Tag Archives: quantum field theory

Bonus Info For “Cosmic Paradox Reveals the Awful Consequence of an Observer-Free Universe”

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I had a piece in Quanta Magazine recently, about a tricky paradox that’s puzzling quantum gravity researchers and some early hints at its resolution.

The paradox comes from trying to describe “closed universes”, which are universes where it is impossible to reach the edge, even if you had infinite time to do it. This could be because the universe wraps around like a globe, or because the universe is expanding so fast no traveler could ever reach an edge. Recently, theoretical physicists have been trying to describe these closed universes, and have noticed a weird issue: each such universe appears to have only one possible quantum state. In general, quantum systems have more possible states the more complex they are, so for a whole universe to have only one possible state is a very strange thing, implying a bizarrely simple universe. Most worryingly, our universe may well be closed. Does that mean that secretly, the real world has only one possible state?

There is a possible solution that a few groups are playing around with. The argument that a closed universe has only one state depends on the fact that nothing inside a closed universe can reach the edge. But if nothing can reach the edge, then trying to observe the universe as a whole from outside would tell you nothing of use. Instead, any reasonable measurement would have to come from inside the universe. Such a measurement introduces a new kind of “edge of the universe”, this time not in the far distance, but close by: the edge between an observer and the rest of the world. And when you add that edge to the calculations, the universe stops being closed, and has all the many states it ought to.

This was an unusually tricky story for me to understand. I narrowly avoided several misconceptions, and I’m still not sure I managed to dodge all of them. Likewise, it was unusually tricky for the editors to understand, and I suspect it was especially tricky for Quanta’s social media team to understand.

It was also, quite clearly, tricky for the readers to understand. So I thought I would use this post to clear up a few misconceptions. I’ll say a bit more about what I learned investigating this piece, and try to clarify what the result does and does not mean.

Q: I’m confused about the math terms you’re using. Doesn’t a closed set contain its boundary?

A: Annoyingly, what physicists mean by a closed universe is a bit different from what mathematicians mean by a closed manifold, which is in turn more restrictive than what mathematicians mean by a closed set. One way to think about this that helped me is that in an open set you can take a limit that takes you out of the set, which is like being able to describe a (possibly infinite) path that takes you “out of the universe”. A closed set doesn’t have that, every path, no matter how long, still ends up in the same universe.

Q: So a bunch of string theorists did a calculation and got a result that doesn’t make sense, a one-state universe. What if they’re just wrong?

A: Two things:

First, the people I talked to emphasized that it’s pretty hard to wiggle out of the conclusion. It’s not just a matter of saying you don’t believe in string theory and that’s that. The argument is based in pretty fundamental principles, and it’s not easy to propose a way out that doesn’t mess up something even more important.

That’s not to say it’s impossible. One of the people I interviewed, Henry Maxfield, thinks that some of the recent arguments are misunderstanding how to use one of their core techniques, in a way that accidentally presupposes the one-state universe.

But even he thinks that the bigger point, that closed universes have only one state, is probably true.

And that’s largely due to a second reason: there are older arguments that back the conclusion up.

One of the oldest dates back to John Wheeler, a physicist famous for both deep musings about the nature of space and time and coining evocative terms like “wormhole”. In the 1960’s, Wheeler argued that, in a theory where space and time can be curved, one should think of a system’s state as including every configuration it can evolve into over time, since it can be tricky to specify a moment “right now”. In a closed universe, you could expect a quantum system to explore every possible configuration…meaning that such a universe should be described by only one state.

Later, physicists studying holography ran into a similar conclusion. They kept noticing systems in quantum gravity where you can describe everything that happens inside by what happens on the edges. If there are no edges, that seems to suggest that in some sense there is nothing inside. Apparently, Lenny Susskind had a slide at the end of talks in the 90’s where he kept bringing up this point.

So even if the modern arguments are wrong, and even if string theory is wrong…it still looks like the overall conclusion is right.

Q: If a closed universe has only one state, does that make it deterministic, and thus classical?

A: Oh boy…

So, on the one hand, there is an idea, which I think also goes back to Wheeler, that asks: “if the universe as a whole has a wavefunction, how does it collapse?” One possibility is that the universe has only one state, so that nobody is needed to collapse the wavefunction, it already is in a definite state.

On the other hand, a universe with only one state does not actually look much like a classical universe. Our universe looks classical largely due to a process called decoherence, where small quantum systems interact with big quantum systems with many states, diluting quantum effects until the world looks classical. If there is only one state, there are no big systems to interact with, and the world has large quantum fluctuations that make it look very different from a classical universe.

Q: How, exactly, are you defining “observer”?

A: A few commenters helpfully chimed in to talk about how physics models observers as “witness” systems, objects that preserve some record of what happens to them. A simple example is a ball sitting next to a bowl: if you find the ball in the bowl later, it means something moved it. This process, preserving what happens and making it more obvious, is in essence how physicists think about observers.

However, this isn’t the whole story in this case. Here, different research groups introducing observers are doing it in different ways. That’s, in part, why none of them are confident they have the right answer.

One of the approaches describes an observer in terms of its path through space and time, its worldline. Instead of a detailed witness system with specific properties, all they do is pick out a line and say “the observer is there”. Identifying that line, and declaring it different from its surroundings, seems to be enough to recover the complexity the universe ought to have.

The other approach treats the witness system in a bit more detail. We usually treat an observer in quantum mechanics as infinitely large compared to the quantum systems they measure. This approach instead gives the observer a finite size, and uses that to estimate how far their experience will be from classical physics.

Crucially, both approaches aren’t a matter of defining a physical object, and looking for it in the theory. Given a collection of atoms, neither team can tell you what is an observer, and what isn’t. Instead, in each approach, the observer is arbitrary: a choice, made by us when we use quantum mechanics, of what to count as an observer and what to count as the rest of the world. That choice can be made in many different ways, and each approach tries to describe what happens when you change that choice.

This is part of what makes this approach uncomfortable to some more philosophically-minded physicists: it treats observers not as a predictable part of the physical world, but as a mathematical description used to make statements about the world.

Q: If these ideas come from AdS/CFT, which is an open universe, how do you use them to describe a closed universe?

A: While more examples emerged later, initially theorists were thinking about two types of closed universes:

First, think about a black hole. You may have heard that when you fall into a black hole, you watch the whole universe age away before your eyes, due to the dramatic differences in the passage of time caused by the extreme gravity. Once you’ve seen the outside universe fade away, you are essentially in a closed universe of your own. The outside world will never affect you again, and you are isolated, with no path to the outside. These black hole interiors are one of the examples theorists looked at.

