle there, which you haven’t observed, that together makes charge add up to zero.

This logic actually works! It was used to predict the top quark. Before the top quark was discovered, the list of quarks, electrons, and neutrinos had electric charges that didn’t add up to zero. One particle was missing, with the same charge as the up quark and charm quark. It was found in 1995, after being proposed almost 20 years earlier.

About the OpenAI Amplitudes Paper, but Not as Much as You’d Like

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I’ve had a bit more time to dig in to the paper I mentioned last week, where OpenAI collaborated with amplitudes researchers, using one of their internal models to find and prove a simplified version of a particle physics formula. I figured I’d say a bit about my own impressions from reading the paper and OpenAI’s press release.

This won’t be a real “deep dive”, though it will be long nonetheless. As it turns out, most of the questions I’d like answers to aren’t answered in the paper or the press release. Getting them will involve actual journalistic work, i.e. blocking off time to interview people, and I haven’t done that yet. What I can do is talk about what I know so far, and what I’m still wondering.

Context:

Scattering amplitudes are formulas used by particle physicists to make predictions. For a while, people would just calculate these when they needed them, writing down pages of mess that you could plug in numbers to to get answers. However, forty years ago two physicists decided they wanted more, writing “we hope to obtain a simplified form for the answer, making our result not only an experimentalist’s, but a theorist’s delight.”

In their next paper, they managed to find that “theorist’s delight”: a simplified, intuitive-looking answer that worked for calculations involving any number of particles, summarizing many different calculations. Ten years later, a few people had started building on it, and ten years after that, the big shots started paying attention. A whole subfield, “amplitudeology”, grew from that seed, finding new forms of “theorists’s delight” in scattering amplitudes.

Each subfield has its own kind of “theory of victory”, its own concept for what kind of research is most likely to yield progress. In amplitudes, it’s these kinds of simplifications. When they work out well, they yield new, more efficient calculation techniques, yielding new messy results which can be simplified once more. To one extent or another, most of the field is chasing after those situations when simplification works out well.

That motivation shapes both the most ambitious projects of senior researchers, and the smallest student projects. Students often spend enormous amounts of time looking for a nice formula for something and figuring out how to generalize it, often on a question suggested by a senior researcher. These projects mostly serve as training, but occasionally manage to uncover something more impressive and useful, an idea others can build around.

I’m mentioning all of this, because as far as I can tell, what ChatGPT and the OpenAI internal model contributed here roughly lines up with the roles students have on amplitudes papers. In fact, it’s not that different from the role one of the authors, Alfredo Guevara, had when I helped mentor him during his Master’s.

Senior researchers noticed something unusual, suggested by prior literature. They decided to work out the implications, did some calculations, and got some messy results. It wasn’t immediately clear how to clean up the results, or generalize them. So they waited, and eventually were contacted by someone eager for a research project, who did the work to get the results into a nice, general form. Then everyone publishes together on a shared paper.

How impressed should you be?

I said, “as far as I can tell” above. What’s annoying is that this paper makes it hard to tell.

If you read through the paper, they mention AI briefly in the introduction, saying they used GPT-5.2 Pro to conjecture formula (39) in the paper, and an OpenAI internal model to prove it. The press release actually goes into more detail, saying that the humans found formulas (29)-(32), and GPT-5.2 Pro found a special case where it could simplify them to formulas (35)-(38), before conjecturing (39). You can get even more detail from an X thread by one of the authors, OpenAI Research Scientist Alex Lupsasca. Alex had done his PhD with another one of the authors, Andrew Strominger, and was excited to apply the tools he was developing at OpenAI to his old research field. So they looked for a problem, and tried out the one that ended up in the paper.

What is missing, from the paper, press release, and X thread, is any real detail about how the AI tools were used. We don’t have the prompts, or the output, or any real way to assess how much input came from humans and how much from the AI.

(We have more for their follow-up paper, where Lupsasca posted a transcript of the chat.)

Contra some commentators, I don’t think the authors are being intentionally vague here. They’re following business as usual. In a theoretical physics paper, you don’t list who did what, or take detailed account of how you came to the results. You clean things up, and create a nice narrative. This goes double if you’re aiming for one of the most prestigious journals, which tend to have length limits.

This business-as-usual approach is ok, if frustrating, for the average physics paper. It is, however, entirely inappropriate for a paper showcasing emerging technologies. For a paper that was going to be highlighted this highly by OpenAI, the question of how they reached their conclusion is much more interesting than the results themselves. And while I wouldn’t ask them to go to the standards of an actual AI paper, with ablation analysis and all that jazz, they could at least have aimed for the level of detail of my final research paper, which gave samples of the AI input and output used in its genetic algorithm.

