Author Archives: 4gravitons

Post on the Weak Gravity Conjecture for FirstPrinciples.org

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I have another piece this week on the FirstPrinciples.org Hub. If you’d like to know who they are, I say a bit about my impressions of them in my post on the last piece I had there. They’re still finding their niche, so there may be shifts in the kind of content they cover over time, but for now they’ve given me an opportunity to cover a few topics that are off the beaten path.

This time, the piece is what we in the journalism biz call an “explainer”. Instead of interviewing people about cutting-edge science, I wrote a piece to explain an older idea. It’s an idea that’s pretty cool, in a way I think a lot of people can actually understand: a black hole puzzle that might explain why gravity is the weakest force. It’s an idea that’s had an enormous influence, both in the string theory world where it originated and on people speculating more broadly about the rules of quantum gravity. If you want to learn more, read the piece!

Since I didn’t interview anyone for this piece, I don’t have the same sort of “bonus content” I sometimes give. Instead of interviewing, I brushed up on the topic, and the best resource I found was this review article written by Dan Harlow, Ben Heidenreich, Matthew Reece, and Tom Rudelius. It gave me a much better idea of the subtleties: how many different ways there are to interpret the original conjecture, and how different attempts to build on it reflect on different facets and highlight different implications. If you are a physicist curious what the whole thing is about, I recommend reading that review: while I try to give a flavor of some of the subtleties, a piece for a broad audience can only do so much.

There Is No Shortcut to Saying What You Mean

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Blogger Andrew Oh-Willeke of Dispatches from Turtle Island pointed me to an editorial in Science about the phrase scientific consensus.

The editorial argues that by referring to conclusions like the existence of climate change or vaccine safety as “the scientific consensus”, communicators have inadvertently fanned the flames of distrust. By emphasizing agreement between scientists, the phrase “scientific consensus” leaves open the question of how that consensus was reached. More conspiracy-minded people imagine shady backroom deals and corrupt payouts, while the more realistic blame incentives and groupthink. If you disagree with “the scientific consensus”, you may thus decide the best way forward is to silence those pesky scientists.

(The link to current events is left as an exercise to the reader, to comment on elsewhere. As usual, please no explicit discussion of politics on this blog!)

Instead of “scientific consensus”, the editorial suggests another term, convergence of evidence. The idea is that by centering the evidence instead of the scientists, the phrase would make it clear that these conclusions are justified by something more than social pressures, and will remain even if the scientists promoting them are silenced.

Oh-Willeke pointed me to another blog post responding to the editorial, which has a nice discussion of how the terms were used historically, showing their popularity over time. “Convergence of evidence” was more popular in the 1950’s, with a small surge in the late 90’s and early 2000’s. “Scientific consensus” rose in the 1980’s and 90’s, lining up with a time when social scientists were skeptical about science’s objectivity and wanted to explore the social reasons why scientists come to agreement. It then fell around the year 2000, before rising again, this time used instead by professional groups of scientists to emphasize their agreement on issues like climate change.

(The blog post then goes on to try to motivate the word “consilience” instead, on the rather thin basis that “convergence of evidence” isn’t interdisciplinary enough, which seems like a pretty silly objection. “Convergence” implies coming in from multiple directions, it’s already interdisciplinary!)

I appreciate “convergence of evidence”, it seems like a useful phrase. But I think the editorial is working from the wrong perspective, in trying to argue for which terms “we should use” in the first place.

Sometimes, as a scientist or an organization or a journalist, you want to emphasize evidence. Is it “a preponderance of evidence”, most but not all? Is it “overwhelming evidence”, evidence so powerful it is unlikely to ever be defeated? Or is it a “convergence of evidence”, evidence that came in slowly from multiple paths, each independent route making a coincidence that much less likely?

But sometimes, you want to emphasize the judgement of the scientists themselves.

