In Scientific American, With a Piece on Vacuum Decay

Publishing Isn’t Free, but SciPost Makes It Cheaper

I’ve mentioned SciPost a few times on this blog. They’re an open journal in every sense you could think of: diamond open-access scientific publishing on an open-source platform, run with open finances. They even publish their referee reports. They’re aiming to cover not just a few subjects, but a broad swath of academia, publishing scientists’ work in the most inexpensive and principled way possible and challenging the dominance of for-profit journals.

And they’re struggling.

SciPost doesn’t charge university libraries for access, they let anyone read their articles for free. And they don’t charge authors Article Processing Charges (or APCs), they let anyone publish for free. All they do is keep track of which institutions those authors are affiliated with, calculate what fraction of their total costs comes from them, and post it in a nice searchable list on their website.

And amazingly, for the last nine years, they’ve been making that work.

SciPost encourages institutions to pay their share, mostly by encouraging authors to bug their bosses until they do. SciPost will also quite happily accept more than an institution’s share, and a few generous institutions do just that, which is what has kept them afloat so far. But since nothing compels anyone to pay, most organizations simply don’t.

From an economist’s perspective, this is that most basic of problems, the free-rider problem. People want scientific publication to be free, but it isn’t. Someone has to pay, and if you don’t force someone to do it, then the few who pay will be exploited by the many who don’t.

There’s more worth saying, though.

First, it’s worth pointing out that SciPost isn’t paying the same cost everyone else pays to publish. SciPost has a stripped-down system, without any physical journals or much in-house copyediting, based entirely on their own open-source software. As a result, they pay about 500 euros per article. Compare this to the fees negotiated by particle physics’ SCOAP3 agreement, which average to closer to 1000 euros, and realize that those fees are on the low end: for-profit journals tend to make their APCs higher in order to, well, make a profit.

(By the way, while it’s tempting to think of for-profit journals as greedy, I think it’s better to think of them as not cost-effective. Profit is an expense, like the interest on a loan: a payment to investors in exchange for capital used to set up the business. The thing is, online journals don’t seem to need that kind of capital, especially when they’re based on code written by academics in their spare time. So they can operate more cheaply as nonprofits.)

So when an author publishes in SciPost instead of a journal with APCs, they’re saving someone money, typically their institution or their grant. This would happen even if their institution paid their share of SciPost’s costs. (But then they would pay something rather than nothing, hence free-rider problem.)

If an author instead would have published in a closed-access journal, the kind where you have to pay to read the articles and university libraries pay through the nose to get access? Then you don’t save any money at all, your library still has to pay for the journal. You only save money if everybody at the institution stops using the journal. This one is instead a collective action problem.

Collective action problems are hard, and don’t often have obvious solutions. Free-rider problems do suggest an obvious solution: why not just charge?

In SciPost’s case, there are philosophical commitments involved. Their desire to attribute costs transparently and equally means dividing a journal’s cost among all its authors’ institutions, a cost only fully determined at the end of the year, which doesn’t make for an easy invoice.

More to the point, though, charging to publish is directly against what the Open Access movement is about.

That takes some unpacking, because of course, someone does have to pay. It probably seems weird to argue that institutions shouldn’t have to pay charges to publish papers…instead, they should pay to publish papers.

SciPost itself doesn’t go into detail about this, but despite how weird it sounds when put like I just did, there is a difference. Charging a fee to publish means that anyone who publishes needs to pay a fee. If you’re working in a developing country on a shoestring budget, too bad, you have to pay the fee. If you’re an amateur mathematician who works in a truck stop and just puzzled through something amazing, too bad, you have to pay the fee.

Instead of charging a fee, SciPost asks for support. I have to think that part of the reason is that they want some free riders. There are some people who would absolutely not be able to participate in science without free riding, and we want their input nonetheless. That means to support them, others need to give more. It means organizations need to think about SciPost not as just another fee, but as a way they can support the scientific process as a whole.

That’s how other things work, like the arXiv. They get support from big universities and organizations and philanthropists, not from literally everyone. It seems a bit weird to do that for a single scientific journal among many, though, which I suspect is part of why institutions are reluctant to do it. But for a journal that can save money like SciPost, maybe it’s worth it.