For the moment, then, I have to guess what input the AI had, and what it actually accomplished.

Let’s focus on the work done by the internal OpenAI model. The descriptions I’ve seen suggest that it started where GPT-5.2 Pro did, with formulas (29)-(32), but with a more specific prompt that guided what it was looking for. It then ran for 12 hours with no additional input, and both conjectured (39) and proved it was correct, providing essentially the proof that follows formula (39) in the paper.

Given that, how impressed should we be?

First, the model needs to decide to go to a specialized region, instead of trying to simplify the formula in full generality. I don’t know whether they prompted their internal model explicitly to do this. It’s not something I’d expect a student to do, because students don’t know what types of results are interesting enough to get published, so they wouldn’t be confident in computing only a limited version of a result without an advisor telling them it was ok. On the other hand, it is actually something I’d expect an LLM to be unusually likely to do, as a result of not managing to consistently stick to the original request! What I don’t know is whether the LLM proposed this for the right reason: that if you have the formula for one region, you can usually find it for other regions.

Second, the model needs to take formulas (29)-(32), write them in the specialized region, and simplify them to formulas (35)-(38). I’ve seen a few people saying you can do this pretty easily with Mathematica. That’s true, though not every senior researcher is comfortable doing that kind of thing, as you need to be a bit smarter than just using the Simplify[] command. Most of the people on this paper strike me as pen-and-paper types who wouldn’t necessarily know how to do that. It’s definitely the kind of thing I’d expect most students to figure out, perhaps after a couple of weeks of flailing around if it’s their first crack at it. The LLM likely would not have used Mathematica, but would have used SymPy, since these “AI scientist” setups usually can write and execute Python code. You shouldn’t think of this as the AI reasoning through the calculation itself, but it at least sounds like it was reasonably quick at coding it up.

Then, the model needs to conjecture formula (39). This gets highlighted in the intro, but as many have pointed out, it’s pretty easy to do. If any non-physicists are still reading at this point, take a look:

Could you guess (39) from (35)-(38)?

After that, the paper goes over the proof that formula (39) is correct. Most of this proof isn’t terribly difficult, but the way it begins is actually unusual in an interesting way. The proof uses ideas from time-ordered perturbation theory, an old-fashioned way to do particle physics calculations. Time-ordered perturbation theory isn’t something any of the authors are known for using with regularity, but it has recently seen a resurgence in another area of amplitudes research, showing up for example in papers by Matthew Schwartz, a colleague of Strominger at Harvard.

If a student of Strominger came up with an idea drawn from time-ordered perturbation theory, that would actually be pretty impressive. It would mean that, rather than just learning from their official mentor, this student was talking to other people in the department and broadening their horizons, showing a kind of initiative that theoretical physicists value a lot.

From an LLM, though, this is not impressive in the same way. The LLM was not trained by Strominger, it did not learn specifically from Strominger’s papers. Its context suggested it was working on an amplitudes paper, and it produced an idea which would be at home in an amplitudes paper, just a different one than the one it was working on.

While not impressive, that capability may be quite useful. Academic subfields can often get very specialized and siloed. A tool that suggests ideas from elsewhere in the field could help some people broaden their horizons.

Overall, it appears that that twelve-hour OpenAI internal model run reproduced roughly what an unusually bright student would be able to contribute over the course of a several-month project. Like most student projects, you could find a senior researcher who could do the project much faster, maybe even faster than the LLM. But it’s unclear whether any of the authors could have: different senior researchers have different skillsets.

A stab at implications:

If we take all this at face-value, it looks like OpenAI’s internal model was able to do a reasonably competent student project with no serious mistakes in twelve hours. If they started selling that capability, what would happen?

If it’s cheap enough, you might wonder if professors would choose to use the OpenAI model instead of hiring students. I don’t think this would happen, though: I think it misunderstands why these kinds of student projects exist in a theoretical field. Professors sometimes use students to get results they care about, but more often, the student’s interest is itself the motivation, with the professor wanting to educate someone, to empire-build, or just to take on their share of the department’s responsibilities. AI is only useful for this insofar as AI companies continue reaching out to these people to generate press releases: once this is routinely possible, the motivation goes away.

