Tag Archives: quantum field theory

Yo Dawg, I Heard You Liked Quantum Field Theory so I Made You a String Theory

String theory may sound strange and exotic, with its extra dimensions and loops of string. Deep down, though, string theory is by far the most conservative attempt at a theory of quantum gravity. It just takes the tools of quantum field theory, and applies them all over again.

Picture a loop of string, traveling through space. From one moment to the next, the loop occupies a loop-shaped region. Now imagine joining all those regions together, forming a tunnel: the space swept out by the string over its entire existence. As the string joins other strings, merging and dividing, the result is a complicated surface. In string theory, we call this surface the worldsheet.

Yes, it looks like Yog-Sothoth. It always looks like Yog-Sothoth.

Imagine what it’s like to live on this two-dimensional surface. You don’t know where the string is in the space around it, because you can’t see off the surface. You can learn something about it, though, because making the worldsheet bend takes energy. I’ve talked about this kind of situation before, and the result is that your world contains a scalar field.

Living on the two-dimensional surface, then, you can describe your world with two-dimensional quantum field theory. Your two-dimensional theory, reinterpreted, then tells you the position of the string in higher-dimensional space. If we were just doing normal particle physics, we’d use quantum field theory to describe the particles. Now that we’ve replaced particles with strings, our quantum field theory describes things that are the result of another quantum field theory.

Xzibit would be proud.

If you understand this aspect of string theory, everything else makes a lot more sense. If you’re just imagining lengths of string, it’s hard to understand how strings can have supersymmetry. In these terms, though, it’s simple: instead of just scalar fields, supersymmetric strings also have fermions (fields with spin 1/2) as part of their two-dimensional quantum field theory.

It’s also deeply related to all those weird extra dimensions. As it turns out, two-dimensional quantum field theories are much more restricted than their cousins in our four (three space plus one time)-dimensional world. In order for a theory with only scalars (like the worldsheet of a moving loop of string) to make sense, there have to be twenty-six scalars. Each scalar is a direction in which the worldsheet can bend, so if you just have scalars you’re looking at a 26-dimensional world. Supersymmetry changes this calculation by adding fermions: with fermions and scalars, you need ten scalars to make your theory mathematically consistent, which is why superstring theory lives in ten dimensions.

This also gives you yet another way to think about branes. Strings come from two-dimensional quantum field theories, while branes come from quantum field theories in other dimensions.

Sticking a quantum field theory inside a quantum field theory is the most straightforward way to move forward. Fundamentally, it’s just using tools we already know work. That doesn’t mean it’s the right solution, or that it describes reality: that’s for the future to establish. But I hope I’ve made it a bit clearer why it’s by far the most popular option.

Science Never Forgets

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I’ll just be doing a short post this week, I’ve been busy at a workshop on Flux Tubes here at Perimeter.

If you’ve ever heard someone tell the history of string theory, you’ve probably heard that it was first proposed not as a quantum theory of gravity, but as a way to describe the strong nuclear force. Colliders of the time had discovered particles, called mesons, that seemed to have a key role in the strong nuclear force that held protons and neutrons together. These mesons had an unusual property: the faster they spun, the higher their mass, following a very simple and regular pattern known as a Regge trajectory. Researchers found that they could predict this kind of behavior if, rather than particles, these mesons were short lengths of “string”, and with this discovery they invented string theory.

As it turned out, these early researchers were wrong. Mesons are not lengths of string, rather, they are pairs of quarks. The discovery of quarks explained how the strong force acted on protons and neutrons, each made of three quarks, and it also explained why mesons acted a bit like strings: in each meson, the two quarks are linked by a flux tube, a roughly cylindrical area filled with the gluons that carry the strong nuclear force. So rather than strings, mesons turned out to be more like bolas.

Leonin sold separately.

If you’ve heard this story before, you probably think it’s ancient history. We know about quarks and gluons now, and string theory has moved on to bigger and better things. You might be surprised to hear that at this week’s workshop, several presenters have been talking about modeling flux tubes between quarks in terms of string theory!

The thing is, science never forgets a good idea. String theory was superseded by quarks in describing the strong force, but it was only proposed in the first place because it matched the data fairly well. Now, with string theory-inspired techniques, people are calculating the first corrections to the string-like behavior of these flux tubes, comparing them with simulations of quarks and gluons, and finding surprisingly good agreement!