The other example are so-called “baby universes”. When physicists use quantum mechanics to calculate the chance of something happening, they have to add up every possible series of events that could have happened in between. For quantum gravity, this includes every possible arrangement of space and time. This includes arrangements with different shapes, including ones with tiny extra “baby universes” which branch off from the main universe and return. Universes with these “baby universes” are another example that theorists considered to understand closed universes.

Q: So wait, are you actually saying the universe needs to be observed to exist? That’s ridiculous, didn’t the universe exist long before humans existed to observe it? Is this some sort of Copenhagen Interpretation thing, or that thing called QBism?

You’re starting to ask philosophical questions, and here’s the thing:

There are physicists who spend their time thinking about how to interpret quantum mechanics. They talk to philosophers, and try to figure out how to answer these kinds of questions in a consistent and systematic way, keeping track of all the potential pitfalls and implications. They’re part of a subfield called “quantum foundations”.

The physicists whose work I was talking about in that piece are not those people.

Of the people I interviewed, one of them, Rob Myers, probably has lunch with quantum foundations researchers on occasion. The others, based at places like MIT and the IAS, probably don’t even do that.

Instead, these are people trying to solve a technical problem, people whose first inclination is to put philosophy to the side, and “shut up and calculate”. These people did a calculation that ought to have worked, checking how many quantum states they could find in a closed universe, and found a weird and annoying answer: just one. Trying to solve the problem, they’ve done technical calculation work, introducing a path through the universe, or a boundary around an observer, and seeing what happens. While some of them may have their own philosophical leanings, they’re not writing works of philosophy. Their papers don’t talk through the philosophical implications of their ideas in all that much detail, and they may well have different thoughts as to what those implications are.

So while I suspect I know the answers they would give to some of these questions, I’m not sure.

Instead, how about I tell you what I think?

I’m not a philosopher, I can’t promise my views will be consistent, that they won’t suffer from some pitfall. But unlike other people’s views, I can tell you what my own views are.

To start off: yes, the universe existed before humans. No, there is nothing special about our minds, we don’t have psychic powers to create the universe with our thoughts or anything dumb like that.

What I think is that, if we want to describe the world, we ought to take lessons from science.

Science works. It works for many reasons, but two important ones stand out.

Science works because it leads to technology, and it leads to technology because it guides actions. It lets us ask, if I do this, what will happen? What will I experience?

And science works because it lets people reach agreement. It lets people reach agreement because it lets us ask, if I observe this, what do I expect you to observe? And if we agree, we can agree on the science.

Ultimately, if we want to describe the world with the virtues of science, our descriptions need to obey this rule: they need to let us ask “what if?” questions about observations.

That means that science cannot avoid an observer. It can often hide the observer, place them far away and give them an infinite mind to behold what they see, so that one observer is essentially the same as another. But we shouldn’t expect to always be able to do this. Sometimes, we can’t avoid saying something about the observer: about where they are, or how big they are, for example.

These observers, though, don’t have to actually exist. We should be able to ask “what if” questions about others, and that means we should be able to dream up fictional observers, and ask, if they existed, what would they see? We can imagine observers swimming in the quark-gluon plasma after the Big Bang, or sitting inside a black hole’s event horizon, or outside our visible universe. The existence of the observer isn’t a physical requirement, but a methodological one: a restriction on how we can make useful, scientific statements about the world. Our theory doesn’t have to explain where observers “come from”, and can’t and shouldn’t do that. The observers aren’t part of the physical world being described, they’re a precondition for us to describe that world.

Is this the Copenhagen Interpretation? I’m not a historian, but I don’t think so. The impression I get is that there was no real Copenhagen Interpretation, that Bohr and Heisenberg, while more deeply interested in philosophy than many physicists today, didn’t actually think things through in enough depth to have a perspective you can name and argue with.

Is this QBism? I don’t think so. It aligns with some things QBists say, but they say a lot of silly things as well. It’s probably some kind of instrumentalism, for what that’s worth.

Is it logical positivism? I’ve been told logical positivists would argue that the world outside the visible universe does not exist. If that’s true, I’m not a logical positivist.

Is it pragmatism? Maybe? What I’ve seen of pragmatism definitely appeals to me, but I’ve seen my share of negative characterizations as well.

In the end, it’s an idea about what’s useful and what’s not, about what moves science forward and what doesn’t. It tries to avoid being preoccupied with unanswerable questions, and as much as possible to cash things out in testable statements. If I do this, what happens? What if I did that instead?

The results I covered for Quanta, to me, show that the observer matters on a deep level. That isn’t a physical statement, it isn’t a mystical statement. It’s a methodological statement: if we want to be scientists, we can’t give up on the observer.

C. N. Yang, Dead at 103

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I don’t usually do obituaries here, but sometimes I have something worth saying.

Chen Ning Yang, a towering figure in particle physics, died last week.

Picture from 1957, when he received his Nobel

I never met him. By the time I started my PhD at Stony Brook, Yang was long-retired, and hadn’t visited the Yang Institute for Theoretical Physics in quite some time.

(Though there was still an office door, tucked behind the institute’s admin staff, that bore his name.)

The Nobel Prize doesn’t always honor the most important theoretical physicists. In order to get a Nobel Prize, you need to discover something that gets confirmed by experiment. Generally, it has to be a very crisp, clear statement about reality. New calculation methods and broader new understandings are on shakier ground, and theorists who propose them tend to be left out, or at best combined together into lists of partial prizes long after the fact.

Yang was lucky. With T. D. Lee, he had made that crisp, clear statement. He claimed that the laws of physics, counter to everyone’s expectations, are not the same when reflected in a mirror. In 1956, Wu confirmed the prediction, and Lee and Yang got the prize the year after.

That’s a huge, fundamental discovery about the natural world. But as a theorist, I don’t think that was Yang’s greatest accomplishment.

Yang contributed to other fields. Practicing theorists have seen his name strewn across concepts, formalisms, and theorems. I didn’t have space to talk about him in my article on integrability for Quanta Magazine, but only just barely: another paragraph or two, and he would have been there.

But his most influential contribution is something even more fundamental. And long-time readers of this blog should already know what it is.

Yang, along with Robert Mills, proposed Yang-Mills Theory.

There isn’t a Nobel prize for Yang-Mills theory. In 1953, when Yang and Mills proposed the theory, it was obviously wrong, a theory that couldn’t explain anything in the natural world, mercilessly mocked by famous bullshit opponent Wolfgang Pauli. Not even an ambitious idea that seemed outlandish (like plate tectonics), it was a theory with such an obvious missing piece that, for someone who prioritized experiment like the Nobel committee does, it seemed pointless to consider.

All it had going for it was that it was a clear generalization, an obvious next step. If there are forces like electromagnetism, with one type of charge going from plus to minus, why not a theory with multiple, interacting types of charge?