Sometimes when scientists agree, they’re working not from evidence but from personal experience: feelings of which kinds of research pan out and which don’t, or shared philosophies that sit deep in how they conceive their discipline. Describing physicists’ reasons for expecting supersymmetry before the LHC turned on as a convergence of evidence would be inaccurate. Describing it as having been a (not unanimous) consensus gets much closer to the truth.

Sometimes, scientists do have evidence, but as a journalist, you can’t evaluate its strength. You note some controversy, you can follow some of the arguments, but ultimately you have to be honest about how you got the information. And sometimes, that will be because it’s what most of the responsible scientists you talked to agreed on: scientific consensus.

As science communicators, we care about telling the truth (as much as we ever can, at any rate). As a result, we cannot adopt blanket rules of thumb. We cannot say, “we as a community are using this term now”. The only responsible thing we can do is to think about each individual word. We need to decide what we actually mean, to read widely and learn from experience, to find which words express our case in a way that is both convincing and accurate. There’s no shortcut to that, no formula where you just “use the right words” and everything turns out fine. You have to do the work, and hope it’s enough.

Experiments Should Be Surprising, but Not Too Surprising

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People are talking about colliders again.

This year, the European particle physics community is updating its shared plan for the future, the European Strategy for Particle Physics. A raft of proposals at the end of March stirred up a tail of public debate, focused on asking what sort of new particle collider should be built, and discussing potential reasons why.

That discussion, in turn, has got me thinking about experiments, and how they’re justified.

The purpose of experiments, and of science in general, is to learn something new. The more sure we are of something, the less reason there is to test it. Scientists don’t check whether the Sun rises every day. Like everyone else, they assume it will rise, and use that knowledge to learn other things.

You want your experiment to surprise you. But to design an experiment to surprise you, you run into a contradiction.

Suppose that every morning, you check whether the Sun rises. If it doesn’t, you will really be surprised! You’ll have made the discovery of the century! That’s a really exciting payoff, grant agencies should be lining up to pay for…

Well, is that actually likely to happen, though?

The same reasons it would be surprising if the Sun stopped rising are reasons why we shouldn’t expect the Sun to stop rising. A sunrise-checking observatory has incredibly high potential scientific reward…but an absurdly low chance of giving that reward.

Ok, so you can re-frame your experiment. You’re not hoping the Sun won’t rise, you’re observing the sunrise. You expect it to rise, almost guaranteed, so your experiment has an almost guaranteed payoff.

But what a small payoff! You saw exactly what you expected, there’s no science in that!

By either criterion, the “does the Sun rise” observatory is a stupid experiment. Real experiments operate in between the two extremes. They also mix motivations. Together, that leads to some interesting tensions.

What was the purpose of the Large Hadron Collider?

There were a few things physicists were pretty sure of, when they planned the LHC. Previous colliders had measured W bosons and Z bosons, and their properties made it clear that something was missing. If you could collide protons with enough energy, physicists were pretty sure you’d see the missing piece. Physicists had a reasonably plausible story for that missing piece, in the form of the Higgs boson. So physicists could be pretty sure they’d see something, and reasonably sure it would be the Higgs boson.

If physicists expected the Higgs boson, what was the point of the experiment?

First, physicists expected to see the Higgs boson, but they didn’t expect it to have the mass that it did. In fact, they didn’t know anything about the particle’s mass, besides that it should be low enough that the collider could produce it, and high enough that it hadn’t been detected before. The specific number? That was a surprise, and an almost-inevitable one. A rare creature, an almost-guaranteed scientific payoff.

I say almost, because there was a second point. The Higgs boson didn’t have to be there. In fact, it didn’t have to exist at all. There was a much bigger potential payoff, of noticing something very strange, something much more complicated than the straightforward theory most physicists had expected.

(Many people also argued for another almost-guaranteed payoff, and that got a lot more press. People talked about finding the origin of dark matter by discovering supersymmetric particles, which they argued was almost guaranteed due to a principle called naturalness. This is very important for understanding the history…but it’s an argument that many people feel has failed, and that isn’t showing up much anymore. So for this post, I’ll leave it to the side.)