More dangerously, if it’s even cheaper, you could imagine students being tempted to use it. The whole point of a student project is to train and acculturate the student, to get them to the point where they have affection for the field and the capability to do more impressive things. You can’t skip that, but people are going to be tempted to.

And of course, there is the broader question of how much farther this technology can go. That’s the hardest to estimate here, since we don’t know the prompts used. So I don’t know if seeing this result tells us anything more about the bigger picture than we knew going in.

Remaining questions:

At the end of the day, there are a lot of things I still want to know. And if I do end up covering this professionally, they’re things I’ll ask.

  1. What was the prompt given to the internal model, and how much did it do based on that prompt?
  2. Was it really done in one shot, no retries or feedback?
  3. How much did running the internal model cost?
  4. Is this result likely to be useful? Are there things people want to calculate that this could make easier? Recursion relations it could seed? Is it useful for SCET somehow?
  5. How easy would it have been for the authors to do what the LLM did? What about other experts in the community?

The Timeline for Replacing Theorists Is Not Technological

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Quanta Magazine recently published a reflection by Natalie Wolchover on the state of fundamental particle physics. The discussion covers a lot of ground, but one particular paragraph has gotten the lion’s share of the attention. Wolchover talked to Jared Kaplan, the ex-theoretical physicist turned co-founder of Anthropic, one of the foremost AI companies today.

Kaplan was one of Nima Arkani-Hamed’s PhD students, which adds an extra little punch.

There’s a lot to contest here. Is AI technology anywhere close to generating papers as good as the top physicists, or is that relegated to the sci-fi future? Does Kaplan really believe this, or is he just hyping up his company?

I don’t have any special insight into those questions, about the technology and Kaplan’s motivations. But I think that, even if we trusted him on the claim that AI could be generating Witten- or Nima-level papers in three years, that doesn’t mean it will replace theoretical physicists. That part of the argument isn’t a claim about the technology, but about society.

So let’s take the technological claims as given, and make them a bit more specific. Since we don’t have any objective way of judging the quality of scientific papers, let’s stick to the subjective. Today, there are a lot of people who get excited when Witten posts a new paper. They enjoy reading them, they find the insights inspiring, they love the clarity of the writing and their tendency to clear up murky ideas. They also find them reliable: the papers very rarely have mistakes, and don’t leave important questions unanswered.

Let’s use that as our baseline, then. Suppose that Anthropic had an AI workflow that could reliably write papers that were just as appealing to physicists as Witten’s papers are, for the same reasons. What happens to physicists?

Witten himself is retired, which for an academic means you do pretty much the same thing you were doing before, but now paid out of things like retirement savings and pension funds, not an institute budget. Nobody is going to fire Witten, there’s no salary to fire him from. And unless he finds these developments intensely depressing and demoralizing (possible, but very much depends on how this is presented), he’s not going to stop writing papers. Witten isn’t getting replaced.

More generally, though, I don’t think this directly results in anyone getting fired, or in universities trimming positions. The people making funding decisions aren’t just sitting on a pot of money, trying to maximize research output. They’ve got money to be spent on hires, and different pools of money to be spent on equipment, and the hires get distributed based on what current researchers at the institutes think is promising. Universities want to hire people who can get grants, to help fund the university, and absent rules about AI personhood, the AIs won’t be applying for grants.

Funding cuts might be argued for based on AI, but that will happen long before AI is performing at the Witten level. We already see this happening in other industries or government agencies, where groups that already want to cut funding are getting think tanks and consultants to write estimates that justify cutting positions, without actually caring whether those estimates are performed carefully enough to justify their conclusions. That can happen now, and doesn’t depend on technological progress.

AI could also replace theoretical physicists in another sense: the physicists themselves might use AI to do most of their work. That’s more plausible, but here adoption still heavily depends on social factors. Will people feel like they are being assessed on whether they can produce these Witten-level papers, and that only those who make them get hired, or funded? Maybe. But it will propagate unevenly, from subfield to subfield. Some areas will make their own rules forbidding AI content, there will be battles and scandals and embarrassments aplenty. It won’t be a single switch, the technology alone setting the timeline.

Finally, AI could replace theoretical physicists in another way, by people outside of academia filling the field so much that theoretical physicists have nothing more that they want to do. Some non-physicists are very passionate about physics, and some of those people have a lot of money. I’ve done writing work for one such person, whose foundation is now attempting to build an AI Physicist. If these AI Physicists get to Witten-level quality, they might start writing compelling paper after compelling paper. Those papers, though, will due to their origins be specialized. Much as philanthropists mostly fund the subfields they’ve heard of, philanthropist-funded AI will mostly target topics the people running the AI have heard are important. Much like physicists themselves adopting the technology, there will be uneven progress from subfield to subfield, inch by socially-determined inch.

