Tag Archives: quantum gravity

Bonus Info For “Cosmic Paradox Reveals the Awful Consequence of an Observer-Free Universe”

I had a piece in Quanta Magazine recently, about a tricky paradox that’s puzzling quantum gravity researchers and some early hints at its resolution.

The paradox comes from trying to describe “closed universes”, which are universes where it is impossible to reach the edge, even if you had infinite time to do it. This could be because the universe wraps around like a globe, or because the universe is expanding so fast no traveler could ever reach an edge. Recently, theoretical physicists have been trying to describe these closed universes, and have noticed a weird issue: each such universe appears to have only one possible quantum state. In general, quantum systems have more possible states the more complex they are, so for a whole universe to have only one possible state is a very strange thing, implying a bizarrely simple universe. Most worryingly, our universe may well be closed. Does that mean that secretly, the real world has only one possible state?

There is a possible solution that a few groups are playing around with. The argument that a closed universe has only one state depends on the fact that nothing inside a closed universe can reach the edge. But if nothing can reach the edge, then trying to observe the universe as a whole from outside would tell you nothing of use. Instead, any reasonable measurement would have to come from inside the universe. Such a measurement introduces a new kind of “edge of the universe”, this time not in the far distance, but close by: the edge between an observer and the rest of the world. And when you add that edge to the calculations, the universe stops being closed, and has all the many states it ought to.

This was an unusually tricky story for me to understand. I narrowly avoided several misconceptions, and I’m still not sure I managed to dodge all of them. Likewise, it was unusually tricky for the editors to understand, and I suspect it was especially tricky for Quanta’s social media team to understand.

It was also, quite clearly, tricky for the readers to understand. So I thought I would use this post to clear up a few misconceptions. I’ll say a bit more about what I learned investigating this piece, and try to clarify what the result does and does not mean.

Q: I’m confused about the math terms you’re using. Doesn’t a closed set contain its boundary?

A: Annoyingly, what physicists mean by a closed universe is a bit different from what mathematicians mean by a closed manifold, which is in turn more restrictive than what mathematicians mean by a closed set. One way to think about this that helped me is that in an open set you can take a limit that takes you out of the set, which is like being able to describe a (possibly infinite) path that takes you “out of the universe”. A closed set doesn’t have that, every path, no matter how long, still ends up in the same universe.

Q: So a bunch of string theorists did a calculation and got a result that doesn’t make sense, a one-state universe. What if they’re just wrong?

A: Two things:

First, the people I talked to emphasized that it’s pretty hard to wiggle out of the conclusion. It’s not just a matter of saying you don’t believe in string theory and that’s that. The argument is based in pretty fundamental principles, and it’s not easy to propose a way out that doesn’t mess up something even more important.

That’s not to say it’s impossible. One of the people I interviewed, Henry Maxfield, thinks that some of the recent arguments are misunderstanding how to use one of their core techniques, in a way that accidentally presupposes the one-state universe.

But even he thinks that the bigger point, that closed universes have only one state, is probably true.

And that’s largely due to a second reason: there are older arguments that back the conclusion up.

One of the oldest dates back to John Wheeler, a physicist famous for both deep musings about the nature of space and time and coining evocative terms like “wormhole”. In the 1960’s, Wheeler argued that, in a theory where space and time can be curved, one should think of a system’s state as including every configuration it can evolve into over time, since it can be tricky to specify a moment “right now”. In a closed universe, you could expect a quantum system to explore every possible configuration…meaning that such a universe should be described by only one state.

Later, physicists studying holography ran into a similar conclusion. They kept noticing systems in quantum gravity where you can describe everything that happens inside by what happens on the edges. If there are no edges, that seems to suggest that in some sense there is nothing inside. Apparently, Lenny Susskind had a slide at the end of talks in the 90’s where he kept bringing up this point.

So even if the modern arguments are wrong, and even if string theory is wrong…it still looks like the overall conclusion is right.

Q: If a closed universe has only one state, does that make it deterministic, and thus classical?

A: Oh boy…

So, on the one hand, there is an idea, which I think also goes back to Wheeler, that asks: “if the universe as a whole has a wavefunction, how does it collapse?” One possibility is that the universe has only one state, so that nobody is needed to collapse the wavefunction, it already is in a definite state.

On the other hand, a universe with only one state does not actually look much like a classical universe. Our universe looks classical largely due to a process called decoherence, where small quantum systems interact with big quantum systems with many states, diluting quantum effects until the world looks classical. If there is only one state, there are no big systems to interact with, and the world has large quantum fluctuations that make it look very different from a classical universe.

Q: How, exactly, are you defining “observer”?

A: A few commenters helpfully chimed in to talk about how physics models observers as “witness” systems, objects that preserve some record of what happens to them. A simple example is a ball sitting next to a bowl: if you find the ball in the bowl later, it means something moved it. This process, preserving what happens and making it more obvious, is in essence how physicists think about observers.