Nothing about Yang-Mills theory was impossible, or contradictory. Mathematically, it was fine. It obeyed all the rules of quantum mechanics. It simply didn’t appear to match anything in the real world.

But, as theorists learn, nature doesn’t let a good idea go to waste.

Of the four fundamental forces of nature, as it would happen, half are Yang-Mills theories. Gravity is different, electromagnetism is simpler, and could be understood without Yang and Mills’ insights. But the weak nuclear force, that’s a Yang-Mills theory. It wasn’t obvious in 1953 because it wasn’t clear how the massless, photon-like particles in Yang-Mills theory could have mass, and it wouldn’t become clear until the work of Peter Higgs over a decade later. And the strong nuclear force, that’s also a Yang-Mills theory, missed because of the ability of such a strong force to “confine” charges, hiding them away.

So Yang got a Nobel, not for understanding half of nature’s forces before anyone else had, but from a quirky question of symmetry.

In practice, Yang was known for all of this, and more. He was enormously influential. I’ve heard it claimed that he personally kept China from investing in a new particle collider, the strength of his reputation the most powerful force on that side of the debate, as he argued that a developing country like China should be investing in science with more short-term industrial impact, like condensed matter and atomic physics. I wonder if the debate will shift with his death, and what commitments the next Chinese five-year plan will make.

Ultimately, Yang is an example of what a theorist can be, a mix of solid work, counterintuitive realizations, and the thought-through generalizations that nature always seems to make use of in the end. If you’re not clear on what a theoretical physicist is, or what one can do, let Yang’s story be your guide.

Why Solving the Muon Puzzle Doesn’t Solve the Puzzle

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You may have heard that the muon g-2 problem has been solved.

Muons are electrons’ heavier cousins. As spinning charged particles, they are magnetic, the strength of that magnetism characterized by a number denoted “g”. If you were to guess this number from classical physics alone, you’d conclude it should be 2, but quantum mechanics tweaks it. The leftover part, “g-2”, can be measured, and predicted, with extraordinary precision, which ought to make it an ideal test: if our current understanding of the particle physics, called the Standard Model, is subtly wrong, the difference might be noticeable there.

And for a while, it looked like such a difference was indeed noticeable. Extremely precise experiments over the last thirty years have consistently found a number slightly different from the extremely precise calculations, different enough that it seemed quite unlikely to be due to chance.

Now, the headlines are singing a different tune.

What changed?

That headline might make you think the change was an experimental result, a new measurement that changed the story. It wasn’t, though. There is a new, more precise measurement, but it agrees with the old measurements.

So the change has to be in the calculations, right? They did a new calculation, corrected a mistake or just pushed up their precision, and found that the Standard Model matches the experiment after all?

…sort of, but again, not really. The group of theoretical physicists associated with the experiment did release new, more accurate calculations. But it wasn’t the new calculations, by themselves, that made a difference. Instead, it was a shift in what kind of calculations they used…or even more specifically, what kind of calculations they trusted.

Parts of the calculation of g-2 can be done with Feynman diagrams, those photogenic squiggles you see on physicists’ blackboards. That part is very precise, and not especially controversial. However, Feynman diagrams only work well when forces between particles are comparatively weak. They’re great for electromagnetism, even better for the weak nuclear force. But for the strong nuclear force, the one that holds protons and neutrons together, you often need a different method.

For g-2, that used to be done via a “data-driven” method. Physicists measured different things, particles affected by the strong nuclear force in different ways, and used that to infer how the strong force would affect g-2. By getting a consistent picture from different experiments, they were reasonably confident that they had the right numbers.

Back in 2020, though, a challenger came to the scene, with another method. Called lattice QCD, this method involves building gigantic computer simulations of the effect of the strong force. People have been doing lattice QCD since the 1970’s, and the simulations have been getting better and better, until in 2020, a group managed to calculate the piece of the g-2 calculation that had until then been done by the data-driven method.

The lattice group found a very different result than what had been found previously. Instead of a wild disagreement with experiment, their calculation agreed. According to them, everything was fine, the muon g-2 was behaving exactly as the Standard Model predicted.

For some of us, that’s where the mystery ended. Clearly, something must be wrong with the data-driven method, not with the Standard Model. No more muon puzzle.

But the data-driven method wasn’t just a guess, it was being used for a reason. A significant group of physicists found the arguments behind it convincing. Now, there was a new puzzle: figuring out why the data-driven method and lattice QCD disagree.

Five years later, has that mystery been solved? Is that, finally, what the headlines are about?

Again, not really, no.

The theorists associated with the experiment have decided to trust lattice QCD, not the data-driven method. But they don’t know what went wrong, exactly.

Instead, they’ve highlighted cracks in the data-driven method. The way the data-driven method works, it brings together different experiments to try to get a shared picture. But that shared picture has started to fall apart. A new measurement by a different experiment doesn’t fit into the system: the data-driven method now “has tensions”, as physicists say. It’s no longer possible to combine all experiments into a shared picture they way they used to. Meanwhile, lattice QCD has gotten even better, reaching even higher precision. From the perspective of the theorists associated with the muon g-2 experiment, switching methods is now clearly the right call.

But does that mean they solved the puzzle?

If you were confident that lattice QCD is the right approach, then the puzzle was already solved in 2020. All that changed was the official collaboration finally acknowledging that.

And if you were confident that the data-driven method was the right approach, then the puzzle is even worse. Now, there are tensions within the method itself…but still no explanation of what went wrong! If you had good reasons to think the method should work, you still have those good reasons. Now you’re just…more puzzled.

I am reminded of another mystery, a few years back, when an old experiment announced a dramatically different measurement for the mass of the W boson. Then, I argued the big mystery was not how the W boson’s mass had changed (it hadn’t), but how they came to be so confident in a result so different from what others, also confidently, had found. In physics, our confidence is encoded in numbers, estimated and measured and tested and computed. If we’re not estimating that confidence correctly…then that’s the real mystery, the real puzzle. One much more important to solve.

Also, I had two more pieces out this week! In Quanta I have a short explainer about bosons and fermions, while at Ars Technica I have a piece about machine learning at the LHC. I may have a “bonus info” post on the latter at some point, I have to think about whether I have enough material for it.

Amplitudes 2025 This Week

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Summer is conference season for academics, and this week held my old sub-field’s big yearly conference, called Amplitudes. This year, it was in Seoul at Seoul National University, the first time the conference has been in Asia.

(I wasn’t there, I don’t go to these anymore. But I’ve been skimming slides in my free time, to give you folks the updates you crave. Be forewarned that conference posts like these get technical fast, I’ll be back to my usual accessible self next week.)