In a hard-to-quantify area like progress in science, that’s all you can hope for. I suspect Kaplan got a bit of a distorted picture of how progress and merit work in theoretical physics. He studied with Nima Arkani-Hamed, who is undeniably exceptionally brilliant but also undeniably exceptionally charismatic. It must feel to a student of Nima’s that academia simply hires the best people, that it does whatever it takes to accomplish the obviously best research. But the best research is not obvious.

I think some of these people imagine a more direct replacement process, not arranged by topic and tastes, but by goals. They picture AI sweeping in and doing what theoretical physics was always “meant to do”: solve quantum gravity, and proceed to shower us with teleporters and antigravity machines. I don’t think there’s any reason to expect that to happen. If you just asked a machine to come up with the most useful model of the universe for a near-term goal, then in all likelihood it wouldn’t consider theoretical high-energy physics at all. If you see your AI as a tool to navigate between utopia and dystopia, theoretical physics might matter at some point: when your AI has devoured the inner solar system, is about to spread beyond the few light-minutes when it can signal itself in real-time, and has to commit to a strategy. But as long as the inner solar system remains un-devoured, I don’t think you’ll see an obviously successful theory of fundamental physics.

On Theories of Everything and Cures for Cancer

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Some people are disappointed in physics. Shocking, I know!

Those people, when careful enough, clarify that they’re disappointed in fundamental physics: not the physics of materials or lasers or chemicals or earthquakes, or even the physics of planets and stars, but the physics that asks big fundamental questions, about the underlying laws of the universe and where they come from.

Some of these people are physicists themselves, or were once upon a time. These often have in mind other directions physicists should have gone. They think that, with attention and funding, their own ideas would have gotten us closer to our goals than the ideas that, in practice, got the attention and the funding.

Most of these people, though, aren’t physicists. They’re members of the general public.

It’s disappointment from the general public, I think, that feels the most unfair to physicists. The general public reads history books, and hears about a series of revolutions: Newton and Maxwell, relativity and quantum mechanics, and finally the Standard Model. They read science fiction books, and see physicists finding “theories of everything”, and making teleporters and antigravity engines. And they wonder what made the revolutions stop, and postponed the science fiction future.

Physicists point out, rightly, that this is an oversimplified picture of how the world works. Something happens between those revolutions, the kind of progress not simple enough to summarize for history class. People tinker away at puzzles, and make progress. And they’re still doing that, even for the big fundamental questions. Physicists know more about even faraway flashy topics like quantum gravity than they did ten years ago. And while physicists and ex-physicists can argue about whether that work is on the right path, it’s certainly farther along its own path than it was. We know things we didn’t know before, progress continues to be made. We aren’t at the “revolution” stage yet, or even all that close. But most progress isn’t revolutionary, and no-one can predict how often revolutions should take place. A revolution is never “due”, and thus can never be “overdue”.

Physicists, in turn, often don’t notice how normal this kind of reaction from the public is. They think people are being stirred up by grifters, or negatively polarized by excess hype, that fundamental physics is facing an unfair reaction only shared by political hot-button topics. But while there are grifters, and people turned off by the hype…this is also just how the public thinks about science.

Have you ever heard the phrase “a cure for cancer”?

Fiction is full of scientists working on a cure for cancer, or who discovered a cure for cancer, or were prevented from finding a cure for cancer. It’s practically a trope. It’s literally a trope.

It’s also a real thing people work on, in a sense. Many scientists work on better treatments for a variety of different cancers. They’re making real progress, even dramatic progress. As many whose loved ones have cancer know, it’s much more likely for someone with cancer to survive than it was, say, twenty years ago.

But those cures don’t meet the threshold for science fiction, or for the history books. They don’t move us, like the polio vaccine did, from a world where you know many people with a disease to a world where you know none. They don’t let doctors give you a magical pill, like in a story or a game, that instantly cures your cancer.

For the vast majority of medical researchers, that kind of goal isn’t realistic, and isn’t worth thinking about. The few that do pursue it work towards extreme long-term solutions, like periodically replacing everyone’s skin with a cloned copy.

So while you will run into plenty of media descriptions of scientists working on cures for cancer, you won’t see the kind of thing the public expects is an actual “cure for cancer”. And people are genuinely disappointed about this! “Where’s my cure for cancer?” is a complaint on the same level as “where’s my hovercar?” There are people who think that medical science has made no progress in fifty years, because after all those news articles, we still don’t have a cure for cancer.