However, this isn’t the whole story in this case. Here, different research groups introducing observers are doing it in different ways. That’s, in part, why none of them are confident they have the right answer.

One of the approaches describes an observer in terms of its path through space and time, its worldline. Instead of a detailed witness system with specific properties, all they do is pick out a line and say “the observer is there”. Identifying that line, and declaring it different from its surroundings, seems to be enough to recover the complexity the universe ought to have.

The other approach treats the witness system in a bit more detail. We usually treat an observer in quantum mechanics as infinitely large compared to the quantum systems they measure. This approach instead gives the observer a finite size, and uses that to estimate how far their experience will be from classical physics.

Crucially, both approaches aren’t a matter of defining a physical object, and looking for it in the theory. Given a collection of atoms, neither team can tell you what is an observer, and what isn’t. Instead, in each approach, the observer is arbitrary: a choice, made by us when we use quantum mechanics, of what to count as an observer and what to count as the rest of the world. That choice can be made in many different ways, and each approach tries to describe what happens when you change that choice.

This is part of what makes this approach uncomfortable to some more philosophically-minded physicists: it treats observers not as a predictable part of the physical world, but as a mathematical description used to make statements about the world.

Q: If these ideas come from AdS/CFT, which is an open universe, how do you use them to describe a closed universe?

A: While more examples emerged later, initially theorists were thinking about two types of closed universes:

First, think about a black hole. You may have heard that when you fall into a black hole, you watch the whole universe age away before your eyes, due to the dramatic differences in the passage of time caused by the extreme gravity. Once you’ve seen the outside universe fade away, you are essentially in a closed universe of your own. The outside world will never affect you again, and you are isolated, with no path to the outside. These black hole interiors are one of the examples theorists looked at.

The other example are so-called “baby universes”. When physicists use quantum mechanics to calculate the chance of something happening, they have to add up every possible series of events that could have happened in between. For quantum gravity, this includes every possible arrangement of space and time. This includes arrangements with different shapes, including ones with tiny extra “baby universes” which branch off from the main universe and return. Universes with these “baby universes” are another example that theorists considered to understand closed universes.

Q: So wait, are you actually saying the universe needs to be observed to exist? That’s ridiculous, didn’t the universe exist long before humans existed to observe it? Is this some sort of Copenhagen Interpretation thing, or that thing called QBism?

You’re starting to ask philosophical questions, and here’s the thing:

There are physicists who spend their time thinking about how to interpret quantum mechanics. They talk to philosophers, and try to figure out how to answer these kinds of questions in a consistent and systematic way, keeping track of all the potential pitfalls and implications. They’re part of a subfield called “quantum foundations”.

The physicists whose work I was talking about in that piece are not those people.

Of the people I interviewed, one of them, Rob Myers, probably has lunch with quantum foundations researchers on occasion. The others, based at places like MIT and the IAS, probably don’t even do that.

Instead, these are people trying to solve a technical problem, people whose first inclination is to put philosophy to the side, and “shut up and calculate”. These people did a calculation that ought to have worked, checking how many quantum states they could find in a closed universe, and found a weird and annoying answer: just one. Trying to solve the problem, they’ve done technical calculation work, introducing a path through the universe, or a boundary around an observer, and seeing what happens. While some of them may have their own philosophical leanings, they’re not writing works of philosophy. Their papers don’t talk through the philosophical implications of their ideas in all that much detail, and they may well have different thoughts as to what those implications are.

So while I suspect I know the answers they would give to some of these questions, I’m not sure.

Instead, how about I tell you what I think?

I’m not a philosopher, I can’t promise my views will be consistent, that they won’t suffer from some pitfall. But unlike other people’s views, I can tell you what my own views are.

To start off: yes, the universe existed before humans. No, there is nothing special about our minds, we don’t have psychic powers to create the universe with our thoughts or anything dumb like that.

What I think is that, if we want to describe the world, we ought to take lessons from science.

Science works. It works for many reasons, but two important ones stand out.

Science works because it leads to technology, and it leads to technology because it guides actions. It lets us ask, if I do this, what will happen? What will I experience?

And science works because it lets people reach agreement. It lets people reach agreement because it lets us ask, if I observe this, what do I expect you to observe? And if we agree, we can agree on the science.

Ultimately, if we want to describe the world with the virtues of science, our descriptions need to obey this rule: they need to let us ask “what if?” questions about observations.

That means that science cannot avoid an observer. It can often hide the observer, place them far away and give them an infinite mind to behold what they see, so that one observer is essentially the same as another. But we shouldn’t expect to always be able to do this. Sometimes, we can’t avoid saying something about the observer: about where they are, or how big they are, for example.

These observers, though, don’t have to actually exist. We should be able to ask “what if” questions about others, and that means we should be able to dream up fictional observers, and ask, if they existed, what would they see? We can imagine observers swimming in the quark-gluon plasma after the Big Bang, or sitting inside a black hole’s event horizon, or outside our visible universe. The existence of the observer isn’t a physical requirement, but a methodological one: a restriction on how we can make useful, scientific statements about the world. Our theory doesn’t have to explain where observers “come from”, and can’t and shouldn’t do that. The observers aren’t part of the physical world being described, they’re a precondition for us to describe that world.