Post on the Weak Gravity Conjecture for FirstPrinciples.org

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I have another piece this week on the FirstPrinciples.org Hub. If you’d like to know who they are, I say a bit about my impressions of them in my post on the last piece I had there. They’re still finding their niche, so there may be shifts in the kind of content they cover over time, but for now they’ve given me an opportunity to cover a few topics that are off the beaten path.

This time, the piece is what we in the journalism biz call an “explainer”. Instead of interviewing people about cutting-edge science, I wrote a piece to explain an older idea. It’s an idea that’s pretty cool, in a way I think a lot of people can actually understand: a black hole puzzle that might explain why gravity is the weakest force. It’s an idea that’s had an enormous influence, both in the string theory world where it originated and on people speculating more broadly about the rules of quantum gravity. If you want to learn more, read the piece!

Since I didn’t interview anyone for this piece, I don’t have the same sort of “bonus content” I sometimes give. Instead of interviewing, I brushed up on the topic, and the best resource I found was this review article written by Dan Harlow, Ben Heidenreich, Matthew Reece, and Tom Rudelius. It gave me a much better idea of the subtleties: how many different ways there are to interpret the original conjecture, and how different attempts to build on it reflect on different facets and highlight different implications. If you are a physicist curious what the whole thing is about, I recommend reading that review: while I try to give a flavor of some of the subtleties, a piece for a broad audience can only do so much.

There Is No Shortcut to Saying What You Mean

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Blogger Andrew Oh-Willeke of Dispatches from Turtle Island pointed me to an editorial in Science about the phrase scientific consensus.

The editorial argues that by referring to conclusions like the existence of climate change or vaccine safety as “the scientific consensus”, communicators have inadvertently fanned the flames of distrust. By emphasizing agreement between scientists, the phrase “scientific consensus” leaves open the question of how that consensus was reached. More conspiracy-minded people imagine shady backroom deals and corrupt payouts, while the more realistic blame incentives and groupthink. If you disagree with “the scientific consensus”, you may thus decide the best way forward is to silence those pesky scientists.

(The link to current events is left as an exercise to the reader, to comment on elsewhere. As usual, please no explicit discussion of politics on this blog!)

Instead of “scientific consensus”, the editorial suggests another term, convergence of evidence. The idea is that by centering the evidence instead of the scientists, the phrase would make it clear that these conclusions are justified by something more than social pressures, and will remain even if the scientists promoting them are silenced.

Oh-Willeke pointed me to another blog post responding to the editorial, which has a nice discussion of how the terms were used historically, showing their popularity over time. “Convergence of evidence” was more popular in the 1950’s, with a small surge in the late 90’s and early 2000’s. “Scientific consensus” rose in the 1980’s and 90’s, lining up with a time when social scientists were skeptical about science’s objectivity and wanted to explore the social reasons why scientists come to agreement. It then fell around the year 2000, before rising again, this time used instead by professional groups of scientists to emphasize their agreement on issues like climate change.

(The blog post then goes on to try to motivate the word “consilience” instead, on the rather thin basis that “convergence of evidence” isn’t interdisciplinary enough, which seems like a pretty silly objection. “Convergence” implies coming in from multiple directions, it’s already interdisciplinary!)

I appreciate “convergence of evidence”, it seems like a useful phrase. But I think the editorial is working from the wrong perspective, in trying to argue for which terms “we should use” in the first place.

Sometimes, as a scientist or an organization or a journalist, you want to emphasize evidence. Is it “a preponderance of evidence”, most but not all? Is it “overwhelming evidence”, evidence so powerful it is unlikely to ever be defeated? Or is it a “convergence of evidence”, evidence that came in slowly from multiple paths, each independent route making a coincidence that much less likely?

But sometimes, you want to emphasize the judgement of the scientists themselves.

Sometimes when scientists agree, they’re working not from evidence but from personal experience: feelings of which kinds of research pan out and which don’t, or shared philosophies that sit deep in how they conceive their discipline. Describing physicists’ reasons for expecting supersymmetry before the LHC turned on as a convergence of evidence would be inaccurate. Describing it as having been a (not unanimous) consensus gets much closer to the truth.