I appreciate that there are real problems in what messages are being delivered to the public about physics, both from hypesters in the physics mainstream and grifters outside it. But put those problems aside, and a deeper issue remains. People understand the world as best they can, as a story. And the world is complicated and detailed, full of many people making incremental progress on many things. Compared to a story, the truth is always at a disadvantage.

For Newtonmas, One Seventeenth of a New Collider

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Individual physicists don’t ask for a lot for Newtonmas. Big collaborations ask for more.

This year, CERN got its Newtonmas gift early: a one billion dollar pledge from a group of philanthropists and foundations, to be spent on their proposed new particle collider.

That may sound like a lot of money (and of course it is), but it’s only a fraction of the 15 billion euros that the collider is estimated to cost. That makes this less a case of private donors saving the project, and more of a nudge, showing governments they can get results for a bit cheaper than they expected.

I do wonder if the donation has also made CERN more bold about their plans, since it was announced shortly after a report from the update process for the European Strategy for Particle Physics, in which the European Strategy Group recommended a backup plan for the collider that is just the same collider with 15% budget cuts. Naturally people started making fun of this immediately.

Credit to @theory_dad on X

There were more serious objections from groups that had proposed more specific backup plans earlier in the process, who are frustrated that their ideas were rejected in favor of a 15% tweak that was not even discussed and seems not to really have been evaluated.

I don’t have any special information about what’s going on behind the scenes, or where this is headed. But I’m amused, and having fun with the parallels this season. I remember writing lists as a kid, trying to take advantage of the once-a-year opportunity to get what seemed almost like a genie’s wish. Whatever my incantations, the unreasonable requests were never fulfilled. Still, I had enough new toys to fill my time, and whet my appetite for the next year.

We’ll see what CERN’s Newtonmas gift brings.

Reminder to Physics Popularizers: “Discover” Is a Technical Term

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When a word has both an everyday meaning and a technical meaning, it can cause no end of confusion.

I’ve written about this before using one of the most common examples, the word “model”, which means something quite different in the phrases “large language model”, “animal model for Alzheimer’s” and “model train”. And I’ve written about running into this kind of confusion at the beginning of my PhD, with the word “effective”.

But there is one example I see crop up again and again, even with otherwise skilled science communicators. It’s the word “discover”.

“Discover”, in physics, has a technical meaning. It’s a first-ever observation of something, with an associated standard of evidence. In this sense, the LHC discovered the Higgs boson in 2012, and LIGO discovered gravitational waves in 2015. And there are discoveries we can anticipate, like the cosmic neutrino background.

But of course, “discover” has a meaning in everyday English, too.

You probably think I’m going to say that “discover”, in everyday English, doesn’t have the same statistical standards it does in physics. That’s true of course, but it’s also pretty obvious, I don’t think it’s confusing anybody.

Rather, there is a much more important difference that physicists often forget: in everyday English, a discovery is a surprise.

“Discover”, a word arguably popularized by Columbus’s discovery of the Americas, is used pretty much exclusively to refer to learning about something you did not know about yet. It can be minor, like discovering a stick of gum you forgot, or dramatic, like discovering you’ve been transformed into a giant insect.

Now, as a scientist, you might say that everything that hasn’t yet been observed is unknown, ready for discovery. We didn’t know that the Higgs boson existed before the LHC, and we don’t know yet that there is a cosmic neutrino background.

But just because we don’t know something in a technical sense, doesn’t mean it’s surprising. And if something isn’t surprising at all, then in everyday, colloquial English, people don’t call it a discovery. You don’t “discover” that the store has milk today, even if they sometimes run out. You don’t “discover” that a movie is fun, if you went because you heard reviews claim it would be, even if the reviews might have been wrong. You don’t “discover” something you already expect.

At best, maybe you could “discover” something controversial. If you expect to find a lost city of gold, and everyone says you’re crazy, then fine, you can discover the lost city of gold. But if everyone agrees that there is probably a lost city of gold there? Then in everyday English, it would be very strange to say that you were the one who discovered it.

With this in mind, the way physicists use the word “discover” can cause a lot of confusion. It can make people think, as with gravitational waves, that a “discovery” is something totally new, that we weren’t pretty confident before LIGO that gravitational waves exist. And it can make people get jaded, and think physicists are overhyping, talking about “discovering” this or that particle physics fact because an experiment once again did exactly what it was expected to.