Science isn’t a linear story, where the past falls away to the shiny new theories of the future. It’s a marketplace. Some ideas are traded more widely, some less…but if a product works, even only sometimes, chances are someone out there will have a reason to buy it.

String Theorists Who Don’t Touch Strings

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This week I’ve been busy, attending a workshop here at Perimeter on Superstring Perturbation Theory.

Superstrings are the supersymmetric strings that string theorists use to describe fundamental particles, while perturbation theory is the trick, common in almost every area of physics, of solving a problem by a series of increasingly precise approximations.

Based on that description, you’d think that superstring perturbation theory would be a central topic in string theory research. You wouldn’t expect it to be the sort of thing only a few people at the top of the field dabble in. You definitely wouldn’t expect one of the speakers at the workshop to mention that this might be the first conference on superstring perturbation theory he’s been to since the 1980’s.

String perturbation theory is an important subject, but it’s not one many string theorists use. And the reason why is that, oddly enough, very few string theorists actually use strings.

Looking at arXiv as I’m writing this, I can see only one paper in the theoretical physics section that directly uses strings. Most of them use something else: either older concepts like black holes, quantum field theory, and supergravity, or newer ones like d-branes. If you talked to the people who wrote those papers, though, most of them would describe themselves as string theorists.

The reason for the disconnect is that string theory as a field is much more than just the study of strings. String theory is a ten-dimensional universe (or eleven with M theory), where different ways of twisting up some of the dimensions result in different apparent physics in the remaining ones. It’s got strings, but also higher-dimensional membranes (and in the eleven dimensions of M theory it only has membranes, not strings). It’s the recipe for a long list of exotic quantum field theories, and a list of possible relations between them. It’s a new way to look at geometry, to think about the intersection of the nature of space and the dynamics of what inhabits it.

If string theory were really just about strings, it likely wouldn’t have grown any bigger than its quantum gravity rivals, like Loop Quantum Gravity. String theory grew because it inspired research directions that went far afield, and far beyond its conceptual core.

That’s part of why most string theorists will be baffled if you insist that string theory needs proof, or that it’s not the right approach to quantum gravity. For most string theorists, it doesn’t matter whether we live in a stringy world, whether gravity might eventually be described by another model. For most string theorists, string theory is a tool, one that opened up fields of inquiry that don’t have much to do with predicting the output of the LHC or describing the early universe. Or, in many cases, actually using strings.

Want to Make Something New? Just Turn on the Lights.

What Counts as a Fundamental Force?

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I’m giving a presentation next Wednesday for Learning Unlimited, an organization that presents educational talks to seniors in Woodstock, Ontario. The talk introduces the fundamental forces and talks about Yang and Mills before moving on to introduce my work.

While practicing the talk today, someone from Perimeter’s outreach department pointed out a rather surprising missing element: I never mention gravity!

Most people know that there are four fundamental forces of nature. There’s Electromagnetism, there’s Gravity, there’s the Weak Nuclear Force, and there’s the Strong Nuclear Force.

Listed here by their most significant uses.

What ties these things together, though? What makes them all “fundamental forces”?

Mathematically, gravity is the odd one out here. Electromagnetism, the Weak Force, and the Strong Force all share a common description: they’re Yang-Mills forces. Gravity isn’t. While you can sort of think of it as a Yang-Mills force “squared”, it’s quite a bit more complicated than the Yang-Mills forces.

You might be objecting that the common trait of the fundamental forces is obvious: they’re forces! And indeed, you can write down a force law for gravity, and a force law for E&M, and umm…

[Mumble Mumble]

Ok, it’s not quite as bad as xkcd would have us believe. You can actually write down a force law for the weak force, if you really want to, and it’s at least sort of possible to talk about the force exerted by the strong interaction.

All that said, though, why are we thinking about this in terms of forces? Forces are a concept from classical mechanics. For a beginning physics student, they come up again and again, in free-body diagram after free-body diagram. But by the time a student learns quantum mechanics, and quantum field theory, they’ve already learned other ways of framing things where forces aren’t mentioned at all. So while forces are kind of familiar to people starting out, they don’t really match onto anything that most quantum field theorists work with, and it’s a bit weird to classify things that only really appear in quantum field theory (the Weak Nuclear Force, the Strong Nuclear Force) based on whether or not they’re forces.