There isn’t a huge amplitudes community in Korea, but it’s bigger than it was back when I got started in the field. Of the organizers, Kanghoon Lee of the Asia Pacific Center for Theoretical Physics and Sangmin Lee of Seoul National University have what I think of as “core amplitudes interests”, like recursion relations and the double-copy. The other Korean organizers are from adjacent areas, work that overlaps with amplitudes but doesn’t show up at the conference each year. There was also a sizeable group of organizers from Taiwan, where there has been a significant amplitudes presence for some time now. I do wonder if Korea was chosen as a compromise between a conference hosted in Taiwan or in mainland China, where there is also quite a substantial amplitudes community.

One thing that impresses me every year is how big, and how sophisticated, the gravitational-wave community in amplitudes has grown. Federico Buccioni’s talk began with a plot that illustrates this well (though that wasn’t his goal):

At the conference Amplitudes, dedicated to the topic of scattering amplitudes, there were almost as many talks with the phrase “black hole” in the title as there were with “scattering” or “amplitudes”! This is for a topic that did not even exist in the subfield when I got my PhD eleven years ago.

With that said, gravitational wave astronomy wasn’t quite as dominant at the conference as Buccioni’s bar chart suggests. There were a few talks each day on the topic: I counted seven in total, excluding any short talks on the subject in the gong show. Spinning black holes were a significant focus, central to Jung-Wook Kim’s, Andres Luna’s and Mao Zeng’s talks (the latter two showing some interesting links between the amplitudes story and classic ideas in classical mechanics) and relevant in several others, with Riccardo Gonzo, Miguel Correia, Ira Rothstein, and Enrico Herrmann’s talks showing not just a wide range of approaches, but an increasing depth of research in this area.

Herrmann’s talk in particular dealt with detector event shapes, a framework that lets physicists think more directly about what a specific particle detector or observer can see. He applied the idea not just to gravitational waves but to quantum gravity and collider physics as well. The latter is historically where this idea has been applied the most thoroughly, as highlighted in Hua Xing Zhu’s talk, where he used them to pick out particular phenomena of interest in QCD.

QCD is, of course, always of interest in the amplitudes field. Buccioni’s talk dealt with the theory’s behavior at high-energies, with a nice example of the “maximal transcendentality principle” where some quantities in QCD are identical to quantities in N=4 super Yang-Mills in the “most transcendental” pieces (loosely, those with the highest powers of pi). Andrea Guerreri’s talk also dealt with high-energy behavior in QCD, trying to address an experimental puzzle where QCD results appeared to violate a fundamental bound all sensible theories were expected to obey. By using S-matrix bootstrap techniques, they clarify the nature of the bound, finding that QCD still obeys it once correctly understood, and conjecture a weird theory that should be possible to frame right on the edge of the bound. The S-matrix bootstrap was also used by Alexandre Homrich, who talked about getting the framework to work for multi-particle scattering.

Heribertus Bayu Hartanto is another recent addition to Korea’s amplitudes community. He talked about a concrete calculation, two-loop five-particle scattering including top quarks, a tricky case that includes elliptic curves.

When amplitudes lead to integrals involving elliptic curves, many standard methods fail. Jake Bourjaily’s talk raised a question he has brought up again and again: what does it mean to do an integral for a new type of function? One possible answer is that it depends on what kind of numerics you can do, and since more general numerical methods can be cumbersome one often needs to understand the new type of function in more detail. In light of that, Stephen Jones’ talk was interesting in taking a common problem often cited with generic approaches (that they have trouble with the complex numbers introduced by Minkowski space) and finding a more natural way in a particular generic approach (sector decomposition) to take them into account. Giulio Salvatori talked about a much less conventional numerical method, linked to the latest trend in Nima-ology, surfaceology. One of the big selling points of the surface integral framework promoted by people like Salvatori and Nima Arkani-Hamed is that it’s supposed to give a clear integral to do for each scattering amplitude, one which should be amenable to a numerical treatment recently developed by Michael Borinsky. Salvatori can currently apply the method only to a toy model (up to ten loops!), but he has some ideas for how to generalize it, which will require handling divergences and numerators.

Other approaches to the “problem of integration” included Anna-Laura Sattelberger’s talk that presented a method to find differential equations for the kind of integrals that show up in amplitudes using the mathematical software Macaulay2, including presenting a package. Matthias Wilhelm talked about the work I did with him, using machine learning to find better methods for solving integrals with integration-by-parts, an area where two other groups have now also published. Pierpaolo Mastrolia talked about integration-by-parts’ up-and-coming contender, intersection theory, a method which appears to be delving into more mathematical tools in an effort to catch up with its competitor.

Sometimes, one is more specifically interested in the singularities of integrals than their numerics more generally. Felix Tellander talked about a geometric method to pin these down which largely went over my head, but he did have a very nice short description of the approach: “Describe the singularities of the integrand. Find a map representing integration. Map the singularities of the integrand onto the singularities of the integral.”

While QCD and gravity are the applications of choice, amplitudes methods germinate in N=4 super Yang-Mills. Ruth Britto’s talk opened the conference with an overview of progress along those lines before going into her own recent work with one-loop integrals and interesting implications of ideas from cluster algebras. Cluster algebras made appearances in several other talks, including Anastasia Volovich’s talk which discussed how ideas from that corner called flag cluster algebras may give insights into QCD amplitudes, though some symbol letters still seem to be hard to track down. Matteo Parisi covered another idea, cluster promotion maps, which he thinks may help pin down algebraic symbol letters.

The link between cluster algebras and symbol letters is an ongoing mystery where the field is seeing progress. Another symbol letter mystery is antipodal duality, where flipping an amplitude like a palindrome somehow gives another valid amplitude. Lance Dixon has made progress in understanding where this duality comes from, finding a toy model where it can be understood and proved.

Others pushed the boundaries of methods specific to N=4 super Yang-Mills, looking for novel structures. Song He’s talk pushes an older approach by Bourjaily and collaborators up to twelve loops, finding new patterns and connections to other theories and observables. Qinglin Yang bootstraps Wilson loops with a Lagrangian insertion, adding a side to the polygon used in previous efforts and finding that, much like when you add particles to amplitudes in a bootstrap, the method gets stricter and more powerful. Jaroslav Trnka talked about work he has been doing with “negative geometries”, an odd method descended from the amplituhedron that looks at amplitudes from a totally different perspective, probing a bit of their non-perturbative data. He’s finding more parts of that setup that can be accessed and re-summed, finding interestingly that multiple-zeta-values show up in quantities where we know they ultimately cancel out. Livia Ferro also talked about a descendant of the amplituhedron, this time for cosmology, getting differential equations for cosmological observables in a particular theory from a combinatorial approach.