My recommendation? If you’re writing for the general public, use other words. The LHC “decisively detected” the Higgs boson. We expect to see “direct evidence” of the cosmic neutrino background. “Discover” has baggage, and should be used with care.

C. N. Yang, Dead at 103

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I don’t usually do obituaries here, but sometimes I have something worth saying.

Chen Ning Yang, a towering figure in particle physics, died last week.

Picture from 1957, when he received his Nobel

I never met him. By the time I started my PhD at Stony Brook, Yang was long-retired, and hadn’t visited the Yang Institute for Theoretical Physics in quite some time.

(Though there was still an office door, tucked behind the institute’s admin staff, that bore his name.)

The Nobel Prize doesn’t always honor the most important theoretical physicists. In order to get a Nobel Prize, you need to discover something that gets confirmed by experiment. Generally, it has to be a very crisp, clear statement about reality. New calculation methods and broader new understandings are on shakier ground, and theorists who propose them tend to be left out, or at best combined together into lists of partial prizes long after the fact.

Yang was lucky. With T. D. Lee, he had made that crisp, clear statement. He claimed that the laws of physics, counter to everyone’s expectations, are not the same when reflected in a mirror. In 1956, Wu confirmed the prediction, and Lee and Yang got the prize the year after.

That’s a huge, fundamental discovery about the natural world. But as a theorist, I don’t think that was Yang’s greatest accomplishment.

Yang contributed to other fields. Practicing theorists have seen his name strewn across concepts, formalisms, and theorems. I didn’t have space to talk about him in my article on integrability for Quanta Magazine, but only just barely: another paragraph or two, and he would have been there.

But his most influential contribution is something even more fundamental. And long-time readers of this blog should already know what it is.

Yang, along with Robert Mills, proposed Yang-Mills Theory.

There isn’t a Nobel prize for Yang-Mills theory. In 1953, when Yang and Mills proposed the theory, it was obviously wrong, a theory that couldn’t explain anything in the natural world, mercilessly mocked by famous bullshit opponent Wolfgang Pauli. Not even an ambitious idea that seemed outlandish (like plate tectonics), it was a theory with such an obvious missing piece that, for someone who prioritized experiment like the Nobel committee does, it seemed pointless to consider.

All it had going for it was that it was a clear generalization, an obvious next step. If there are forces like electromagnetism, with one type of charge going from plus to minus, why not a theory with multiple, interacting types of charge?

Nothing about Yang-Mills theory was impossible, or contradictory. Mathematically, it was fine. It obeyed all the rules of quantum mechanics. It simply didn’t appear to match anything in the real world.

But, as theorists learn, nature doesn’t let a good idea go to waste.

Of the four fundamental forces of nature, as it would happen, half are Yang-Mills theories. Gravity is different, electromagnetism is simpler, and could be understood without Yang and Mills’ insights. But the weak nuclear force, that’s a Yang-Mills theory. It wasn’t obvious in 1953 because it wasn’t clear how the massless, photon-like particles in Yang-Mills theory could have mass, and it wouldn’t become clear until the work of Peter Higgs over a decade later. And the strong nuclear force, that’s also a Yang-Mills theory, missed because of the ability of such a strong force to “confine” charges, hiding them away.

So Yang got a Nobel, not for understanding half of nature’s forces before anyone else had, but from a quirky question of symmetry.

In practice, Yang was known for all of this, and more. He was enormously influential. I’ve heard it claimed that he personally kept China from investing in a new particle collider, the strength of his reputation the most powerful force on that side of the debate, as he argued that a developing country like China should be investing in science with more short-term industrial impact, like condensed matter and atomic physics. I wonder if the debate will shift with his death, and what commitments the next Chinese five-year plan will make.

Ultimately, Yang is an example of what a theorist can be, a mix of solid work, counterintuitive realizations, and the thought-through generalizations that nature always seems to make use of in the end. If you’re not clear on what a theoretical physicist is, or what one can do, let Yang’s story be your guide.

The Rocks in the Ground Era of Fundamental Physics

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It’s no secret that the early twentieth century was a great time to make progress in fundamental physics. On one level, it was an era when huge swaths of our understanding of the world were being rewritten, with relativity and quantum mechanics just being explored. It was a time when a bright student could guide the emergence of whole new branches of scholarship, and recently discovered physical laws could influence world events on a massive scale.