This mix, of a guaranteed small surprise and the potential for a very large surprise, was a big part of what made the LHC make sense. The mix has changed a bit for people considering a new collider, and it’s making for a rougher conversation.

Like the LHC, most of the new collider proposals have a guaranteed payoff. The LHC could measure the mass of the Higgs, these new colliders will measure its “couplings”: how strongly it influences other particles and forces.

Unlike the LHC, though, this guarantee is not a guaranteed surprise. Before building the LHC, we did not know the mass of the Higgs, and we could not predict it. On the other hand, now we absolutely can predict the couplings of the Higgs. We have quite precise numbers, our expectation for what they should be based on a theory that so far has proven quite successful.

We aren’t certain, of course, just like physicists weren’t certain before. The Higgs boson might have many surprising properties, things that contradict our current best theory and usher in something new. These surprises could genuinely tell us something about some of the big questions, from the nature of dark matter to the universe’s balance of matter and antimatter to the stability of the laws of physics.

But of course, they also might not. We no longer have that rare creature, a guaranteed mild surprise, to hedge in case the big surprises fail. We have guaranteed observations, and experimenters will happily tell you about them…but no guaranteed surprises.

That’s a strange position to be in. And I’m not sure physicists have figured out what to do about it.

Antimatter Isn’t Magic

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You’ve heard of antimatter, right?

For each type of particle, there is a rare kind of evil twin with the opposite charge, called an anti-particle. When an anti-proton meets a proton, they annihilate each other in a giant blast of energy.

I see a lot of questions online about antimatter. One recurring theme is people asking a very general question: how does antimatter work?

If you’ve just heard the pop physics explanation, antimatter probably sounds like magic. What about antimatter lets it destroy normal matter? Does it need to touch? How long does it take? And what about neutral particles like neutrons?

You find surprisingly few good explanations of this online, but I can explain why. Physicists like me don’t expect antimatter to be confusing in this way, because to us, antimatter isn’t doing anything all that special. When a particle and an antiparticle annihilate, they’re doing the same thing that any other pair of particles do when they do…basically anything else.

Instead of matter and antimatter, let’s talk about one of the oldest pieces of evidence for quantum mechanics, the photoelectric effect. Scientists shone light at a metal, and found that if the wavelength of the light was short enough, electrons would spring free, causing an electric current. If the wavelength was too long, the metal wouldn’t emit any electrons, no matter how much light they shone. Einstein won his Nobel prize for the explanation: the light hitting the metal comes in particle-sized pieces, called photons, whose energy is determined by the wavelength of the light. If the individual photons don’t have enough energy to get an electron to leave the metal, then no electron will move, no matter how many photons you use.

What happens to the photons after they hit the metal?

They go away. We say they are absorbed, an electron absorbs a photon and speeds up, increasing its kinetic energy so it can escape.

But we could just as easily say the photon is annihilated, if we wanted to.

In the photoelectric effect, you start with one electron and one photon, they come together, and you end up with one electron and no photon. In proton-antiproton annihilation, you start with a proton and an antiproton, they come together, and you end up with no protons or antiprotons, but instead “energy”…which in practice, usually means two photons.

That’s all that happens, deep down at the root of things. The laws of physics are rules about inputs and outputs. Start with these particles, they come together, you end up with these other particles. Sometimes one of the particles stays the same. Sometimes particles seem to transform, and different kinds of particles show up. Sometimes some of the particles are photons, and you think of them as “just energy”, and easy to absorb. But particles are particles, and nothing is “just energy”. Each thing, absorption, decay, annihilation, each one is just another type of what we call interactions.

What makes annihilation of matter and antimatter seem unique comes down to charges. Interactions have to obey the laws of physics: they conserve energy, they conserve momentum, and they conserve charge.

So why can an antiproton and a proton annihilate to pure photons, while two protons can’t? A proton and an antiproton have opposite charge, a photon has zero charge. You could combine two protons to make something else, but it would have to have the same charge as two protons.