Isn’t there some connection, though? After all, gravity, electromagnetism, the strong force, and the weak force may be different mathematically, but at least they all involve bosons.

Well, yes. And so does the Higgs.

The Higgs is usually left out of listings of the fundamental forces, because it’s not really a “force”. It doesn’t have a direction, instead it works equally at every point in space. But if you include spin 2 gravity and spin 1 Yang-Mills forces, why not also include the spin 0 Higgs?

Well, if you’re doing that, why not include fermions as well? People often think of fermions as “matter” and bosons as “energy”, but in fact both have energy, and neither is made of it. Electrons and quarks are just as fundamental as photons and gluons and gravitons, just as central a part of how the universe works.

I’m still trying to decide whether my presentation about Yang-Mills forces should also include gravity. On the one hand, it would make everything more familiar. On the other…pretty much this entire post.

Explanations of Phenomena Are All Alike; Every Unexplained Phenomenon Is Unexplained in Its Own Way

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Vladimir Kazakov began his talk at ICTP-SAIFR this week with a variant of Tolstoy’s famous opening to the novel Anna Karenina: “Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” Kazakov flipped the order of the quote, stating that while “Un-solvable models are each un-solvable in their own way, solvable models are all alike.”

In talking about solvable and un-solvable models, Kazakov was referring to a concept called integrability, the idea that in certain quantum field theories it’s possible to avoid the messy approximations of perturbation theory and instead jump straight to the answer. Kazakov was observing that these integrable systems seem to have a deep kinship: the same basic methods appear to work to understand all of them.

I’d like to generalize Kazakov’s point, and talk about a broader trend in physics.

Much has been made over the years of the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences”, most notably in physicist Eugene Wigner’s famous essay, The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences. There’s a feeling among some people that mathematics is much better at explaining physical phenomena than one would expect, that the world appears to be “made of math” and that it didn’t have to be.

On the surface, this is a reasonable claim. Certain mathematical ideas, group theory for example, seem to pop up again and again in physics, sometimes in wildly different contexts. The history of fundamental physics has tended to see steady progress over the years, from clunkier mathematical concepts to more and more elegant ones.

Some physicists tend to be dismissive of this. Lee Smolin in particular seems to be under the impression that mathematics is just particularly good at providing useful approximations. This perspective links to his definition of mathematics as “the study of systems of evoked relationships inspired by observations of nature,” a definition to which Peter Woit vehemently objects. Woit argues what I think any mathematician would when presented by a statement like Smolin’s: that mathematics is much more than just a useful tool for approximating observations, and that contrary to physicists’ vanity most of mathematics goes on without any explicit interest in observing the natural world.

While it’s generally rude for physicists to propose definitions for mathematics, I’m going to do so anyway. I think the following definition is one mathematicians would be more comfortable with, though it may be overly broad: Mathematics is the study of simple rules with complex consequences.

We live in a complex world. The breadth of the periodic table, the vast diversity of life, the tangled webs of galaxies across the sky, these are things that display both vast variety and a sense of order. They are, in a rather direct way, the complex consequences of rules that are at heart very very simple.

Part of the wonder of modern mathematics is how interconnected it has become. Many sub-fields, once distinct, have discovered over the years that they are really studying different aspects of the same phenomena. That’s why when you see a proof of a three-hundred-year-old mathematical conjecture, it uses terms that seem to have nothing to do with the original problem. It’s why Woit, in an essay on this topic, quotes Edward Frenkel’s description of a particular recent program as a blueprint for a “Grand Unified Theory of Mathematics”. Increasingly, complex patterns are being shown to be not only consequences of simple rules, but consequences of the same simple rules.

Mathematics itself is “unreasonably effective”. That’s why, when faced with a complex world, we shouldn’t be surprised when the same simple rules pop up again and again to explain it. That’s what explaining something is: breaking down something complex into the simple rules that give rise to it. And as mathematics progresses, it becomes more and more clear that a few closely related types of simple rules lie behind any complex phenomena. While each unexplained fact about the universe may seem unexplained in its own way, as things are explained bit by bit they show just how alike they really are.

The Real Problem with Fine-Tuning

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You’ve probably heard it said that the universe is fine-tuned.

The Standard Model, our current best understanding of the rules that govern particle physics, is full of lots of fiddly adjustable parameters. The masses of fundamental particles and the strengths of the fundamental forces aren’t the sort of thing we can predict from first principles: we need to go out, do experiments, and find out what they are. And you’ve probably heard it argued that, if these fiddly parameters were even a little different from what they are, life as we know it could not exist.