Is this the Copenhagen Interpretation? I’m not a historian, but I don’t think so. The impression I get is that there was no real Copenhagen Interpretation, that Bohr and Heisenberg, while more deeply interested in philosophy than many physicists today, didn’t actually think things through in enough depth to have a perspective you can name and argue with.

Is this QBism? I don’t think so. It aligns with some things QBists say, but they say a lot of silly things as well. It’s probably some kind of instrumentalism, for what that’s worth.

Is it logical positivism? I’ve been told logical positivists would argue that the world outside the visible universe does not exist. If that’s true, I’m not a logical positivist.

Is it pragmatism? Maybe? What I’ve seen of pragmatism definitely appeals to me, but I’ve seen my share of negative characterizations as well.

In the end, it’s an idea about what’s useful and what’s not, about what moves science forward and what doesn’t. It tries to avoid being preoccupied with unanswerable questions, and as much as possible to cash things out in testable statements. If I do this, what happens? What if I did that instead?

The results I covered for Quanta, to me, show that the observer matters on a deep level. That isn’t a physical statement, it isn’t a mystical statement. It’s a methodological statement: if we want to be scientists, we can’t give up on the observer.

Technology as Evidence

Post on the Weak Gravity Conjecture for FirstPrinciples.org

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I have another piece this week on the FirstPrinciples.org Hub. If you’d like to know who they are, I say a bit about my impressions of them in my post on the last piece I had there. They’re still finding their niche, so there may be shifts in the kind of content they cover over time, but for now they’ve given me an opportunity to cover a few topics that are off the beaten path.

This time, the piece is what we in the journalism biz call an “explainer”. Instead of interviewing people about cutting-edge science, I wrote a piece to explain an older idea. It’s an idea that’s pretty cool, in a way I think a lot of people can actually understand: a black hole puzzle that might explain why gravity is the weakest force. It’s an idea that’s had an enormous influence, both in the string theory world where it originated and on people speculating more broadly about the rules of quantum gravity. If you want to learn more, read the piece!

Since I didn’t interview anyone for this piece, I don’t have the same sort of “bonus content” I sometimes give. Instead of interviewing, I brushed up on the topic, and the best resource I found was this review article written by Dan Harlow, Ben Heidenreich, Matthew Reece, and Tom Rudelius. It gave me a much better idea of the subtleties: how many different ways there are to interpret the original conjecture, and how different attempts to build on it reflect on different facets and highlight different implications. If you are a physicist curious what the whole thing is about, I recommend reading that review: while I try to give a flavor of some of the subtleties, a piece for a broad audience can only do so much.

How Small Scales Can Matter for Large Scales

Which String Theorists Are You Complaining About?

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Do string theorists have an unfair advantage? Do they have an easier time getting hired, for example?

In one of the perennial arguments about this on Twitter, Martin Bauer posted a bar chart of faculty hires in the US by sub-field. The chart was compiled by Erich Poppitz from data in the US particle physics rumor mill, a website where people post information about who gets hired where for the US’s quite small number of permanent theoretical particle physics positions at research universities and national labs. The data covers 1994 to 2017, and shows one year, 1999, when there were more string theorists hired than all other topics put together. The years around then also had many string theorists hired, but the proportion starts falling around the mid 2000’s…around when Lee Smolin wrote a book, The Trouble With Physics, arguing that string theorists had strong-armed their way into academic dominance. After that, the percentage of string theorists falls, oscillating between a tenth and a quarter of total hires.

Judging from that, you get the feeling that string theory’s critics are treating a temporary hiring fad as if it was a permanent fact. The late 1990’s were a time of high-profile developments in string theory that excited a lot of people. Later, other hiring fads dominated, often driven by experiments: I remember when the US decided to prioritize neutrino experiments and neutrino theorists had a much easier time getting hired, and there seem to be similar pushes now with gravitational waves, quantum computing, and AI.

Thinking about the situation in this way, though, ignores what many of the critics have in mind. That’s because the “string” column on that bar chart is not necessarily what people think of when they think of string theory.

If you look at the categories on Poppitz’s bar chart, you’ll notice something odd. “String” its itself a category. Another category, “lattice”, refers to lattice QCD, a method to find the dynamics of quarks numerically. The third category, though, is a combination of three things “ph/th/cosm”.

“Cosm” here refers to cosmology, another sub-field. “Ph” and “th” though aren’t really sub-fields. Instead, they’re arXiv categories, sections of the website arXiv.org where physicists post papers before they submit them to journals. The “ph” category is used for phenomenology, the type of theoretical physics where people try to propose models of the real world and make testable predictions. The “th” category is for “formal theory”, papers where theoretical physicists study the kinds of theories they use in more generality and develop new calculation methods, with insights that over time filter into “ph” work.