What about neutrons? A neutron has no electric charge, so you might think it wouldn’t need antimatter. But a neutron has another type of charge, called baryon number. In order to annihilate one, you’d need an anti-neutron, which would still have zero electric charge but would have the opposite baryon number. (By the way, physicists have been making anti-neutrons since 1956.)

On the other hand, photons actually have no charge. So do Higgs bosons. So one Higgs boson can become two photons, without annihilating with anything else. Each of these particles can be called its own antiparticle: a photon is also an antiphoton, a Higgs is also an anti-Higgs.

Because particle-antiparticle annihilation follows the same rules as other interactions between particles, it also takes place via the same forces. When a proton and an antiproton annihilate each other, they typically do this via the electromagnetic force. This is why you end up with light, which is an electromagnetic wave. Like everything in the quantum world, this annihilation isn’t certain. Is has a chance to happen, proportional to the strength of the interaction force involved.

What about neutrinos? They also appear to have a kind of charge, called lepton number. That might not really be a conserved charge, and neutrinos might be their own antiparticles, like photons. However, they are much less likely to be annihilated than protons and antiprotons, because they don’t have electric charge, and thus their interaction doesn’t depend on the electromagnetic force, but on the much weaker weak nuclear force. A weaker force means a less likely interaction.

Antimatter might seem like the stuff of science fiction. But it’s not really harder to understand than anything else in particle physics.

(I know, that’s a low bar!)

It’s just interactions. Particles go in, particles go out. If it follows the rules, it can happen, if it doesn’t, it can’t. Antimatter is no different.

I’ve Felt Like a Hallucinating LLM

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ChatGPT and its kin work by using Large Language Models, or LLMs.

A climate model is a pile of mathematics and code, honed on data from the climate of the past. Tell it how the climate starts out, and it will give you a prediction for what happens next.

Similarly, a language model is a pile of mathematics and code, honed on data from the texts of the past. Tell it how a text starts, and it will give you a prediction for what happens next.

We have a rough idea of what a climate model can predict. The climate has to follow the laws of physics, for example. Similarly, a text should follow the laws of grammar, the order of verbs and nouns and so forth. The creators of the earliest, smallest language models figured out how to do that reasonably well.

Texts do more than just follow grammar, though. They can describe the world. And LLMs are both surprisingly good and surprisingly bad at that. They can do a lot when used right, answering test questions most humans would struggle with. But they also “hallucinate”, confidently saying things that have nothing to do with reality.

If you want to understand why large language models make both good predictions and bad, you shouldn’t just think about abstract “texts”. Instead, think about a specific type of text: a story.

Stories follow grammar, most of the time. But they also follow their own logic. The hero sets out, saves the world, and returns home again. The evil queen falls from the tower at the climax of the final battle. There are three princesses, and only the third can break the spell.

We aren’t usually taught this logic, like we’re taught physics or grammar. We learn it from experience, from reading stories and getting used to patterns. It’s the logic, not of how a story must go, but of how a story typically goes. And that question, of what typically comes next, is exactly the question LLMs are designed to answer.

It’s also a question we sometimes answer.

I was a theatre kid, and I loved improv in particular. Some of it was improv comedy, the games and skits you might have seen on “Whose Line is it Anyway?” But some of it was more…hippy stuff.

I’d meet up with a group on Saturdays. One year we made up a creation myth, half-rehearsed and half-improvised, a collection of gods and primordial beings. The next year we moved the story forward. Civilization had risen…and fallen again. We played a group of survivors gathered around a campfire, wary groups wondering what came next.

We plotted out characters ahead of time. I was the “villain”, or the closest we had to one. An enforcer of the just-fallen empire, the oppressor embodied. While the others carried clubs, staves, and farm implements, I was the only one with a real weapon: a sword.

(Plastic in reality, but the audience knew what to do.)

In the arguments and recriminations of the story, that sword set me apart, a constant threat that turned my character from contemptible to dangerous, that gave me a seat at the table even as I antagonized and stirred the pot.