Sometimes, scientists do have evidence, but as a journalist, you can’t evaluate its strength. You note some controversy, you can follow some of the arguments, but ultimately you have to be honest about how you got the information. And sometimes, that will be because it’s what most of the responsible scientists you talked to agreed on: scientific consensus.

As science communicators, we care about telling the truth (as much as we ever can, at any rate). As a result, we cannot adopt blanket rules of thumb. We cannot say, “we as a community are using this term now”. The only responsible thing we can do is to think about each individual word. We need to decide what we actually mean, to read widely and learn from experience, to find which words express our case in a way that is both convincing and accurate. There’s no shortcut to that, no formula where you just “use the right words” and everything turns out fine. You have to do the work, and hope it’s enough.

Experiments Should Be Surprising, but Not Too Surprising

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People are talking about colliders again.

This year, the European particle physics community is updating its shared plan for the future, the European Strategy for Particle Physics. A raft of proposals at the end of March stirred up a tail of public debate, focused on asking what sort of new particle collider should be built, and discussing potential reasons why.

That discussion, in turn, has got me thinking about experiments, and how they’re justified.

The purpose of experiments, and of science in general, is to learn something new. The more sure we are of something, the less reason there is to test it. Scientists don’t check whether the Sun rises every day. Like everyone else, they assume it will rise, and use that knowledge to learn other things.

You want your experiment to surprise you. But to design an experiment to surprise you, you run into a contradiction.

Suppose that every morning, you check whether the Sun rises. If it doesn’t, you will really be surprised! You’ll have made the discovery of the century! That’s a really exciting payoff, grant agencies should be lining up to pay for…

Well, is that actually likely to happen, though?

The same reasons it would be surprising if the Sun stopped rising are reasons why we shouldn’t expect the Sun to stop rising. A sunrise-checking observatory has incredibly high potential scientific reward…but an absurdly low chance of giving that reward.

Ok, so you can re-frame your experiment. You’re not hoping the Sun won’t rise, you’re observing the sunrise. You expect it to rise, almost guaranteed, so your experiment has an almost guaranteed payoff.

But what a small payoff! You saw exactly what you expected, there’s no science in that!

By either criterion, the “does the Sun rise” observatory is a stupid experiment. Real experiments operate in between the two extremes. They also mix motivations. Together, that leads to some interesting tensions.

What was the purpose of the Large Hadron Collider?

There were a few things physicists were pretty sure of, when they planned the LHC. Previous colliders had measured W bosons and Z bosons, and their properties made it clear that something was missing. If you could collide protons with enough energy, physicists were pretty sure you’d see the missing piece. Physicists had a reasonably plausible story for that missing piece, in the form of the Higgs boson. So physicists could be pretty sure they’d see something, and reasonably sure it would be the Higgs boson.

If physicists expected the Higgs boson, what was the point of the experiment?

First, physicists expected to see the Higgs boson, but they didn’t expect it to have the mass that it did. In fact, they didn’t know anything about the particle’s mass, besides that it should be low enough that the collider could produce it, and high enough that it hadn’t been detected before. The specific number? That was a surprise, and an almost-inevitable one. A rare creature, an almost-guaranteed scientific payoff.

I say almost, because there was a second point. The Higgs boson didn’t have to be there. In fact, it didn’t have to exist at all. There was a much bigger potential payoff, of noticing something very strange, something much more complicated than the straightforward theory most physicists had expected.

(Many people also argued for another almost-guaranteed payoff, and that got a lot more press. People talked about finding the origin of dark matter by discovering supersymmetric particles, which they argued was almost guaranteed due to a principle called naturalness. This is very important for understanding the history…but it’s an argument that many people feel has failed, and that isn’t showing up much anymore. So for this post, I’ll leave it to the side.)

This mix, of a guaranteed small surprise and the potential for a very large surprise, was a big part of what made the LHC make sense. The mix has changed a bit for people considering a new collider, and it’s making for a rougher conversation.

Like the LHC, most of the new collider proposals have a guaranteed payoff. The LHC could measure the mass of the Higgs, these new colliders will measure its “couplings”: how strongly it influences other particles and forces.