“String”, on the other hand, is not an arXiv category. When string theorists write papers, they’ll put them into “th” or “ph” or another relevant category (for example “gr-qc”, for general relativity and quantum cosmology). This means that when Poppitz distinguishes “ph/th/cosm” from “string”, he’s being subjective, using his own judgement to decide who counts as a string theorist.

So who counts as a string theorist? The simplest thing to do would be to check if their work uses strings. Failing that, they could use other tools of string theory and its close relatives, like Calabi-Yau manifolds, M-branes, and holography.

That might be what Poppitz was doing, but if he was, he was probably missing a lot of the people critics of string theory complain about. He even misses many people who describe themselves as string theorists. In an old post of mine I go through the talks at Strings, string theory’s big yearly conference, giving them finer-grained categories. The majority don’t use anything uniquely stringy.

Instead, I think critics of string theory have two kinds of things in mind.

First, most of the people who made their reputations on string theory are still in academia, and still widely respected. Some of them still work on string theory topics, but many now work on other things. Because they’re still widely respected, their interests have a substantial influence on the field. When one of them starts looking at connections between theories of two-dimensional materials, you get a whole afternoon of talks at Strings about theories of two-dimensional materials. Working on those topics probably makes it a bit easier to get a job, but also, many of the people working on them are students of these highly respected people, who just because of that have an easier time getting a job. If you’re a critic of string theory who thinks the founders of the field led physics astray, then you probably think they’re still leading physics astray even if they aren’t currently working on string theory.

Second, for many other people in physics, string theorists are their colleagues and friends. They’ll make fun of trends that seem overhyped and under-thought, like research on the black hole information paradox or the swampland, or hopes that a slightly tweaked version of supersymmetry will show up soon at the LHC. But they’ll happily use ideas developed in string theory when they prove handy, using supersymmetric theories to test new calculation techniques, string theory’s extra dimensions to inspire and ground new ideas for dark matter, or the math of strings themselves as interesting shortcuts to particle physics calculations. String theory is available as reference to these people in a way that other quantum gravity proposals aren’t. That’s partly due to familiarity and shared language (I remember a talk at Perimeter where string theorists wanted to learn from practitioners from another area and the discussion got bogged down by how they were using the word “dimension”), but partly due to skepticism of the various alternate approaches. Most people have some idea in their heads of deep problems with various proposals: screwing up relativity, making nonsense out of quantum mechanics, or over-interpreting on limited evidence. The most commonly believed criticisms are usually wrong, with objections long-known to practitioners of the alternate approaches, and so those people tend to think they’re being treated unfairly. But the wrong criticisms are often simplified versions of correct criticisms, passed down by the few people who dig deeply into these topics, criticisms that the alternative approaches don’t have good answers to.

The end result is that while string theory itself isn’t dominant, a sort of “string friendliness” is. Most of the jobs aren’t going to string theorists in the literal sense. But the academic world string theorists created keeps turning. People still respect string theorists and the research directions they find interesting, and people are still happy to collaborate and discuss with string theorists. For research communities people are more skeptical of, it must feel very isolating, like the world is still being run by their opponents. But this isn’t the kind of hegemony that can be solved by a revolution. Thinking that string theory is a failed research program, and people focused on it should have a harder time getting hired, is one thing. Thinking that everyone who respects at least one former string theorist should have a harder time getting hired is a very different goal. And if what you’re complaining about is “string friendliness”, not actual string theorists, then that’s what you’re asking for.

The Nowhere String

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Space and time seem as fundamental as anything can get. Philosophers like Immanuel Kant thought that they were inescapable, that we could not conceive of the world without space and time. But increasingly, physicists suspect that space and time are not as fundamental as they appear. When they try to construct a theory of quantum gravity, physicists find puzzles, paradoxes that suggest that space and time may just be approximations to a more fundamental underlying reality.

One piece of evidence that quantum gravity researchers point to are dualities. These are pairs of theories that seem to describe different situations, including with different numbers of dimensions, but that are secretly indistinguishable, connected by a “dictionary” that lets you interpret any observation in one world in terms of an equivalent observation in the other world. By itself, duality doesn’t mean that space and time aren’t fundamental: as I explained in a blog post a few years ago, it could still be that one “side” of the duality is a true description of space and time, and the other is just a mathematical illusion. To show definitively that space and time are not fundamental, you would want to find a situation where they “break down”, where you can go from a theory that has space and time to a theory that doesn’t. Ideally, you’d want a physical means of going between them: some kind of quantum field that, as it shifts, changes the world between space-time and not space-time.

What I didn’t know when I wrote that post was that physicists already knew about such a situation in 1993.

Back when I was in pre-school, famous string theorist Edward Witten was trying to understand something that others had described as a duality, and realized there was something more going on.