That’s fine-tuning…or at least, that’s what many people mean when they talk about fine-tuning. It’s not exactly what physicists mean though. The thing is, almost nobody who studies particle physics thinks the parameters of the Standard Model are the full story. In fact, any theory with adjustable parameters probably isn’t the full story.

It all goes back to a point I made a while back: nature abhors a constant. The whole purpose of physics is to explain the natural world, and we have a long history of taking things that look arbitrary and linking them together, showing that reality has fewer parameters than we had thought. This is something physics is very good at. (To indulge in a little extremely amateurish philosophy, it seems to me that this is simply an inherent part of how we understand the world: if we encounter a parameter, we will eventually come up with an explanation for it.)

Moreover, at this point we have a rough idea of what this sort of explanation should look like. We have experience playing with theories that don’t have any adjustable parameters, or that only have a few: M theory is an example, but there are also more traditional quantum field theories that fill this role with no mention of string theory. From our exploration of these theories, we know that they can serve as the kind of explanation we need: in a world governed by one of these theories, people unaware of the full theory would observe what would look at first glance like a world with many fiddly adjustable parameters, parameters that would eventually turn out to be consequences of the broader theory.

So for a physicist, fine-tuning is not about those fiddly parameters themselves. Rather, it’s about the theory that predicts them. Because we have experience playing with these sorts of theories, we know roughly the sorts of worlds they create. What we know is that, while sometimes they give rise to worlds that appear fine-tuned, they tend to only do so in particular ways. Setups that give rise to fine-tuning have consequences: supersymmetry, for example, can give rise to an apparently fine-tuned universe but has to have “partner” particles that show up in powerful enough colliders. In general, a theory that gives rise to apparent fine-tuning will have some detectable consequences.

That’s where physicists start to get worried. So far, we haven’t seen any of these detectable consequences, and it’s getting to the point where we could have, had they been the sort many people expected.

Physicists are worried about fine-tuning, but not because it makes the universe “unlikely”. They’re worried because the more finely-tuned our universe appears, the harder it is to find an explanation for it in terms of the sorts of theories we’re used to working with, and the less likely it becomes that someone will discover a good explanation any time soon. We’re quite confident that there should be some explanation, hundreds of years of scientific progress strongly suggest that to be the case. But the nature of that explanation is becoming increasingly opaque.

Why You Should Be Skeptical about Faster-than-Light Neutrinos

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While I do love science, I don’t always love IFL Science. They can be good at drumming up enthusiasm, but they can also be ridiculously gullible. Case in point: last week, IFL Science ran a piece on a recent paper purporting to give evidence for faster-than-light particles.

Faster than light! Sounds cool, right? Here’s why you should be skeptical:

If a science article looks dubious, you should check out the source. In this case, IFL Science links to an article on the preprint server arXiv.

arXiv is a freely accessible website where physicists and mathematicians post their articles. The site has multiple categories, corresponding to different fields. It’s got categories for essentially any type of physics you’d care to include, with the option to cross-list if you think people from multiple areas might find your work interesting.

So which category is this paper in? Particle physics? Astrophysics?

General Physics, actually.

General Physics is arXiv’s catch-all category. Some of it really is general, and can’t be put into any more specific place. But most of it, including this, falls into another category: things arXiv’s moderators think are fishy.

arXiv isn’t a journal. If you follow some basic criteria, it won’t reject your articles. Instead, dubious articles are put into General Physics, to signify that they don’t seem to belong with the other scholarship in the established categories. General Physics is a grab-bag of weird ideas and crackpot theories, a mix of fringe physicists and overenthusiastic amateurs. There probably are legitimate papers in there too…but for every paper in there, you can guarantee that some experienced researcher found it suspicious enough to send into exile.

Even if you don’t trust the moderators of arXiv, there are other reasons to be wary of faster-than-light particles.

According to Einstein’s theory of relativity, massless particles travel at the speed of light, while massive particles always travel slower. To travel faster than the speed of light, you need to have a very unusual situation: a particle whose mass is an imaginary number.

Particles like that are called tachyons, and they’re a staple of science fiction. While there was a time when they were a serious subject of physics speculation, nowadays the general view is that tachyons are a sign we’re making bad assumptions.