Outside of everybody’s favorite theories, some speakers talked about more general approaches to understanding the differences between theories. Andreas Helset covered work on the geometry of the space of quantum fields in a theory, applying the method to a general framework for characterizing deviations from the standard model called the SMEFT. Jasper Roosmale Nepveu also talked about a general space of theories, thinking about how positivity (a trait linked to fundamental constraints like causality and unitarity) gets tangled up with loop effects, and the implications this has for renormalization.

Soft theorems, universal behavior of amplitudes when a particle has low energy, continue to be a trendy topic, with Silvia Nagy showing how the story continues to higher orders and Sangmin Choi investigating loop effects. Callum Jones talks about one of the more powerful results from the soft limit, Weinberg’s theorem showing the uniqueness of gravity. Weinberg’s proof was set up in Minkowski space, but we may ultimately live in curved, de Sitter space. Jones showed how the ideas Weinberg explored generalize in de Sitter, using some tools from the soft-theorem-inspired field of dS/CFT. Julio Parra-Martinez, meanwhile, tied soft theorems to another trendy topic, higher symmetries, a more general notion of the usual types of symmetries that physicists have explored in the past. Lucia Cordova reported work that was not particularly connected to soft theorems but was connected to these higher symmetries, showing how they interact with crossing symmetry and the S-matrix bootstrap.

Finally, a surprisingly large number of talks linked to Kevin Costello and Natalie Paquette’s work with self-dual gauge theories, where they found exact solutions from a fairly mathy angle. Paquette gave an update on her work on the topic, while Alfredo Guevara talked about applications to black holes, comparing the power of expanding around a self-dual gauge theory to that of working with supersymmetry. Atul Sharma looked at scattering in self-dual backgrounds in work that merges older twistor space ideas with the new approach, while Roland Bittelson talked about calculating around an instanton background.

Also, I had another piece up this week at FirstPrinciples, based on an interview with the (outgoing) president of the Sloan Foundation. I won’t have a “bonus info” post for this one, as most of what I learned went into the piece. But if you don’t know what the Sloan Foundation does, take a look! I hadn’t known they funded Jupyter notebooks and Hidden Figures, or that they introduced Kahneman and Tversky.

In Scientific American, With a Piece on Vacuum Decay

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I had a piece in Scientific American last week. It’s paywalled, but if you’re a subscriber there you can see it, or you can buy the print magazine.

(I also had two pieces out in other outlets this week. I’ll be saying more about them…in a couple weeks.)

The Scientific American piece is about an apocalyptic particle physics scenario called vacuum decay. It’s a topic I covered last year in Quanta Magazine, an unlikely event where the Higgs field which gives fundamental particles their mass changes value, suddenly making all other particles much more massive and changing physics as we know it. It’s a change that physicists think would start as a small bubble and spread at (almost) the speed of light, covering the universe.

What I wrote for Quanta was a short news piece covering a small adjustment to the calculation, one that made the chance of vacuum decay slightly more likely. (But still mind-bogglingly small, to be clear.)

Scientific American asked for a longer piece, and that gave me space to dig deeper. I was able to say more about how vacuum decay works, with a few metaphors that I think should make it a lot easier to understand. I also got to learn about some new developments, in particular, an interesting story about how tiny primordial black holes could make vacuum decay dramatically more likely.

One thing that was a bit too complicated to talk about were the puzzles involved in trying to calculate these chances. In the article, I mention a calculation of the chance of vacuum decay by a team including Matthew Schwartz. That calculation wasn’t the first to estimate the chance of vacuum decay, and it’s not the most recent update either. Instead, I picked it because Schwartz’s team approached the question in what struck me as a more reliable way, trying to cut through confusion by asking the most basic question you can in a quantum theory: given that now you observe X, what’s the chance that later you observe Y? Figuring out how to turn vacuum decay into that kind of question correctly is tricky (for example, you need to include the possibility that vacuum decay happens, then reverses, then happens again).

The calculations of black holes speeding things up didn’t work things out in quite as much detail. I like to think I’ve made a small contribution by motivating them to look at Schwartz’s work, which might spawn a more rigorous calculation in future. When I talked to Schwartz, he wasn’t even sure whether the picture of a bubble forming in one place and spreading at light speed is correct: he’d calculated the chance of the initial decay, but hadn’t found a similarly rigorous way to think about the aftermath. So even more than the uncertainty I talk about in the piece, the questions about new physics and probability, there is even some doubt about whether the whole picture really works the way we’ve been imagining it.

That makes for a murky topic! But it’s also a flashy one, a compelling story for science fiction and the public imagination, and yeah, another motivation to get high-precision measurements of the Higgs and top quark from future colliders! (If maybe not quite the way this guy said it.)

Antimatter Isn’t Magic

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You’ve heard of antimatter, right?

For each type of particle, there is a rare kind of evil twin with the opposite charge, called an anti-particle. When an anti-proton meets a proton, they annihilate each other in a giant blast of energy.

I see a lot of questions online about antimatter. One recurring theme is people asking a very general question: how does antimatter work?

If you’ve just heard the pop physics explanation, antimatter probably sounds like magic. What about antimatter lets it destroy normal matter? Does it need to touch? How long does it take? And what about neutral particles like neutrons?

You find surprisingly few good explanations of this online, but I can explain why. Physicists like me don’t expect antimatter to be confusing in this way, because to us, antimatter isn’t doing anything all that special. When a particle and an antiparticle annihilate, they’re doing the same thing that any other pair of particles do when they do…basically anything else.

Instead of matter and antimatter, let’s talk about one of the oldest pieces of evidence for quantum mechanics, the photoelectric effect. Scientists shone light at a metal, and found that if the wavelength of the light was short enough, electrons would spring free, causing an electric current. If the wavelength was too long, the metal wouldn’t emit any electrons, no matter how much light they shone. Einstein won his Nobel prize for the explanation: the light hitting the metal comes in particle-sized pieces, called photons, whose energy is determined by the wavelength of the light. If the individual photons don’t have enough energy to get an electron to leave the metal, then no electron will move, no matter how many photons you use.

What happens to the photons after they hit the metal?

They go away. We say they are absorbed, an electron absorbs a photon and speeds up, increasing its kinetic energy so it can escape.

But we could just as easily say the photon is annihilated, if we wanted to.

In the photoelectric effect, you start with one electron and one photon, they come together, and you end up with one electron and no photon. In proton-antiproton annihilation, you start with a proton and an antiproton, they come together, and you end up with no protons or antiprotons, but instead “energy”…which in practice, usually means two photons.

That’s all that happens, deep down at the root of things. The laws of physics are rules about inputs and outputs. Start with these particles, they come together, you end up with these other particles. Sometimes one of the particles stays the same. Sometimes particles seem to transform, and different kinds of particles show up. Sometimes some of the particles are photons, and you think of them as “just energy”, and easy to absorb. But particles are particles, and nothing is “just energy”. Each thing, absorption, decay, annihilation, each one is just another type of what we call interactions.