In string theory, particles are described by lengths of vibrating string. In practice, string theorists like to think about what it’s like to live on the string itself, seeing it vibrate. In that world, there are two dimensions, one space dimension back and forth along the string and one time dimension going into the future. To describe the vibrations of the string in that world, string theorists use the same kind of theory that people use to describe physics in our world: a quantum field theory. In string theory, you have a two-dimensional quantum field theory stuck “inside” a theory with more dimensions describing our world. You see that this world exists by seeing the kinds of vibrations your two-dimensional world can have, through a type of quantum field called a scalar field. With ten scalar fields, ten different ways you can push energy into your stringy world, you can infer that the world around you is a space-time with ten dimensions.

String theory has “extra” dimensions beyond the three of space and one of time we’re used to, and these extra dimensions can be curled up in various ways to hide them from view, often using a type of shape called a Calabi-Yau manifold. In the late 80’s and early 90’s, string theorists had found a similarity between the two-dimensional quantum field theories you get folding string theory around some of these Calabi-Yau manifolds and another type of two-dimensional quantum field theory related to theories used to describe superconductors. People called the two types of theories dual, but Witten figured out there was something more going on.

Witten described the two types of theories in the same framework, and showed that they weren’t two equivalent descriptions of the same world. Rather, they were two different ways one theory could behave.

The two behaviors were connected by something physical: the value of a quantum field called a modulus field. This field can be described by a number, and that number can be positive or negative.

When the modulus field is a large positive number, then the theory behaves like string theory twisted around a Calabi-Yau manifold. In particular, the scalar fields have many different values they can take, values that are smoothly related to each other. These values are nothing more or less than the position of the string in space and time. Because the scalars can take many values, the string can sit in many different places, and because the values are smoothly related to each other, the string can smoothly move from one place to another.

When the modulus field is a large negative number, then the theory is very different. What people thought of as the other side of the duality, a theory like the theories used to describe superconductors, is the theory that describes what happens when the modulus field is large and negative. In this theory, the scalars can no longer take many values. Instead, they have one option, one stable solution. That means that instead of there being many different places the string could sit, describing space, there are no different places, and thus no space. The string lives nowhere.

These are two very different situations, one with space and one without. And they’re connected by something physical. You could imagine manipulating the modulus field, using other fields to funnel energy into it, pushing it back and forth from a world with space to a world of nowhere. Much more than the examples I was aware of, this is a super-clear example of a model where space is not fundamental, but where it can be manipulated, existing or not existing based on physical changes.

We don’t know whether a model like this describes the real world. But it’s gratifying to know that it can be written down, that there is a picture, in full mathematical detail, of how this kind of thing works. Hopefully, it makes the idea that space and time are not fundamental sound a bit more reasonable.

Replacing Space-Time With the Space in Your Eyes

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Nima Arkani-Hamed thinks space-time is doomed.

That doesn’t mean he thinks it’s about to be destroyed by a supervillain. Rather, Nima, like many physicists, thinks that space and time are just approximations to a deeper reality. In order to make sense of gravity in a quantum world, seemingly fundamental ideas, like that particles move through particular places at particular times, will probably need to become more flexible.

But while most people who think space-time is doomed research quantum gravity, Nima’s path is different. Nima has been studying scattering amplitudes, formulas used by particle physicists to predict how likely particles are to collide in particular ways. He has been trying to find ways to calculate these scattering amplitudes without referring directly to particles traveling through space and time. In the long run, the hope is that knowing how to do these calculations will help suggest new theories beyond particle physics, theories that can’t be described with space and time at all.

Ten years ago, Nima figured out how to do this in a particular theory, one that doesn’t describe the real world. For that theory he was able to find a new picture of how to calculate scattering amplitudes based on a combinatorical, geometric space with no reference to particles traveling through space-time. He gave this space the catchy name “the amplituhedron“. In the years since, he found a few other “hedra” describing different theories.

Now, he’s got a new approach. The new approach doesn’t have the same kind of catchy name: people sometimes call it surfaceology, or curve integral formalism. Like the amplituhedron, it involves concepts from combinatorics and geometry. It isn’t quite as “pure” as the amplituhedron: it uses a bit more from ordinary particle physics, and while it avoids specific paths in space-time it does care about the shape of those paths. Still, it has one big advantage: unlike the amplituhedron, Nima’s new approach looks like it can work for at least a few of the theories that actually describe the real world.

The amplituhedron was mysterious. Instead of space and time, it described the world in terms of a geometric space whose meaning was unclear. Nima’s new approach also describes the world in terms of a geometric space, but this space’s meaning is a lot more clear.

The space is called “kinematic space”. That probably still sounds mysterious. “Kinematic” in physics refers to motion. In the beginning of a physics class when you study velocity and acceleration before you’ve introduced a single force, you’re studying kinematics. In particle physics, kinematic refers to the motion of the particles you detect. If you see an electron going up and to the right at a tenth the speed of light, those are its kinematics.

Kinematic space, then, is the space of observations. By saying that his approach is based on ideas in kinematic space, what Nima is saying is that it describes colliding particles not based on what they might be doing before they’re detected, but on mathematics that asks questions only about facts about the particles that can be observed.