Put that way, it sounds like it was a time of low-hanging fruit, the early days of a field when great strides can be made before the easy problems are all solved and only the hard ones are left. And that’s part of it, certainly: the fields sprung from that era have gotten more complex and challenging over time, requiring more specialized knowledge to make any kind of progress. But there is also a physical reason why physicists had such an enormous impact back then.

The early twentieth century was the last time that you could dig up a rock out of the ground, do some chemistry, and end up with a discovery about the fundamental laws of physics.

When scientists like Curie and Becquerel were working with uranium, they didn’t yet understand the nature of atoms. The distinctions between elements were described in qualitative terms, but only just beginning to be physically understood. That meant that a weird object in nature, “a weird rock”, could do quite a lot of interesting things.

And once you find a rock that does something physically unexpected, you can scale up. From the chemistry experiments of a single scientist’s lab, countries can build industrial processes to multiply the effect. Nuclear power and the bomb were such radical changes because they represented the end effect of understanding the nature of atoms, and atoms are something people could build factories to manipulate.

Scientists went on to push that understanding further. They wanted to know what the smallest pieces of matter were composed of, to learn the laws behind the most fundamental laws they knew. And with relativity and quantum mechanics, they could begin to do so systematically.

US particle physics has a nice bit of branding. They talk about three frontiers: the Energy Frontier, the Intensity Frontier, and the Cosmic Frontier.

Some things we can’t yet test in physics are gated by energy. If we haven’t discovered a particle, it may be because it’s unstable, decaying quickly into lighter particles so we can’t observe it in everyday life. If these particles interact appreciably with particles of everyday matter like protons and electrons, then we can try to make them in particle colliders. These end up creating pretty much everything up to a certain mass, due to a combination of the tendency in quantum mechanics for everything that can happen to happen, and relativity’s E=mc^2. In the mid-20th century these particle colliders were serious pieces of machinery, but still small enough to make industrial: now, there are so-called medical accelerators in many hospitals based on their designs. But current particle accelerators are a different beast, massive facilities built by international collaborations. This is the Energy Frontier.

Some things in physics are gated by how rare they are. Some particles interact only very faintly with other particles, so to detect them, physicists have to scan a huge chunk of matter, a giant tank of argon or a kilometer of antarctic ice, looking for deviations from the norm. Over time, these experiments have gotten bigger, looking for more and more subtle effects. A few weird ones still fit on tabletops, but only because they have the tools to measure incredibly small variations. Most are gigantic. This is the Intensity Frontier.

Finally, the Cosmic Frontier looks for the unknown behind both kinds of gates, using the wider universe to look at events with extremely high energy or size.

Pushing these frontiers has meant cleaning up our understanding of the fundamental laws of physics up to these frontiers. It means that whatever is still hiding, it either requires huge amounts of energy to produce, or is an extremely rare, subtle effect.

That means that you shouldn’t expect another nuclear bomb out of fundamental physics. Physics experiments are already working on vast scales, to the extent that a secret government project would have to be smaller than publicly known experiments, in physical size, energy use, and budget. And you shouldn’t expect another nuclear power plant, either: we’ve long passed the kinds of things you could devise a clever industrial process to take advantage of at scale.

Instead, new fundamental physics will only be directly useful once we’re the kind of civilization that operates on a much greater scale than we do today. That means larger than the solar system: there wouldn’t be much advantage, at this point, of putting a particle physics experiment on the edge of the Sun. It means the kind of civilization that tosses galaxies around.

It means that right now, you won’t see militaries or companies pushing the frontiers of fundamental physics, unlike the way they might have wanted to at the dawn of the twentieth century. By the time fundamental physics is useful in that way, all of these actors will likely be radically different: companies, governments, and in all likelihood human beings themselves. Instead, supporting fundamental physics right now is an act of philanthropy, maintaining a practice because it maintains good habits of thought and produces powerful ideas, the same reasons organizations support mathematics or poetry. That’s not nothing, and fundamental physics is still often affordable as philanthropy goes. But it’s not changing the world, not the way physicists did in the early twentieth century.

Some Dumb AI Ideas

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Sometimes, when I write a post about AI, I’ve been sitting on an idea for a long time. I’ve talked to experts, I’ve tried to understand the math, I’ve honed my points and cleared away clutter.

This is not one of those times. The ideas in this post almost certainly have something deeply wrong with them. But hopefully they’re interesting food for thought.

My first dumb idea: instruction tuning was a mistake.

I’m drawing the seeds of this one from a tumblr post by nostalgebraist, someone known for making a popular bot trained on his tumblr posts in the early days before GPT became ChatGPT.

