Economists must find academics confusing.

When investors put money in a company, they have some control over what that company does. They vote to decide a board, and the board votes to hire a CEO. If the company isn’t doing what the investors want, the board can fire the CEO, or the investors can vote in a new board. Everybody is incentivized to do what the people who gave the money want to happen. And usually, those people want the company to increase its profits, since most of them people are companies with their own investors).

Academics are paid by universities and research centers, funded in the aggregate by governments and student tuition and endowments from donors. But individually, they’re also often funded by grants.

What grant-givers want is more ambiguous. The money comes in big lumps from governments and private foundations, which generally want something vague like “scientific progress”. The actual decision of who gets the money are made by committees made up of senior scientists. These people aren’t experts in every topic, so they have to extrapolate, much as investors have to guess whether a new company will be profitable based on past experience. At their best, they use their deep familiarity with scientific research to judge which projects are most likely to work, and which have the most interesting payoffs. At their weakest, though, they stick with ideas they’ve heard of, things they know work because they’ve seen them work before. That, in a nutshell, is why mainstream research prevails: not because the mainstream wants to suppress alternatives, but because sometimes the only way to guess if something will work is raw familiarity.

(What “works” means is another question. The cynical answers are “publishes papers” or “gets citations”, but that’s a bit unfair: in Europe and the US, most funders know that these numbers don’t tell the whole story. The trivial answer is “achieves what you said it would”, but that can’t be the whole story, because some goals are more pointless than others. You might want the answer to be “benefits humanity”, but that’s almost impossible to judge. So in the end the answer is “sounds like good science”, which is vulnerable to all the fads you can imagine…but is pretty much our only option, regardless.)

So are academics incentivized to do what the grant committees want? Sort of.

Science never goes according to plan. Grant committees are made up of scientists, so they know that. So while many grants have a review process afterwards to see whether you achieved what you planned, they aren’t all that picky about it. If you can tell a good story, you can explain why you moved away from your original proposal. You can say the original idea inspired a new direction, or that it became clear that a new approach was necessary. I’ve done this with an EU grant, and they were fine with it.

Looking at this, you might imagine that an academic who’s a half-capable storyteller could get away with anything they wanted. Propose a fashionable project, work on what you actually care about, and tell a good story afterwards to avoid getting in trouble. As long as you’re not literally embezzling the money (the guy who was paying himself rent out of his visitor funding, for instance), what could go wrong? You get the money without the incentives, you move the scientific world and nobody gets to move you.

It’s not quite that easy, though.

Sabine Hossenfelder told herself she could do something like this. She got grants for fashionable topics she thought were pointless, and told herself she’d spend time on the side on the things she felt were actually important. Eventually, she realized she wasn’t actually doing the important things: the faddish research ended up taking all her time. Not able to get grants doing what she actually cared about (and, in one of those weird temporary European positions that only lasts until you run out of grants), she now has to make a living from her science popularization work.

I can’t speak for Hossenfelder, but I’ve also put some thought into how to choose what to research, about whether I could actually be an unmoved mover. A few things get in the way:

First, applying for grants doesn’t just take storytelling skills, it takes scientific knowledge. Grant committees aren’t experts in everything, but they usually send grants to be reviewed by much more appropriate experts. These experts will check if your grant makes sense. In order to make the grant make sense, you have to know enough about the faddish topic to propose something reasonable. You have to keep up with the fad. You have to spend time reading papers, and talking to people in the faddish subfield. This takes work, but also changes your motivation. If you spend time around people excited by an idea, you’ll either get excited too, or be too drained by the dissonance to get any work done.

Second, you can’t change things that much. You still need a plausible story as to how you got from where you are to where you are going.

Third, you need to be a plausible person to do the work. If the committee looks at your CV and sees that you’ve never actually worked on the faddish topic, they’re more likely to give a grant to someone who’s actually worked on it.

Fourth, you have to choose what to do when you hire people. If you never hire any postdocs or students working on the faddish topic, then it will be very obvious that you aren’t trying to research it. If you do hire them, then you’ll be surrounded by people who actually care about the fad, and want your help to understand how to work with it.

Ultimately, to avoid the grant committee’s incentives, you need a golden tongue and a heart of stone, and even then you’ll need to spend some time working on something you think is pointless.