But the story had another direction. The arguments pushed and pulled, and gradually the survivors realized that they would not survive if they did not put their grievances to rest, if they did not seek peace. So, one man stepped forward, and tossed his staff into the fire.

The others followed. One by one, clubs and sticks and menacing tools were cast aside. And soon, I was the only one armed.

If I was behaving logically, if I followed my character’s interests, I would have “won” there. I had gotten what I wanted, now there was no check on my power.

But that wasn’t what the story wanted. Improv is a game of fast decisions and fluid invention. We follow our instincts, and our instincts are shaped by experience. The stories of the past guide our choices, and must often be the only guide: we don’t have time to edit, or to second-guess.

And I felt the story, and what it wanted. It was a command that transcended will, that felt like it left no room for an individual actor making an individual decision.

I cast my sword into the fire.

The instinct that brought me to do that is the same instinct that guides authors when they say that their characters write themselves, when their story goes in an unexpected direction. It’s an instinct that can be tempered and counteracted, with time and effort, because it can easily lead to nonsense. It’s why every good book needs an editor, why improv can be as repetitive as it is magical.

And it’s been the best way I’ve found to understand LLMs.

An LLM telling a story tells a typical story, based on the data used to create it. In the same way, an LLM giving advice gives typical advice, to some extent in content but more importantly in form, advice that is confident and mentions things advice often mentions. An LLM writing a biography will write a typical biography, which may not be your biography, even if your biography was one of those used to create it, because it tries to predict how a biography should go based on all the other biographies. And all of these predictions and hallucinations are very much the kind of snap judgement that disarmed me.

These days, people are trying to build on top of LLMs and make technology that does more, that can edit and check its decisions. For the most part, they’re building these checks out of LLMs. Instead of telling one story, of someone giving advice on the internet, they tell two stories: the advisor and the editor, one giving the advice and one correcting it. They have to tell these stories many times, broken up into many parts, to approximate something other than the improv actor’s first instincts, and that’s why software that does this is substantially more expensive than more basic software that doesn’t.

I can’t say how far they’ll get. Models need data to work well, decisions need reliability to be good, computers need infrastructure to compute. But if you want to understand what’s at an LLM’s beating heart, think about the first instincts you have in writing or in theatre, in stories or in play. Then think about a machine that just does that.

Lambda-CDM Is Not Like the Standard Model

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A statistician will tell you that all models are wrong, but some are useful.

Particle physicists have an enormously successful model called the Standard Model, which describes the world in terms of seventeen quantum fields, giving rise to particles from the familiar electron to the challenging-to-measure Higgs boson. The model has nineteen parameters, numbers that aren’t predicted by the model itself but must be found by doing experiments and finding the best statistical fit. With those numbers as input, the model is extremely accurate, aside from the occasional weird discrepancy.

Cosmologists have their own very successful standard model that they use to model the universe as a whole. Called ΛCDM, it describes the universe in terms of three things: dark energy, denoted with a capital lambda (Λ), cold dark matter (CDM), and ordinary matter, all interacting with each other via gravity. The model has six parameters, which must be found by observing the universe and finding the best statistical fit. When those numbers are input, the model is extremely accurate, though there have recently been some high-profile discrepancies.

These sound pretty similar. You model the world as a list of things, fix your parameters based on nature, and make predictions. Wikipedia has a nice graphic depicting the quantum fields of the Standard Model, and you could imagine a similar graphic for ΛCDM.

A graphic like that would be misleading, though.

ΛCDM doesn’t just propose a list of fields and let them interact freely. Instead, it tries to model the universe as a whole, which means it carries assumptions about how matter and energy are distributed, and how space-time is shaped. Some of this is controlled by its parameters, and by tweaking them one can model a universe that varies in different ways. But other assumptions are baked in. If the universe had a very different shape, caused by a very different distribution of matter and energy, then we would need a very different model to represent it. We couldn’t use ΛCDM.

The Standard Model isn’t like that. If you collide two protons together, you need a model of how quarks are distributed inside protons. But that model isn’t the Standard Model, it’s a separate model used for that particular type of experiment. The Standard Model is supposed to be the big picture, the stuff that exists and affects every experiment you can do.