What makes annihilation of matter and antimatter seem unique comes down to charges. Interactions have to obey the laws of physics: they conserve energy, they conserve momentum, and they conserve charge.

So why can an antiproton and a proton annihilate to pure photons, while two protons can’t? A proton and an antiproton have opposite charge, a photon has zero charge. You could combine two protons to make something else, but it would have to have the same charge as two protons.

What about neutrons? A neutron has no electric charge, so you might think it wouldn’t need antimatter. But a neutron has another type of charge, called baryon number. In order to annihilate one, you’d need an anti-neutron, which would still have zero electric charge but would have the opposite baryon number. (By the way, physicists have been making anti-neutrons since 1956.)

On the other hand, photons actually have no charge. So do Higgs bosons. So one Higgs boson can become two photons, without annihilating with anything else. Each of these particles can be called its own antiparticle: a photon is also an antiphoton, a Higgs is also an anti-Higgs.

Because particle-antiparticle annihilation follows the same rules as other interactions between particles, it also takes place via the same forces. When a proton and an antiproton annihilate each other, they typically do this via the electromagnetic force. This is why you end up with light, which is an electromagnetic wave. Like everything in the quantum world, this annihilation isn’t certain. Is has a chance to happen, proportional to the strength of the interaction force involved.

What about neutrinos? They also appear to have a kind of charge, called lepton number. That might not really be a conserved charge, and neutrinos might be their own antiparticles, like photons. However, they are much less likely to be annihilated than protons and antiprotons, because they don’t have electric charge, and thus their interaction doesn’t depend on the electromagnetic force, but on the much weaker weak nuclear force. A weaker force means a less likely interaction.

Antimatter might seem like the stuff of science fiction. But it’s not really harder to understand than anything else in particle physics.

(I know, that’s a low bar!)

It’s just interactions. Particles go in, particles go out. If it follows the rules, it can happen, if it doesn’t, it can’t. Antimatter is no different.

Some FAQ for Microsoft’s Majorana 1 Chip

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Recently, Microsoft announced a fancy new quantum computing chip called Majorana 1. I’ve noticed quite a bit of confusion about what they actually announced, and while there’s a great FAQ page about it on the quantum computing blog Shtetl Optimized, the post there aims at a higher level, assuming you already know the basics. You can think of this post as a complement to that one, that tries to cover some basic things Shtetl Optimized took for granted.

Q: In the announcement, Microsoft said:

“It leverages the world’s first topoconductor, a breakthrough type of material which can observe and control Majorana particles to produce more reliable and scalable qubits, which are the building blocks for quantum computers.”

That sounds wild! Are they really using particles in a computer?

A: All computers use particles. Electrons are particles!

Q: You know what I mean!

A: You’re asking if these are “particle physics” particles, like the weird types they try to observe at the LHC?

No, they’re not.

Particle physicists use a mathematical framework called quantum field theory, where particles are ripples in things called quantum fields that describe properties of the universe. But they aren’t the only people to use that framework. Instead of studying properties of the universe you can study properties of materials, weird alloys and layers of metal and crystal that do weird and useful things. The properties of these materials can be approximately described with the same math, with quantum fields. Just as the properties of the universe ripple to produce particles, these properties of materials ripple to produce what are called quasiparticles. Ultimately, these quasiparticles come down to movements of ordinary matter, usually electrons in the original material. They’re just described with a kind of math that makes them look like their own particles.

Q: So, what are these Majorana particles supposed to be?

A: In quantum field theory, most particles come with an antimatter partner. Electrons, for example, have partners called positrons, with a positive electric charge instead of a negative one. These antimatter partners have to exist due to the math of quantum field theory, but there is a way out: some particles are their own antimatter partner, letting one particle cover both roles. This happens for some “particle physics particles”, but all the examples we’ve found are a type of particle called a “boson”, particles related to forces. In 1937, the physicist Ettore Majorana figured out the math you would need to make a particle like this that was a fermion instead, the other main type of particle that includes electrons and protons. So far, we haven’t found one of these Majorana fermions in nature, though some people think the elusive neutrino particles could be an example. Others, though, have tried instead to find a material described by Majorana’s theory. This should in principle be easier, you can build a lot of different materials after all. But it’s proven quite hard for people to do. Back in 2018, Microsoft claimed they’d managed this, but had to retract the claim. This time, they seem more confident, though the scientific community is still not convinced.

Q: And what’s this topoconductor they’re talking about?

A: Topoconductor is short for topological superconductor. Superconductors are materials that conduct electricity much better than ordinary metals.

Q: And, topological means? Something about donuts, right?

A: If you’ve heard anything about topology, you’ve heard that it’s a type of mathematics where donuts are equivalent to coffee cups. You might have seen an animation of a coffee cup being squished and mushed around until the ring of the handle becomes the ring of a donut.

This isn’t actually the important part of topology. The important part is that, in topology, a ball is not equivalent to a donut.

Topology is the study of which things can change smoothly into one another. If you want to change a donut into a ball, you have to slice through the donut’s ring or break the surface inside. You can’t smoothly change one to another. Topologists study shapes of different kinds of things, figuring out which ones can be changed into each other smoothly and which can’t.

Q: What does any of that have to do with quantum computers?

A: The shapes topologists study aren’t always as simple as donuts and coffee cups. They can also study the shape of quantum fields, figuring out which types of quantum fields can change smoothly into each other and which can’t.

The idea of topological quantum computation is to use those rules about what can change into each other to encode information. You can imagine a ball encoding zero, and a donut encoding one. A coffee cup would then also encode one, because it can change smoothly into a donut, while a box would encode zero because you can squash the corners to make it a ball. This helps, because it means that you don’t screw up your information by making smooth changes. If you accidentally drop your box that encodes zero and squish a corner, it will still encode zero.

This matters in quantum computing because it is very easy to screw up quantum information. Quantum computers are very delicate, and making them work reliably has been immensely challenging, requiring people to build much bigger quantum computers so they can do each calculation with many redundant backups. The hope is that topological superconductors would make this easier, by encoding information in a way that is hard to accidentally change.

Q: Cool. So does that mean Microsoft has the best quantum computer now?

A: The machine Microsoft just announced has only a single qubit, the quantum equivalent of just a single bit of computer memory. At this point, it can’t do any calculations. It can just be read, giving one or zero. The hope is that the power of the new method will let Microsoft catch up with companies that have computers with hundred of qubits, and help them arrive faster at the millions of qubits that will be needed to do anything useful.

Q: Ah, ok. But it sounds like they accomplished some crazy Majorana stuff at least, right?