AIs like ChatGPT are based on Large Language Models, insanely complicated mathematical formulas that predict, given part of a text, what the rest of that text is likely to look like. In the early days, this was largely how they were used. Loosely described nostalgebraist’s bot, called nostalgebraist-autoresponder, began with a list of tumblr posts and asks and determines what additional posts would best fit in.

If you think about it, though, ChatGPT doesn’t really work like that. ChatGPT has conversations: you send it messages, it sends you responses. The text it creates is a dialogue, with you supplying half the input. But most texts aren’t dialogues, and ChatGPT draws on a lot of non-dialogue texts to make its dialogue-like responses.

The reason it does this is something called instruction tuning. ChatGPT has been intentionally biased, not to give the most likely completion to a task in general, but to give completions that fit this dialogue genre. What I didn’t know until I read nostalgebraist’s post was that this genre was defined artificially: AI researchers made up fake dialogues with AI, cheesy sci-fi conversations imagining how an AI might respond to instructions from a user, and then biased the Large Language Model so that rather than giving the most likely text in general, it gives a text that is more likely to look like these cheesy sci-fi conversations. It’s why ChatGPT sounds kind of like a fictional robot: not because sci-fi writers accurately predicted what AI would sound like, but because AI was created based on sci-fi texts.

For nostalgebraist, this leads into an interesting reflection of how a sci-fi AI should behave, how being warped around a made-up genre without history or depth creates characters which act according to simple narratives and express surprising anxiety.

For myself, though, I can’t help but wonder if the goal of dialogue itself is the problem. Dialogue is clearly important commercially: people use ChatGPT because they can chat with it. But Large Language Models aren’t inherently chatbots: they produce plausible texts, of any sort you could imagine. People seem to want a machine that can, for example, answer scientific questions as part of a conversation. But most competent answers to scientific questions aren’t conversations, they’re papers. If people stuck with the “raw” model, producing excerpts of nonexistent papers rather than imitating a dialogue with a non-existent expert, wouldn’t you expect the answers to be more accurate, with the model no longer biased by an irrelevant goal? Is the need to make a sell-able chatbot making these AIs worse at everything else people are trying to use them for?

I’m imagining a world where, instead of a chatbot, OpenAI built an “alternate universe simulator”. You give it some context, some texts or parts of texts from a universe you made up, and it completes them in a plausible way. By imagining different universes, you can use it to answer different questions. Such a gimmick would get fewer customers, and fewer investors, it would probably do worse. But I have to wonder if the actual technology might have been more useful.

My second idea is dumber, to the point where I mostly know why it doesn’t work. But thinking about it might help clarify how things work for people unused to AI.

I saw someone point out that, unlike something like Wikipedia, AI doesn’t give you context. You shouldn’t trust Wikipedia, or a source you find on Google, blindly. If you want to, you can look through the edit history on Wikipedia, or figure out who wrote a page you found on Google and how. If ChatGPT tells you something, by default you don’t know where that knowledge came from. You can tell it to search, and then you’ll get links, but that’s because it’s using Google or the like behind the scenes anyway. You don’t know where the model is getting its ideas.

Why couldn’t we get that context, though?

Every text produced by a Large Language Model is causally dependent on its training data. Different data, different model, different text. That doesn’t mean that each text draws from one source, or just a few sources: ChatGPT isn’t copying the training data, at least not so literally.

But it does mean that, if ChatGPT says something is true, you should in principle be able to ask which data was most important in making it say that. If you leave a piece of data out of the training, and get similar answers, you can infer that the response you got doesn’t have much to do with that piece of data. But if you leave out a text in training, and now ChatGPT gives totally different responses to the same question…then there’s a pretty meaningful sense that it got the information from that source.

If this were the type of non-AI statistical model people use in physics, this would be straightforward. Researchers do this all the time: take one experiment out of the data, see how their analysis changes, and thereby figure out which experiments are most important to check. One can even sometimes calculate, given a model, where you should look.

Unfortunately, you can’t do this with ChatGPT. The model is just too big. You can’t calculate anything explicitly about it, the giant mathematical formulas behind it are so complicated that the most you can do is get probabilities out case by case, you can’t “unwind” them and see where the numbers come from. And you can’t just take out sources one by one, and train the model again: not when training takes months of expensive computer time.

So unlike with the previous idea, I understand even on a technical level why you can’t do this. But it helped me to be able to think about what I would like to do, if it were possible. Maybe it helps you too!