That means the Standard Model is supported in a way that ΛCDM isn’t. The Standard Model describes many different experiments, and is supported by almost all of them. When an experiment disagrees, it has specific implications for part of the model only. For example, neutrinos have mass, which was not predicted in the Standard Model, but it proved easy for people to modify the model to fit. We know the Standard Model is not the full picture, but we also know that any deviations from it must be very small. Large deviations would contradict other experiments, or more basic principles like probabilities needing to be smaller than one.

In contrast, ΛCDM is really just supported by one experiment. We have one universe to observe. We can gather a lot of data, measuring it from its early history to the recent past. But we can’t run it over and over again under different conditions, and our many measurements are all measuring different aspects of the same thing. That’s why unlike in the Standard Model, we can’t separate out assumptions about the shape of the universe from assumptions about what it contains. Dark energy and dark matter are on the same footing as distribution of fluctuations and homogeneity and all those shape-related words, part of one model that gets fit together as a whole.

And so while both the Standard Model and ΛCDM are successful, that success means something different. It’s hard to imagine that we find new evidence and discover that electrons don’t exist, or quarks don’t exist. But we may well find out that dark energy doesn’t exist, or that the universe has a radically different shape. The statistical success of ΛCDM is impressive, and it means any alternative has a high bar to clear. But it doesn’t have to mean rethinking everything the way an alternative to the Standard Model would.

I Have a Theory

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“I have a theory,” says the scientist in the book. But what does that mean? What does it mean to “have” a theory?

First, there’s the everyday sense. When you say “I have a theory”, you’re talking about an educated guess. You think you know why something happened, and you want to check your idea and get feedback. A pedant would tell you you don’t really have a theory, you have a hypothesis. It’s “your” hypothesis, “your theory”, because it’s what you think happened.

The pedant would insist that “theory” means something else. A theory isn’t a guess, even an educated guess. It’s an explanation with evidence, tested and refined in many different contexts in many different ways, a whole framework for understanding the world, the most solid knowledge science can provide. Despite the pedant’s insistence, that isn’t the only way scientists use the word “theory”. But it is a common one, and a central one. You don’t really “have” a theory like this, though, except in the sense that we all do. These are explanations with broad consensus, things you either know of or don’t, they don’t belong to one person or another.

Except, that is, if one person takes credit for them. We sometimes say “Darwin’s theory of evolution”, or “Einstein’s theory of relativity”. In that sense, we could say that Einstein had a theory, or that Darwin had a theory.

Sometimes, though, “theory” doesn’t mean this standard official definition, even when scientists say it. And that changes what it means to “have” a theory.

For some researchers, a theory is a lens with which to view the world. This happens sometimes in physics, where you’ll find experts who want to think about a situation in terms of thermodynamics, or in terms of a technique called Effective Field Theory. It happens in mathematics, where some choose to analyze an idea with category theory not to prove new things about it, but just to translate it into category theory lingo. It’s most common, though, in the humanities, where researchers often specialize in a particular “interpretive framework”.

For some, a theory is a hypothesis, but also a pet project. There are physicists who come up with an idea (maybe there’s a variant of gravity with mass! maybe dark energy is changing!) and then focus their work around that idea. That includes coming up with ways to test whether the idea is true, showing the idea is consistent, and understanding what variants of the idea could be proposed. These ideas are hypotheses, in that they’re something the scientist thinks could be true. But they’re also ideas with many moving parts that motivate work by themselves.

Taken to the extreme, this kind of “having” a theory can go from healthy science to political bickering. Instead of viewing an idea as a hypothesis you might or might not confirm, it can become a platform to fight for. Instead of investigating consistency and proposing tests, you focus on arguing against objections and disproving your rivals. This sometimes happens in science, especially in more embattled areas, but it happens much more often with crackpots, where people who have never really seen science done can decide it’s time for their idea, right or wrong.