Even if you don’t apply for grants, even if you have a real permanent position or even tenure, you still feel some of these pressures. You’re still surrounded by people who care about particular things, by students and postdocs who need grants and jobs and fellow professors who are confident the mainstream is the right path forward. It takes a lot of strength, and sometimes cruelty, to avoid bowing to that.

So despite the ambiguous rules and lack of oversight, academics still respond to incentives: they can’t just do whatever they feel like. They aren’t bound by shareholders, they aren’t expected to make a profit. But ultimately, the things that do constrain them, expertise and cognitive load, social pressure and compassion for those they mentor, those can be even stronger.

I suspect that those pressures dominate the private sector as well. My guess is that for all that companies think of themselves as trying to maximize profits, the all-too-human motivations we share are more powerful than any corporate governance structure or org chart. But I don’t know yet. Likely, I’ll find out soon.

They say when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

Academics are a bit smarter than that. Confidently predict a world of nails, and you fall to the first paper that shows evidence of a screw. There are limits to how long you can delude yourself when your job is supposed to be all about finding the truth.

You can make your own nails, though.

Suppose there’s something you’re really good at. Maybe, like many of my past colleagues, you can do particle physics calculations faster than anyone else, even when the particles are super-complicated hypothetical gravitons. Maybe you know more than anyone else about how to make a quantum computer, or maybe you just know how to build a “quantum computer“. Maybe you’re an expert in esoteric mathematics, who can re-phrase anything in terms of the arcane language of category theory.

That’s your hammer. Get good enough with it, and anyone with a nail-based problem will come to you to solve it. If nails are trendy, then you’ll impress grant committees and hiring committees, and your students will too.

When nails aren’t trendy, though, you need to try something else. If your job is secure, and you don’t have students with their own insecure jobs banging down your door, then you could spend a while retraining. You could form a reading group, pick up a textbook or two about screwdrivers and wrenches, and learn how to use different tools. Eventually, you might find a screwdriving task you have an advantage with, something you can once again do better than everyone else, and you’ll start getting all those rewards again.

Or, maybe you won’t. You’ll get less funding to hire people, so you’ll do less research, so your work will get less impressive and you’ll get less funding, and so on and so forth.

Instead of risking that, most academics take another path. They take what they’re good at, and invent new problems in the new trendy area to use that expertise.

If everyone is excited about gravitational waves, you turn a black hole calculation into a graviton calculation. If companies are investing in computation in the here-and-now, then you find ways those companies can use insights from your quantum research. If everyone wants to know how AI works, you build a mathematical picture that sort of looks like one part of how AI works, and do category theory to it.

At first, you won’t be competitive. Your hammer isn’t going to work nearly as well as the screwdrivers people have been using forever for these problems, and there will be all sorts of new issues you have to solve just to get your hammer in position in the first place. But that doesn’t matter so much, as long as you’re honest. Academic research is expected to take time, applications aren’t supposed to be obvious. Grant committees care about what you’re trying to do, as long as you have a reasonably plausible story about how you’ll get there.

(Investors are also not immune to a nice story. Customers are also not immune to a nice story. You can take this farther than you might think.)

So, unlike the re-trainers, you survive. And some of the time, you make it work. Your hammer-based screwdriving ends up morphing into something that, some of the time, actually does something the screwdrivers can’t. Instead of delusionally imagining nails, you’ve added a real ersatz nail to the world, where previously there was just a screw.

Making nails is a better path for you. Is it a better path for the world? I’m not sure.

If all those grants you won, all those jobs you and your students got, all that money from investors or customers drawn in by a good story, if that all went to the people who had the screwdrivers in the first place, could they have done a better job?

Sometimes, no. Sometimes you happen upon some real irreproducible magic. Your hammer is Thor’s hammer, and when hefted by the worthy it can do great things.

Sometimes, though, your hammer was just the hammer that got the funding. Now every screwdriver kit has to have a space for a little hammer, when it could have had another specialized screwdriver that fit better in the box.

In the end, the world is build out of these kinds of ill-fitting toolkits. We all try to survive, both as human beings and by our sub-culture’s concept of the good life. We each have our hammers, and regardless of whether the world is full of screws, we have to convince people they want a hammer anyway. Everything we do is built on a vast rickety pile of consequences, the end-results of billions of people desperate to be wanted. For those of us who love clean solutions and ideal paths, this is maddening and frustrating and terrifying. But it’s life, and in a world where we never know the ideal path, screw-nails and nail-screws are the best way we’ve found to get things done.