Assuming that someone is a republic serial villain is a good example.

Why is that? It has to do with the nature of mass.

In quantum field theory, what we observe as particles arise as ripples in quantum fields, extending across space and time. The harder it is to make the field ripple, the higher the particle’s mass.

A tachyon has imaginary mass. This means that it isn’t hard to make the field ripple at all. In fact, exactly the opposite happens: it’s easier to ripple than to stay still! Any ripple, no matter how small, will keep growing until it’s not just a ripple, but a new default state for the field. Only when it becomes hard to change again will the changes stop. If it’s hard to change, though, then the particle has a normal, non-imaginary mass, and is no longer a tachyon!

Thus, the modern understanding is that if a theory has tachyons in it, it’s because we’re assuming that one of the quantum fields has the wrong default state. Switching to the correct default gets rid of the tachyons.

There are deeper problems with the idea proposed in this paper. Normally, the only types of fields that can have tachyons are scalars, fields that can be defined by a single number at each point, sort of like a temperature. The particles this article is describing aren’t scalars, though, they’re fermions, the type of particle that includes everyday matter like electrons. Those sorts of particles can’t be tachyons at all without breaking some fairly important laws of physics. (For a technical explanation of why this is, Lubos Motl’s reply to the post here is pretty good.)

Of course, this paper’s author knows all this. He’s well aware that he’s suggesting bending some fairly fundamental laws, and he seems to think there’s room for it. But that, really, is the issue here: there’s room for it. The paper isn’t, as IFL Science seems to believe, six pieces of evidence for faster-than-light particles. It’s six measurements that, if you twist them around and squint and pick exactly the right model, have room for faster-than-light particles. And that’s…probably not worth an article.

Why I Can’t Explain Ghosts: Or, a Review of a Popular Physics Piece

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Since today is Halloween, I really wanted to write a post talking about the spookiest particles in physics, ghosts.

And their superpartners, ghost riders.

The problem is, in order to explain ghosts I’d have to explain something called gauge symmetry. And gauge symmetry is quite possibly the hardest topic in modern physics to explain to a general audience.

Deep down, gauge symmetry is the idea that irrelevant extra parts of how we represent things in physics should stay irrelevant. While that sounds obvious, it’s far from obvious how you can go from that to predicting new particles like the Higgs boson.

Explaining this is tough! Tough enough that I haven’t thought of a good way to do it yet.

Which is why I was fairly stoked when a fellow postdoc pointed out a recent popular physics article by Juan Maldacena, explaining gauge symmetry.

Juan Maldacena is a Big Deal. He’s the guy who figured out the AdS/CFT correspondence, showing that string theory (in a particular hyperbola-shaped space called AdS) and everybody’s favorite N=4 super Yang-Mills theory are secretly the same, a discovery which led to a Big Blue Dot on Paperscape. So naturally, I was excited to see what he had to say.

Big Blue Dot pictured here.

The core analogy he makes is with currencies in different countries. Just like gauge symmetry, currencies aren’t measuring anything “real”: they’re arbitrary conventions put in place because we don’t have a good way of just buying things based on pure “value”. However, also like gauge symmetry, then can have real-life consequences, as different currency exchange rates can lead to currency speculation, letting some people make money and others lose money. In Maldacena’s analogy the Higgs field works like a precious metal, making differences in exchange rates manifest as different prices of precious metals in different countries.

It’s a solid analogy, and one that is quite close to the real mathematics of the problem (as the paper’s Appendix goes into detail to show). However, I have some reservations, both about the paper as a whole and about the core analogy.

In general, Maldacena doesn’t do a very good job of writing something publicly accessible. There’s a lot of stilted, academic language, and a lot of use of “we” to do things other than lead the reader through a thought experiment. There’s also a sprinkling of terms that I don’t think the average person will understand; for example, I doubt the average college student knows flux as anything other than a zany card game.

Regarding the analogy itself, I think Maldacena has fallen into the common physicist trap of making an analogy that explains things really well…if you already know the math.

This is a problem I see pretty frequently. I keep picking on this article, and I apologize for doing so, but it’s got a great example of this when it describes supersymmetry as involving “a whole new class of number that can be thought of as the square roots of zero”. That’s a really great analogy…if you’re a student learning about the math behind supersymmetry. If you’re not, it doesn’t tell you anything about what supersymmetry does, or how it works, or why anyone might study it. It relates something unfamiliar to something unfamiliar.