Finally, sometimes someone “has” a theory that isn’t a hypothesis at all. In theoretical physics, a “theory” can refer to a complete framework, even if that framework isn’t actually supposed to describe the real world. Some people spend time focusing on a particular framework of this kind, understanding its properties in the hope of getting broader insights. By becoming an expert on one particular theory, they can be said to “have” that theory.

Bonus question: in what sense do string theorists “have” string theory?

You might imagine that string theory is an interpretive framework, like category theory, with string theorists coming up with the “string version” of things others understand in other ways. This, for the most part, doesn’t happen. Without knowing whether string theory is true, there isn’t much benefit in just translating other things to string theory terms, and people for the most part know this.

For some, string theory is a pet project hypothesis. There is a community of people who try to get predictions out of string theory, or who investigate whether string theory is consistent. It’s not a huge number of people, but it exists. A few of these people can get more combative, or make unwarranted assumptions based on dedication to string theory in particular: for example, you’ll see the occasional argument that because something is difficult in string theory it must be impossible in any theory of quantum gravity. You see a spectrum in the community, from people for whom string theory is a promising project to people for whom it is a position that needs to be defended and argued for.

For the rest, the question of whether string theory describes the real world takes a back seat. They’re people who “have” string theory in the sense that they’re experts, and they use the theory primarily as a mathematical laboratory to learn broader things about how physics works. If you ask them, they might still say that they hypothesize string theory is true. But for most of these people, that question isn’t central to their work.

This Week, at FirstPrinciples.org

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I’ve got a piece out this week in a new venue: FirstPrinciples.org, where I’ve written a profile of a startup called Vaire Computing.

Vaire works on reversible computing, an idea that tries to leverage thermodynamics to make a computer that wastes as little heat as possible. While I learned a lot of fun things that didn’t make it into the piece…I’m not going to tell you them this week! That’s because I’m working on another piece about reversible computing, focused on a different aspect of the field. When that piece is out I’ll have a big “bonus material post” talking about what I learned writing both pieces.

This week, instead, the bonus material is about FirstPrinciples.org itself, where you’ll be seeing me write more often in future. The First Principles Foundation was founded by Ildar Shar, a Canadian tech entrepreneur who thinks that physics is pretty cool. (Good taste that!) His foundation aims to support scientific progress, especially in addressing the big, fundamental questions. They give grants, analyze research trends, build scientific productivity tools…and most relevantly for me, publish science news on their website, in a section called the Hub.

The first time I glanced through the Hub, it was clear that FirstPrinciples and I have a lot in common. Like me, they’re interested both in scientific accomplishments and in the human infrastructure that makes them possible. They’ve interviewed figures in the open access movement, like the creators of arXiv and SciPost. On the science side, they mix coverage of the mainstream and reputable with outsiders challenging the status quo, and hot news topics with explainers of key concepts. They’re still new, and still figuring out what they want to be. But from my glimpse on the way, it looks like they’re going somewhere good.

Hot Things Are Less Useful

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Did you know that particle colliders have to cool down their particle beams before they collide?

You might have learned in school that temperature is secretly energy. With a number called Boltzmann’s constant, you can convert a temperature of a gas in Kelvin to the average energy of a molecule in the gas. If that’s what you remember about temperature, it might seem weird that someone would cool down the particles in a particle collider. The whole point of a particle collider is to accelerate particles, giving them lots of energy, before colliding them together. Since those particles have a lot of energy, they must be very hot, right?

Well, no. Here’s the thing: temperature is not just the average energy. It’s the average random energy. It’s energy that might be used to make a particle move forward or backwards, up or down, a random different motion for each particle. It doesn’t include motion that’s the same for each particle, like the movement of a particle beam.

Cooling down a particle beam then, doesn’t mean slowing it down. Rather, it means making it more consistent, getting the different particles moving in the same direction rather than randomly spreading apart. You want the particles to go somewhere specific, speeding up and slamming into the other beam. You don’t want them to move randomly, running into the walls and destroying your collider. So you can have something with high energy that is comparatively cool.