A: Umm…

Read the Shtetl-Optimized FAQ if you want more details. The short answer is that this is still controversial. So far, the evidence they’ve made public isn’t enough to show that they found these Majorana quasiparticles, or that they made a topological superconductor. They say they have more recent evidence that they haven’t published yet. We’ll see.

Bonus Material for “How Hans Bethe Stumbled Upon Perfect Quantum Theories”

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I had an article last week in Quanta Magazine. It’s a piece about something called the Bethe ansatz, a method in mathematical physics that was discovered by Hans Bethe in the 1930’s, but which only really started being understood and appreciated around the 1960’s. Since then it’s become a key tool, used in theoretical investigations in areas from condensed matter to quantum gravity. In this post, I thought I’d say a bit about the story behind the piece and give some bonus material that didn’t fit.

When I first decided to do the piece I reached out to Jules Lamers. We were briefly office-mates when I worked in France, where he was giving a short course on the Bethe ansatz and the methods that sprung from it. It turned out he had also been thinking about writing a piece on the subject, and we considered co-writing for a bit, but that didn’t work for Quanta. He helped me a huge amount with understanding the history of the subject and tracking down the right sources. If you’re a physicist who wants to learn about these things, I recommend his lecture notes. And if you’re a non-physicist who wants to know more, I hope he gets a chance to write a longer popular-audience piece on the topic!

If you clicked through to Jules’s lecture notes, you’d see the word “Bethe ansatz” doesn’t appear in the title. Instead, you’d see the phrase “quantum integrability”. In classical physics, an “integrable” system is one where you can calculate what will happen by doing an integral, essentially letting you “solve” any problem completely. Systems you can describe with the Bethe ansatz are solvable in a more complicated quantum sense, so they get called “quantum integrable”. There’s a whole research field that studies these quantum integrable systems.

My piece ended up rushing through the history of the field. After talking about Bethe’s original discovery, I jumped ahead to ice. The Bethe ansatz was first used to think about ice in the 1960’s, but the developments I mentioned leading up to it, where experimenters noticed extra variability and theorists explained it with the positions of hydrogen atoms, happened earlier, in the 1930’s. (Thanks to the commenter who pointed out that this was confusing!) Baxter gets a starring role in this section and had an important role in tying things together, but other people (Lieb and Sutherland) were involved earlier, showing that the Bethe ansatz indeed could be used with thin sheets of ice. This era had a bunch of other big names that I didn’t have space to talk about: C. N. Yang makes an appearance, and while Faddeev comes up later, I didn’t mention that he had a starring role in the 1970’s in understanding the connection to classical integrability and proposing a mathematical structure to understand what links all these different integrable theories together.

I vaguely gestured at black holes and quantum gravity, but didn’t have space for more than that. The connection there is to a topic you might have heard of before if you’ve read about string theory, called AdS/CFT, a connection between two kinds of world that are secretly the same: a toy model of gravity called Anti-de Sitter space (AdS) and a theory without gravity that looks the same at any scale (called a Conformal Field Theory, or CFT). It turns out that in the most prominent example of this, the theory without gravity is integrable! In fact, it’s a theory I spent a lot of time working with back in my research days, called N=4 super Yang-Mills. This theory is kind of like QCD, and in some sense it has integrability for similar reasons to those that Feynman hoped for and Korchemsky and Faddeev found. But it actually goes much farther, outside of the high-energy approximation where Korchemsky and Faddeev’s result works, and in principle seems to include everything you might want to know about the theory. Nowadays, people are using it to investigate the toy model of quantum gravity, hoping to get insights about quantum gravity in general.

One thing I didn’t get a chance to mention at all is the connection to quantum computing. People are trying to build a quantum computer with carefully-cooled atoms. It’s important to test whether the quantum computer functions well enough, or if the quantum states aren’t as perfect as they need to be. One way people have been testing this is with the Bethe ansatz: because it lets you calculate the behavior of special systems perfectly, you can set up your quantum computer to model a Bethe ansatz, and then check how close to the prediction your results are. You know that the theoretical result is complete, so any failure has to be due to an imperfection in your experiment.

I gave a quick teaser to a very active field, one that has fascinated a lot of prominent physicists and been applied in a wide variety of areas. I hope I’ve inspired you to learn more!

How Small Scales Can Matter for Large Scales

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For a certain type of physicist, nothing matters more than finding the ultimate laws of nature for its tiniest building-blocks, the rules that govern quantum gravity and tell us where the other laws of physics come from. But because they know very little about those laws at this point, they can predict almost nothing about observations on the larger distance scales we can actually measure.

“Almost nothing” isn’t nothing, though. Theoretical physicists don’t know nature’s ultimate laws. But some things about them can be reasonably guessed. The ultimate laws should include a theory of quantum gravity. They should explain at least some of what we see in particle physics now, explaining why different particles have different masses in terms of a simpler theory. And they should “make sense”, respecting cause and effect, the laws of probability, and Einstein’s overall picture of space and time.

All of these are assumptions, of course. Further assumptions are needed to derive any testable consequences from them. But a few communities in theoretical physics are willing to take the plunge, and see what consequences their assumptions have.

First, there’s the Swampland. String theorists posit that the world has extra dimensions, which can be curled up in a variety of ways to hide from view, with different observable consequences depending on how the dimensions are curled up. This list of different observable consequences is referred to as the Landscape of possibilities. Based on that, some string theorists coined the term “Swampland” to represent an area outside the Landscape, containing observations that are incompatible with quantum gravity altogether, and tried to figure out what those observations would be.

In principle, the Swampland includes the work of all the other communities on this list, since a theory of quantum gravity ought to be consistent with other principles as well. In practice, people who use the term focus on consequences of gravity in particular. The earliest such ideas argued from thought experiments with black holes, finding results that seemed to demand that gravity be the weakest force for at least one type of particle. Later researchers would more frequently use string theory as an example, looking at what kinds of constructions people had been able to make in the Landscape to guess what might lie outside of it. They’ve used this to argue that dark energy might be temporary, and to try to figure out what traits new particles might have.

Second, I should mention naturalness. When talking about naturalness, people often use the analogy of a pen balanced on its tip. While possible in principle, it must have been set up almost perfectly, since any small imbalance would cause it to topple, and that perfection demands an explanation. Similarly, in particle physics, things like the mass of the Higgs boson and the strength of dark energy seem to be carefully balanced, so that a small change in how they were set up would lead to a much heavier Higgs boson or much stronger dark energy. The need for an explanation for the Higgs’ careful balance is why many physicists expected the Large Hadron Collider to discover additional new particles.