Unlike the LHC, though, this guarantee is not a guaranteed surprise. Before building the LHC, we did not know the mass of the Higgs, and we could not predict it. On the other hand, now we absolutely can predict the couplings of the Higgs. We have quite precise numbers, our expectation for what they should be based on a theory that so far has proven quite successful.

We aren’t certain, of course, just like physicists weren’t certain before. The Higgs boson might have many surprising properties, things that contradict our current best theory and usher in something new. These surprises could genuinely tell us something about some of the big questions, from the nature of dark matter to the universe’s balance of matter and antimatter to the stability of the laws of physics.

But of course, they also might not. We no longer have that rare creature, a guaranteed mild surprise, to hedge in case the big surprises fail. We have guaranteed observations, and experimenters will happily tell you about them…but no guaranteed surprises.

That’s a strange position to be in. And I’m not sure physicists have figured out what to do about it.

Antimatter Isn’t Magic

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You’ve heard of antimatter, right?

For each type of particle, there is a rare kind of evil twin with the opposite charge, called an anti-particle. When an anti-proton meets a proton, they annihilate each other in a giant blast of energy.

I see a lot of questions online about antimatter. One recurring theme is people asking a very general question: how does antimatter work?

If you’ve just heard the pop physics explanation, antimatter probably sounds like magic. What about antimatter lets it destroy normal matter? Does it need to touch? How long does it take? And what about neutral particles like neutrons?

You find surprisingly few good explanations of this online, but I can explain why. Physicists like me don’t expect antimatter to be confusing in this way, because to us, antimatter isn’t doing anything all that special. When a particle and an antiparticle annihilate, they’re doing the same thing that any other pair of particles do when they do…basically anything else.

Instead of matter and antimatter, let’s talk about one of the oldest pieces of evidence for quantum mechanics, the photoelectric effect. Scientists shone light at a metal, and found that if the wavelength of the light was short enough, electrons would spring free, causing an electric current. If the wavelength was too long, the metal wouldn’t emit any electrons, no matter how much light they shone. Einstein won his Nobel prize for the explanation: the light hitting the metal comes in particle-sized pieces, called photons, whose energy is determined by the wavelength of the light. If the individual photons don’t have enough energy to get an electron to leave the metal, then no electron will move, no matter how many photons you use.

What happens to the photons after they hit the metal?

They go away. We say they are absorbed, an electron absorbs a photon and speeds up, increasing its kinetic energy so it can escape.

But we could just as easily say the photon is annihilated, if we wanted to.

In the photoelectric effect, you start with one electron and one photon, they come together, and you end up with one electron and no photon. In proton-antiproton annihilation, you start with a proton and an antiproton, they come together, and you end up with no protons or antiprotons, but instead “energy”…which in practice, usually means two photons.

That’s all that happens, deep down at the root of things. The laws of physics are rules about inputs and outputs. Start with these particles, they come together, you end up with these other particles. Sometimes one of the particles stays the same. Sometimes particles seem to transform, and different kinds of particles show up. Sometimes some of the particles are photons, and you think of them as “just energy”, and easy to absorb. But particles are particles, and nothing is “just energy”. Each thing, absorption, decay, annihilation, each one is just another type of what we call interactions.

What makes annihilation of matter and antimatter seem unique comes down to charges. Interactions have to obey the laws of physics: they conserve energy, they conserve momentum, and they conserve charge.

So why can an antiproton and a proton annihilate to pure photons, while two protons can’t? A proton and an antiproton have opposite charge, a photon has zero charge. You could combine two protons to make something else, but it would have to have the same charge as two protons.

What about neutrons? A neutron has no electric charge, so you might think it wouldn’t need antimatter. But a neutron has another type of charge, called baryon number. In order to annihilate one, you’d need an anti-neutron, which would still have zero electric charge but would have the opposite baryon number. (By the way, physicists have been making anti-neutrons since 1956.)

On the other hand, photons actually have no charge. So do Higgs bosons. So one Higgs boson can become two photons, without annihilating with anything else. Each of these particles can be called its own antiparticle: a photon is also an antiphoton, a Higgs is also an anti-Higgs.