In general, the best way I’ve found to think about temperature and heat is in terms of usefulness and uselessness. Cool things are useful, they do what you expect and not much more. Hot things are less useful, they use energy to do random things you don’t want. Sometimes, by chance, this random energy will still do something useful, and if you have a cold thing to pair with the hot thing, you can take advantage of this in a consistent way. But hot things by themselves are less useful, and that’s why particle colliders try to cool down their beams.

AI Can’t Do Science…And Neither Can Other Humans

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Seen on Twitter:

I don’t know the context here, so I can’t speak to what Prof. Cronin meant. But it got me thinking.

Suppose you, like Prof. Cronin, were to insist that AI “cannot in principle” do science, because AI “is not autonomous” and “does not come up with its own problems to solve”. What might you mean?

You might just be saying that AI is bad at coming up with new problems to solve. That’s probably fair, at least at the moment. People have experimented with creating simple “AI researchers” that “study” computer programs, coming up with hypotheses about the programs’ performance and testing them. But it’s a long road from that to reproducing the much higher standards human scientists have to satisfy.

You probably don’t mean that, though. If you did, you wouldn’t have said “in principle”. You mean something stronger.

More likely, you might mean that AI cannot come up with its own problems, because AI is a tool. People come up with problems, and use AI to help solve them. In this perspective, not only is AI “not autonomous”, it cannot be autonomous.

On a practical level, this is clearly false. Yes, machine learning models, the core technology in current AI, are set up to answer questions. A user asks something, and receives the model’s prediction of the answer. That’s a tool, but for the more flexible models like GPT it’s trivial to turn it into something autonomous. Just add another program: a loop that asks the model what to do, does it, tells the model the result, and asks what to do next. Like taping a knife to a Roomba, you’ve made a very simple modification to make your technology much more dangerous.

You might object, though, that this simple modification of GPT is not really autonomous. After all, a human created it. That human had some goal, some problem they wanted to solve, and the AI is just solving the problem for them.

That may be a fair description of current AI, but insisting it’s true in principle has some awkward implications. If you make a “physics AI”, just tell it to do “good physics”, and it starts coming up with hypotheses you’d never thought of, is it really fair to say it’s just solving your problem?

What if the AI, instead, was a child? Picture a physicist encouraging a child to follow in their footsteps, filling their life with physics ideas and rhapsodizing about the hard problems of the field at the dinner table. Suppose the child becomes a physicist in turn, and finds success later in life. Were they really autonomous? Were they really a scientist?

What if the child, instead, was a scientific field, and the parent was the general public? The public votes for representatives, the representatives vote to hire agencies, and the agencies promise scientists they’ll give them money if they like the problems they come up with. Who is autonomous here?

(And what happens if someone takes a hammer to that process? I’m…still not talking about this! No-politics-rule still in effect, sorry! I do have a post planned, but it will have to wait until I can deal with the fallout.)

At this point, you’d probably stop insisting. You’d drop that “in principle”, and stick with the claim I started with, that current AI can’t be a scientist.

But you have another option.

You can accept the whole chain of awkward implications, bite all the proverbial bullets. Yes, you insist, AI is not autonomous. Neither is the physicist’s child in your story, and neither are the world’s scientists paid by government grants. Each is a tool, used by the one, true autonomous scientist: you.

You are stuck in your skull, a blob of curious matter trained on decades of experience in the world and pre-trained with a couple billion years of evolution. For whatever reason, you want to know more, so you come up with problems to solve. You’re probably pretty vague about those problems. You might want to see more pretty pictures of space, or wrap your head around the nature of time. So you turn the world into your tool. You vote and pay taxes, so your government funds science. You subscribe to magazines and newspapers, so you hear about it. You press out against the world, and along with the pressure that already exists it adds up, and causes change. Biological intelligences and artificial intelligences scurry at your command. From their perspective, they are proposing their own problems, much more detailed and complex than the problems you want to solve. But from yours, they’re your limbs beyond limbs, sight beyond sight, asking the fundamental questions you want answered.