As I’ve argued before, this kind of argument rests on assumptions about the fundamental laws of physics. It assumes that the fundamental laws explain the mass of the Higgs, not merely by giving it an arbitrary number but by showing how that number comes from a non-arbitrary physical process. It also assumes that we understand well how physical processes like that work, and what kinds of numbers they can give. That’s why I think of naturalness as a type of argument, much like the Swampland, that uses the smallest scales to constrain larger ones.

Third is a host of constraints that usually go together: causality, unitarity, and positivity. Causality comes from cause and effect in a relativistic universe. Because two distant events can appear to happen in different orders depending on how fast you’re going, any way to send signals faster than light is also a way to send signals back in time, causing all of the paradoxes familiar from science fiction. Unitarity comes from quantum mechanics. If quantum calculations are supposed to give the probability of things happening, those probabilities should make sense as probabilities: for example, they should never go above one.

You might guess that almost any theory would satisfy these constraints. But if you extend a theory to the smallest scales, some theories that otherwise seem sensible end up failing this test. Actually linking things up takes other conjectures about the mathematical form theories can have, conjectures that seem more solid than the ones underlying Swampland and naturalness constraints but that still can’t be conclusively proven. If you trust the conjectures, you can derive restrictions, often called positivity constraints when they demand that some set of observations is positive. There has been a renaissance in this kind of research over the last few years, including arguments that certain speculative theories of gravity can’t actually work.

Which String Theorists Are You Complaining About?

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Do string theorists have an unfair advantage? Do they have an easier time getting hired, for example?

In one of the perennial arguments about this on Twitter, Martin Bauer posted a bar chart of faculty hires in the US by sub-field. The chart was compiled by Erich Poppitz from data in the US particle physics rumor mill, a website where people post information about who gets hired where for the US’s quite small number of permanent theoretical particle physics positions at research universities and national labs. The data covers 1994 to 2017, and shows one year, 1999, when there were more string theorists hired than all other topics put together. The years around then also had many string theorists hired, but the proportion starts falling around the mid 2000’s…around when Lee Smolin wrote a book, The Trouble With Physics, arguing that string theorists had strong-armed their way into academic dominance. After that, the percentage of string theorists falls, oscillating between a tenth and a quarter of total hires.

Judging from that, you get the feeling that string theory’s critics are treating a temporary hiring fad as if it was a permanent fact. The late 1990’s were a time of high-profile developments in string theory that excited a lot of people. Later, other hiring fads dominated, often driven by experiments: I remember when the US decided to prioritize neutrino experiments and neutrino theorists had a much easier time getting hired, and there seem to be similar pushes now with gravitational waves, quantum computing, and AI.

Thinking about the situation in this way, though, ignores what many of the critics have in mind. That’s because the “string” column on that bar chart is not necessarily what people think of when they think of string theory.

If you look at the categories on Poppitz’s bar chart, you’ll notice something odd. “String” its itself a category. Another category, “lattice”, refers to lattice QCD, a method to find the dynamics of quarks numerically. The third category, though, is a combination of three things “ph/th/cosm”.

“Cosm” here refers to cosmology, another sub-field. “Ph” and “th” though aren’t really sub-fields. Instead, they’re arXiv categories, sections of the website arXiv.org where physicists post papers before they submit them to journals. The “ph” category is used for phenomenology, the type of theoretical physics where people try to propose models of the real world and make testable predictions. The “th” category is for “formal theory”, papers where theoretical physicists study the kinds of theories they use in more generality and develop new calculation methods, with insights that over time filter into “ph” work.

“String”, on the other hand, is not an arXiv category. When string theorists write papers, they’ll put them into “th” or “ph” or another relevant category (for example “gr-qc”, for general relativity and quantum cosmology). This means that when Poppitz distinguishes “ph/th/cosm” from “string”, he’s being subjective, using his own judgement to decide who counts as a string theorist.

So who counts as a string theorist? The simplest thing to do would be to check if their work uses strings. Failing that, they could use other tools of string theory and its close relatives, like Calabi-Yau manifolds, M-branes, and holography.

That might be what Poppitz was doing, but if he was, he was probably missing a lot of the people critics of string theory complain about. He even misses many people who describe themselves as string theorists. In an old post of mine I go through the talks at Strings, string theory’s big yearly conference, giving them finer-grained categories. The majority don’t use anything uniquely stringy.

Instead, I think critics of string theory have two kinds of things in mind.

First, most of the people who made their reputations on string theory are still in academia, and still widely respected. Some of them still work on string theory topics, but many now work on other things. Because they’re still widely respected, their interests have a substantial influence on the field. When one of them starts looking at connections between theories of two-dimensional materials, you get a whole afternoon of talks at Strings about theories of two-dimensional materials. Working on those topics probably makes it a bit easier to get a job, but also, many of the people working on them are students of these highly respected people, who just because of that have an easier time getting a job. If you’re a critic of string theory who thinks the founders of the field led physics astray, then you probably think they’re still leading physics astray even if they aren’t currently working on string theory.

Second, for many other people in physics, string theorists are their colleagues and friends. They’ll make fun of trends that seem overhyped and under-thought, like research on the black hole information paradox or the swampland, or hopes that a slightly tweaked version of supersymmetry will show up soon at the LHC. But they’ll happily use ideas developed in string theory when they prove handy, using supersymmetric theories to test new calculation techniques, string theory’s extra dimensions to inspire and ground new ideas for dark matter, or the math of strings themselves as interesting shortcuts to particle physics calculations. String theory is available as reference to these people in a way that other quantum gravity proposals aren’t. That’s partly due to familiarity and shared language (I remember a talk at Perimeter where string theorists wanted to learn from practitioners from another area and the discussion got bogged down by how they were using the word “dimension”), but partly due to skepticism of the various alternate approaches. Most people have some idea in their heads of deep problems with various proposals: screwing up relativity, making nonsense out of quantum mechanics, or over-interpreting on limited evidence. The most commonly believed criticisms are usually wrong, with objections long-known to practitioners of the alternate approaches, and so those people tend to think they’re being treated unfairly. But the wrong criticisms are often simplified versions of correct criticisms, passed down by the few people who dig deeply into these topics, criticisms that the alternative approaches don’t have good answers to.

The end result is that while string theory itself isn’t dominant, a sort of “string friendliness” is. Most of the jobs aren’t going to string theorists in the literal sense. But the academic world string theorists created keeps turning. People still respect string theorists and the research directions they find interesting, and people are still happy to collaborate and discuss with string theorists. For research communities people are more skeptical of, it must feel very isolating, like the world is still being run by their opponents. But this isn’t the kind of hegemony that can be solved by a revolution. Thinking that string theory is a failed research program, and people focused on it should have a harder time getting hired, is one thing. Thinking that everyone who respects at least one former string theorist should have a harder time getting hired is a very different goal. And if what you’re complaining about is “string friendliness”, not actual string theorists, then that’s what you’re asking for.