Because particle-antiparticle annihilation follows the same rules as other interactions between particles, it also takes place via the same forces. When a proton and an antiproton annihilate each other, they typically do this via the electromagnetic force. This is why you end up with light, which is an electromagnetic wave. Like everything in the quantum world, this annihilation isn’t certain. Is has a chance to happen, proportional to the strength of the interaction force involved.

What about neutrinos? They also appear to have a kind of charge, called lepton number. That might not really be a conserved charge, and neutrinos might be their own antiparticles, like photons. However, they are much less likely to be annihilated than protons and antiprotons, because they don’t have electric charge, and thus their interaction doesn’t depend on the electromagnetic force, but on the much weaker weak nuclear force. A weaker force means a less likely interaction.

Antimatter might seem like the stuff of science fiction. But it’s not really harder to understand than anything else in particle physics.

(I know, that’s a low bar!)

It’s just interactions. Particles go in, particles go out. If it follows the rules, it can happen, if it doesn’t, it can’t. Antimatter is no different.

I’ve Felt Like a Hallucinating LLM

Lambda-CDM Is Not Like the Standard Model

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A statistician will tell you that all models are wrong, but some are useful.

Particle physicists have an enormously successful model called the Standard Model, which describes the world in terms of seventeen quantum fields, giving rise to particles from the familiar electron to the challenging-to-measure Higgs boson. The model has nineteen parameters, numbers that aren’t predicted by the model itself but must be found by doing experiments and finding the best statistical fit. With those numbers as input, the model is extremely accurate, aside from the occasional weird discrepancy.

Cosmologists have their own very successful standard model that they use to model the universe as a whole. Called ΛCDM, it describes the universe in terms of three things: dark energy, denoted with a capital lambda (Λ), cold dark matter (CDM), and ordinary matter, all interacting with each other via gravity. The model has six parameters, which must be found by observing the universe and finding the best statistical fit. When those numbers are input, the model is extremely accurate, though there have recently been some high-profile discrepancies.

These sound pretty similar. You model the world as a list of things, fix your parameters based on nature, and make predictions. Wikipedia has a nice graphic depicting the quantum fields of the Standard Model, and you could imagine a similar graphic for ΛCDM.

A graphic like that would be misleading, though.

ΛCDM doesn’t just propose a list of fields and let them interact freely. Instead, it tries to model the universe as a whole, which means it carries assumptions about how matter and energy are distributed, and how space-time is shaped. Some of this is controlled by its parameters, and by tweaking them one can model a universe that varies in different ways. But other assumptions are baked in. If the universe had a very different shape, caused by a very different distribution of matter and energy, then we would need a very different model to represent it. We couldn’t use ΛCDM.

The Standard Model isn’t like that. If you collide two protons together, you need a model of how quarks are distributed inside protons. But that model isn’t the Standard Model, it’s a separate model used for that particular type of experiment. The Standard Model is supposed to be the big picture, the stuff that exists and affects every experiment you can do.

That means the Standard Model is supported in a way that ΛCDM isn’t. The Standard Model describes many different experiments, and is supported by almost all of them. When an experiment disagrees, it has specific implications for part of the model only. For example, neutrinos have mass, which was not predicted in the Standard Model, but it proved easy for people to modify the model to fit. We know the Standard Model is not the full picture, but we also know that any deviations from it must be very small. Large deviations would contradict other experiments, or more basic principles like probabilities needing to be smaller than one.

In contrast, ΛCDM is really just supported by one experiment. We have one universe to observe. We can gather a lot of data, measuring it from its early history to the recent past. But we can’t run it over and over again under different conditions, and our many measurements are all measuring different aspects of the same thing. That’s why unlike in the Standard Model, we can’t separate out assumptions about the shape of the universe from assumptions about what it contains. Dark energy and dark matter are on the same footing as distribution of fluctuations and homogeneity and all those shape-related words, part of one model that gets fit together as a whole.

And so while both the Standard Model and ΛCDM are successful, that success means something different. It’s hard to imagine that we find new evidence and discover that electrons don’t exist, or quarks don’t exist. But we may well find out that dark energy doesn’t exist, or that the universe has a radically different shape. The statistical success of ΛCDM is impressive, and it means any alternative has a high bar to clear. But it doesn’t have to mean rethinking everything the way an alternative to the Standard Model would.