I’m worried that Maldacena is doing that in this paper. His setup is mathematically rigorous, but doesn’t say much about the why of things: why do physicists use something like this economic model to understand these forces? How does this lead to what we observe around us in the real world? What’s actually going on, physically? What do particles have to do with dimensionless constants? (If you’re curious about that last one, I like to think I have a good explanation here.)

It’s not that Maldacena ignores these questions, he definitely puts effort into answering them. The problem is that his analogy itself doesn’t really address them. They’re the trickiest part, the part that people need help picturing and framing, the part that would benefit the most from a good analogy. Instead, the core imagery of the piece is wasted on details that don’t really do much for a non-expert.

Maybe I’m wrong about this, and I welcome comments from non-physicists. Do you feel like Maldacena’s account gives you a satisfying idea of what gauge symmetry is?

No, Hawking didn’t say that a particle collider could destroy the universe

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So apparently Hawking says that the Higgs could destroy the universe.

I’ve covered this already, right? No need to say anything more?

…

Ok, fine, I’ll write a real blog post.

The Higgs is a scalar field: a number, sort of like temperature, that can vary across space and time. In the case of the Higgs this number determines the mass of almost every fundamental particle (the jury is still somewhat out on neutrinos). The Higgs doesn’t vary much at all, in fact it takes an enormous (Large Hadron Collider-sized) amount of energy to get it to wobble even a little bit. That is because the Higgs is in a very very stable state.

Hawking was pointing out that, given our current model of the Higgs, there’s actually another possible state for the Higgs to be in, one that’s even more stable (because it takes less energy, essentially). In that state, the number the Higgs corresponds to is much larger, so everything would be much more massive, with potentially catastrophic results. (Matt Strassler goes into some detail about the assumptions behind this.)

For those who have been following my blog for a while, you may find these “stable states” familiar. They’re vacua, different possible ways to set up “empty” space. In that post, I may have given the impression that there’s no way to change from one stable state, one “vacuum”, to another. In the case of the Higgs, the state it’s in is so stable that vast amounts of energy (again, a Large Hadron Collider-worth) only serve to create a small, unstable fluctuation, the Higgs boson, which vanishes in a fraction of a second.

And that would be the full story, were it not for a curious phenomenon called quantum tunneling.

If you’ve heard someone else describe quantum tunneling, you’ve probably heard that quantum particles placed on one side of a wall have a very small chance of being found later on the other side of the wall, as if they had tunneled there.

Using their incredibly tiny shovels.

However, quantum tunneling applies to much more than just walls. In general, a particle in an otherwise stable state (whether stable because there are walls keeping it in place, or for other reasons) can tunnel into another state, provided that the new state is “more stable” (has lower energy).

The chance of doing this is small, and it gets smaller the more “stable” the particle’s initial state is. Still, if you apply that logic to the Higgs, you realize there’s a very very very small chance that one day the Higgs could just “tunnel” away from its current stable state, destroying the universe as we know it in the process.

If that happened, everything we know would vanish at the speed of light, and we wouldn’t see it coming.

While that may sound scary, it’s also absurdly unlikely, to the extent that it probably won’t happen until the universe is many times older than it is now. It’s not the sort of thing anybody should worry about, at least on a personal level.

Is Hawking fear-mongering, then, by pointing this out? Hardly. He’s just explaining science. Pointing out the possibility that the Higgs could spontaneously change and end the universe is a great way to emphasize the sheer scale of physics, and it’s pretty common for science communicators to mention it. I seem to recall a section about it in Particle Fever, and Sean Carroll even argues that it’s a good thing, due to killing off spooky Boltzmann Brains.

What do particle colliders have to do with all this? Well, apart from quantum tunneling, just inputting enough energy in the right way can cause a transition from one stable state to another. Here “enough energy” means about a million times that produced by the Large Hadron Collider. As Hawking jokes, you’d need a particle collider the size of the Earth to get this effect. I don’t know whether he actually ran the numbers, but if anything I’d guess that a Large Earth Collider would actually be insufficient.

Either way, Hawking is just doing standard science popularization, which isn’t exactly newsworthy. Once again, “interpret something Hawking said in the most ridiculous way possible” seems to be the du jour replacement for good science writing.

4 gravitons

Stories about physics from someone who's been there