(For the experts: this isn’t quite true, because he still needs a concept of loop momenta. He’s getting the actual integrands from his approach, rather than the dual definition he got from the amplituhedron. But he does still have to integrate one way or another.)

Quantum mechanics famously has many interpretations. In my experience, Nima’s favorite interpretation is the one known as “shut up and calculate”. Instead of arguing about the nature of an indeterminately philosophical “real world”, Nima thinks quantum physics is a tool to calculate things people can observe in experiments, and that’s the part we should care about.

From a practical perspective, I agree with him. And I think if you have this perspective, then ultimately, kinematic space is where your theories have to live. Kinematic space is nothing more or less than the space of observations, the space defined by where things land in your detectors, or if you’re a human and not a collider, in your eyes. If you want to strip away all the speculation about the nature of reality, this is all that is left over. Any theory, of any reality, will have to be described in this way. So if you think reality might need a totally new weird theory, it makes sense to approach things like Nima does, and start with the one thing that will always remain: observations.

Why Quantum Gravity Is Controversial

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Merging quantum mechanics and gravity is a famously hard physics problem. Explaining why merging quantum mechanics and gravity is hard is, in turn, a very hard science communication problem. The more popular descriptions tend to lead to misunderstandings, and I’ve posted many times over the years to chip away at those misunderstandings.

Merging quantum mechanics and gravity is hard…but despite that, there are proposed solutions. String Theory is supposed to be a theory of quantum gravity. Loop Quantum Gravity is supposed to be a theory of quantum gravity. Asymptotic Safety is supposed to be a theory of quantum gravity.

One of the great virtues of science and math is that we are, eventually, supposed to agree. Philosophers and theologians might argue to the end of time, but in math we can write down a proof, and in science we can do an experiment. If we don’t yet have the proof or the experiment, then we should reserve judgement. Either way, there’s no reason to get into an unproductive argument.

Despite that, string theorists and loop quantum gravity theorists and asymptotic safety theorists, famously, like to argue! There have been bitter, vicious, public arguments about the merits of these different theories, and decades of research doesn’t seem to have resolved them. To an outside observer, this makes quantum gravity seem much more like philosophy or theology than like science or math.

Why is there still controversy in quantum gravity? We can’t do quantum gravity experiments, sure, but if that were the problem physicists could just write down the possibilities and leave it at that. Why argue?

Some of the arguments are for silly aesthetic reasons, or motivated by academic politics. Some are arguments about which approaches are likely to succeed in future, which as always is something we can’t actually reliably judge. But the more justified arguments, the strongest and most durable ones, are about a technical challenge. They’re about something called non-perturbative physics.

Most of the time, when physicists use a theory, they’re working with an approximation. Instead of the full theory, they’re making an assumption that makes the theory easier to use. For example, if you assume that the velocity of an object is small, you can use Newtonian physics instead of special relativity. Often, physicists can systematically relax these assumptions, including more and more of the behavior of the full theory and getting a better and better approximation to the truth. This process is called perturbation theory.

Other times, this doesn’t work well. The full theory has some trait that isn’t captured by the approximations, something that hides away from these systematic tools. The theory has some important aspect that is non-perturbative.

Every proposed quantum gravity theory uses approximations like this. The theory’s proponents try to avoid these approximations when they can, but often they have to approximate and hope they don’t miss too much. The opponents, in turn, argue that the theory’s proponents are missing something important, some non-perturbative fact that would doom the theory altogether.

Asymptotic Safety is built on top of an approximation, one different from what other quantum gravity theorists typically use. To its proponents, work using their approximation suggests that gravity works without any special modifications, that the theory of quantum gravity is easier to find than it seems. Its opponents aren’t convinced, and think that the approximation is missing something important which shows that gravity needs to be modified.

In Loop Quantum Gravity, the critics think their approximation misses space-time itself. Proponents of Loop Quantum Gravity have been unable to prove that their theory, if you take all the non-perturbative corrections into account, doesn’t just roll up all of space and time into a tiny spiky ball. They expect that their theory should allow for a smooth space-time like we experience, but the critics aren’t convinced, and without being able to calculate the non-perturbative physics neither side can convince the other.

String Theory was founded and originally motivated by perturbative approximations. Later, String Theorists figured out how to calculate some things non-perturbatively, often using other simplifications like supersymmetry. But core questions, like whether or not the theory allows a positive cosmological constant, seem to depend on non-perturbative calculations that the theory gives no instructions for how to do. Some critics don’t think there is a consistent non-perturbative theory at all, that the approximations String Theorists use don’t actually approximate to anything. Even within String Theory, there are worries that the theory might try to resist approximation in odd ways, becoming more complicated whenever a parameter is small enough that you could use it to approximate something.