I Have a Theory

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“I have a theory,” says the scientist in the book. But what does that mean? What does it mean to “have” a theory?

First, there’s the everyday sense. When you say “I have a theory”, you’re talking about an educated guess. You think you know why something happened, and you want to check your idea and get feedback. A pedant would tell you you don’t really have a theory, you have a hypothesis. It’s “your” hypothesis, “your theory”, because it’s what you think happened.

The pedant would insist that “theory” means something else. A theory isn’t a guess, even an educated guess. It’s an explanation with evidence, tested and refined in many different contexts in many different ways, a whole framework for understanding the world, the most solid knowledge science can provide. Despite the pedant’s insistence, that isn’t the only way scientists use the word “theory”. But it is a common one, and a central one. You don’t really “have” a theory like this, though, except in the sense that we all do. These are explanations with broad consensus, things you either know of or don’t, they don’t belong to one person or another.

Except, that is, if one person takes credit for them. We sometimes say “Darwin’s theory of evolution”, or “Einstein’s theory of relativity”. In that sense, we could say that Einstein had a theory, or that Darwin had a theory.

Sometimes, though, “theory” doesn’t mean this standard official definition, even when scientists say it. And that changes what it means to “have” a theory.

For some researchers, a theory is a lens with which to view the world. This happens sometimes in physics, where you’ll find experts who want to think about a situation in terms of thermodynamics, or in terms of a technique called Effective Field Theory. It happens in mathematics, where some choose to analyze an idea with category theory not to prove new things about it, but just to translate it into category theory lingo. It’s most common, though, in the humanities, where researchers often specialize in a particular “interpretive framework”.

For some, a theory is a hypothesis, but also a pet project. There are physicists who come up with an idea (maybe there’s a variant of gravity with mass! maybe dark energy is changing!) and then focus their work around that idea. That includes coming up with ways to test whether the idea is true, showing the idea is consistent, and understanding what variants of the idea could be proposed. These ideas are hypotheses, in that they’re something the scientist thinks could be true. But they’re also ideas with many moving parts that motivate work by themselves.

Taken to the extreme, this kind of “having” a theory can go from healthy science to political bickering. Instead of viewing an idea as a hypothesis you might or might not confirm, it can become a platform to fight for. Instead of investigating consistency and proposing tests, you focus on arguing against objections and disproving your rivals. This sometimes happens in science, especially in more embattled areas, but it happens much more often with crackpots, where people who have never really seen science done can decide it’s time for their idea, right or wrong.

Finally, sometimes someone “has” a theory that isn’t a hypothesis at all. In theoretical physics, a “theory” can refer to a complete framework, even if that framework isn’t actually supposed to describe the real world. Some people spend time focusing on a particular framework of this kind, understanding its properties in the hope of getting broader insights. By becoming an expert on one particular theory, they can be said to “have” that theory.

Bonus question: in what sense do string theorists “have” string theory?

You might imagine that string theory is an interpretive framework, like category theory, with string theorists coming up with the “string version” of things others understand in other ways. This, for the most part, doesn’t happen. Without knowing whether string theory is true, there isn’t much benefit in just translating other things to string theory terms, and people for the most part know this.

For some, string theory is a pet project hypothesis. There is a community of people who try to get predictions out of string theory, or who investigate whether string theory is consistent. It’s not a huge number of people, but it exists. A few of these people can get more combative, or make unwarranted assumptions based on dedication to string theory in particular: for example, you’ll see the occasional argument that because something is difficult in string theory it must be impossible in any theory of quantum gravity. You see a spectrum in the community, from people for whom string theory is a promising project to people for whom it is a position that needs to be defended and argued for.

For the rest, the question of whether string theory describes the real world takes a back seat. They’re people who “have” string theory in the sense that they’re experts, and they use the theory primarily as a mathematical laboratory to learn broader things about how physics works. If you ask them, they might still say that they hypothesize string theory is true. But for most of these people, that question isn’t central to their work.

This Week, at FirstPrinciples.org

4 gravitons

Stories about physics from someone who's been there