All of this would be less of a problem with real-world evidence. Many fields of science are happy to use approximations that aren’t completely rigorous, as long as those approximations have a good track record in the real world. In general though, we don’t expect evidence relevant to quantum gravity any time soon. Maybe we’ll get lucky, and studies of cosmology will reveal something, or an experiment on Earth will have a particularly strange result. But nature has no obligation to help us out.

Without evidence, though, we can still make mathematical progress. You could imagine someone proving that the various perturbative approaches to String Theory become inconsistent when stitched together into a full non-perturbative theory. Alternatively, you could imagine someone proving that a theory like String Theory is unique, that no other theory can do some key thing that it does. Either of these seems unlikely to come any time soon, and most researchers in these fields aren’t pursuing questions like that. But the fact the debate could be resolved means that it isn’t just about philosophy or theology. There’s a real scientific, mathematical controversy, one rooted in our inability to understand these theories beyond the perturbative methods their proponents use. And while I don’t expect it to be resolved any time soon, one can always hold out hope for a surprise.

Amplitudes 2024, Continued

(Not At) Amplitudes 2024 at the IAS

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For over a decade, I studied scattering amplitudes, the formulas particle physicists use to find the probability that particles collide, or scatter, in different ways. I went to Amplitudes, the field’s big yearly conference, every year from 2015 to 2023.

This year is different. I’m on the way out of the field, looking for my next steps. Meanwhile, Amplitudes 2024 is going full speed ahead at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton.

With poster art that is, as the kids probably don’t say anymore, “on fleek”

The talks aren’t live-streamed this year, but they are posting slides, and they will be posting recordings. Since a few of my readers are interested in new amplitudes developments, I’ve been paging through the posted slides looking for interesting highlights. So far, I’ve only seen slides from the first few days: I will probably write about the later talks in a future post.

Each day of Amplitudes this year has two 45-minute “review talks”, one first thing in the morning and the other first thing after lunch. I put “review talks” in quotes because they vary a lot, between talks that try to introduce a topic for the rest of the conference to talks that mostly focus on the speaker’s own research. Lorenzo Tancredi’s talk was of the former type, an introduction to the many steps that go into making predictions for the LHC, with a focus on those topics where amplitudeologists have made progress. The talk opens with the type of motivation I’d been writing in grant and job applications over the last few years (we don’t know most of the properties of the Higgs yet! To measure them, we’ll need to calculate amplitudes with massive particles to high precision!), before moving into a review of the challenges and approaches in different steps of these calculations. While Tancredi apologizes in advance that the talk may be biased, I found it surprisingly complete: if you want to get an idea of the current state of the “LHC amplitudes pipeline”, his slides are a good place to start.

Tancredi’s talk serves as introduction for a variety of LHC-focused talks, some later that day and some later in the week. Federica Devoto discussed high-energy quarks while Chiara Signorile-Signorile and George Sterman showed advances in handling of low-energy particles. Xiaofeng Xu has a program that helps predict symbol letters, the building-blocks of scattering amplitudes that can be used to reconstruct or build up the whole thing, while Samuel Abreu talked about a tricky state-of-the-art case where Xu’s program misses part of the answer.

Later Monday morning veered away from the LHC to focus on more toy-model theories. Renata Kallosh’s talk in particular caught my attention. This blog is named after a long-standing question in amplitudes: will the four-graviton amplitude in N=8 supergravity diverge at seven loops in four dimensions? This seemingly arcane question is deep down a question about what is actually required for a successful theory of quantum gravity, and in particular whether some of the virtues of string theory can be captured by a simpler theory instead. Answering the question requires a prodigious calculation, and the more “loops” are involved the more difficult it is. Six years ago, the calculation got to five loops, and it hasn’t passed that mark since then. That five-loop calculation gave some reason for pessimism, a nice pattern at lower loops that stopped applying at five.

Kallosh thinks she has an idea of what to expect. She’s noticed a symmetry in supergravity, one that hadn’t previously been taken into account. She thinks that symmetry should keep N=8 supergravity from diverging on schedule…but only in exactly four dimensions. All of the lower-loop calculations in N=8 supergravity diverged in higher dimensions than four, and it seems like with this new symmetry she understands why. Her suggestion is to focus on other four-dimensional calculations. If seven loops is still too hard, then dialing back the amount of supersymmetry from N=8 to something lower should let her confirm her suspicions. Already a while back N=5 supergravity was found to diverge later than expected in four dimensions. She wants to know whether that pattern continues.

(Her backup slides also have a fun historical point: in dimensions greater than four, you can’t get elliptical planetary orbits. So four dimensions is special for our style of life.)

Other talks on Monday included a talk by Zahra Zahraee on progress towards “solving” the field’s favorite toy model, N=4 super Yang-Mills. Christian Copetti talked about the work I mentioned here, while Meta employee François Charlton’s “review talk” dealt with his work applying machine learning techniques to “translate” between questions in mathematics and their answers. In particular, he reported progress with my current boss Matthias Wilhelm and frequent collaborator and mentor Lance Dixon on using transformers to guess high-loop formulas in N=4 super Yang-Mills. They have an interesting proof of principle now, but it will probably still be a while until they can use the method to predict something beyond the state of the art.

In the meantime at least they have some hilarious AI-generated images

Tuesday’s review by Ian Moult was genuinely a review, but of a topic not otherwise covered at the conference, that of “detector observables”. The idea is that rather than talking about which individual particles are detected, one can ask questions that make more sense in terms of the experimental setup, like asking about the amounts of energy deposited in different detectors. This type of story has gone from an idle observation by theorists to a full research program, with theorists and experimentalists in active dialogue.

Natalia Toro brought up that, while we say each particle has a definite spin, that may not actually be the case. Particles with so-called “continuous spins” can masquerade as particles with a definite integer spin at lower energies. Toro and Schuster promoted this view of particles ten years ago, but now can make a bit more sense of it, including understanding how continuous-spin particles can interact.

The rest of Tuesday continued to be a bit of a grab-bag. Yael Shadmi talked about applying amplitudes techniques to Effective Field Theory calculations, while Franziska Porkert talked about a Feynman diagram involving two different elliptic curves. Interestingly (well, to me at least), the curves never appear “together”, you can represent the diagram as a sum of terms involving one curve and terms involving the other, much simpler than it could have been!

Tuesday afternoon’s review talk by Iain Stewart was one of those “guest from an adjacent field” talks, in this case from an approach called SCET, and at first glance didn’t seem to do much to reach out to the non-SCET people in the audience. Frequent past collaborator of mine Andrew McLeod showed off a new set of relations between singularities of amplitudes, found by digging in to the structure of the equations discovered by Landau that control this behavior. He and his collaborators are proposing a new way to keep track of these things involving “minimal cuts”, a clear pun on the “maximal cuts” that have been of great use to other parts of the community. Whether this has more or less staying power than “negative geometries” remains to be seen.

Closing Tuesday, Shruti Paranjape showed there was more to discover about the simplest amplitudes, called “tree amplitudes”. By asking why these amplitudes are sometimes equal to zero, she was able to draw a connection to the “double-copy” structure that links the theory of the strong force and the theory of gravity. Johannes Henn’s talk noticed an intriguing pattern. A while back, I had looked into under which circumstances amplitudes were positive. Henn found that “positive” is an understatement. In a certain region, the amplitudes we were looking at turn out to not just be positive, but also always decreasing, and also with second derivative always positive. In fact, the derivatives appear to alternate, always with one sign or the other as one takes more derivatives. Henn is calling this unusual property “completely monotonous”, and trying to figure out how widely it holds.

Wednesday had a more mathematical theme. Bernd Sturmfels began with a “review talk” that largely focused on his own work on the space of curves with marked points, including a surprising analogy between amplitudes and the likelihood functions one needs to minimize in machine learning. Lauren Williams was the other “actual mathematician” of the day, and covered her work on various topics related to the amplituhedron.

The remaining talks on Wednesday were not literally by mathematicians, but were “mathematically informed”. Carolina Figueiredo and Hayden Lee talked about work with Nima Arkani-Hamed on different projects. Figueiredo’s talk covered recent developments in the “curve integral formalism”, a recent step in Nima’s quest to geometrize everything in sight, this time in the context of more realistic theories. The talk, which like those Nima gives used tablet-written slides, described new insights one can gain from this picture, including new pictures of how more complicated amplitudes can be built up of simpler ones. If you want to understand the curve integral formalism further, I’d actually suggest instead looking at Mark Spradlin’s slides from later that day. The second part of Spradlin’s talk dealt with an area Figueiredo marked for future research, including fermions in the curve integral picture. I confess I’m still not entirely sure what the curve integral formalism is good for, but Spradlin’s talk gave me a better idea of what it’s doing. (The first part of his talk was on a different topic, exploring the space of string-like amplitudes to figure out which ones are actually consistent.)

Hayden Lee’s talk mentions the emergence of time, but the actual story is a bit more technical. Lee and collaborators are looking at cosmological correlators, observables like scattering amplitudes but for cosmology. Evaluating these is challenging with standard techniques, but can be approached with some novel diagram-based rules which let the results be described in terms of the measurable quantities at the end in a kind of “amplituhedron-esque” way.

Aidan Herderschee and Mariana Carrillo González had talks on Wednesday on ways of dealing with curved space. Herderschee talked about how various amplitudes techniques need to be changed to deal with amplitudes in anti-de-Sitter space, with difference equations replacing differential equations and sum-by-parts relations replacing integration-by-parts relations. Carrillo González looked at curved space through the lens of a special kind of toy model theory called a self-dual theory, which allowed her to do cosmology-related calculations using a double-copy technique.

Finally, Stephen Sharpe had the second review talk on Wednesday. This was another “outside guest” talk, a discussion from someone who does Lattice QCD about how they have been using their methods to calculate scattering amplitudes. They seem to count the number of particles a bit differently than we do, I’m curious whether this came up in the question session.

4 gravitons

Stories about physics from someone who's been there