Tag Archives: biology

In Defense of Reductionist Chauvinism

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I don’t think people who argue about reductionism are really arguing about reductionism.

Reductionism is the idea that the behavior of big, complicated things (people, economies, ecosystems) boils down to the behavior of their smallest constituents (molecules, atoms, subatomic particles). It’s often contrasted with emergence, the idea that new rules emerge in those big, complicated systems that are more than just the rules that govern the smallest scales.

Emergence can be divided into two kinds: weak and strong. In strong emergence, the big, complicated things have their own causal powers that aren’t due to smaller things at all. This tends to get mystical, with ideas like “lifeforce” and “consciousness”. Weak emergence is much milder, and while the big complicated things are best described by their own laws, in weak emergence they are in principle still caused by laws on smaller scales.

In practice, basically no-one believes in strong emergence: it seems way too much like magic for most scientists. And basically everyone believes in weak emergence: it would be nuts to insist that economists and biologists aren’t discovering important rules that would be almost impossible to find for someone who just had physics and chemistry to work with.

So if everyone agrees, what do people argue about?

Arguments about reductionism are really arguments about attitudes. If you position yourself as a reductionist, or an emergentist, you’re defending a particular way of thinking about the world, one that privileges one scale over another. When people argue for emergence, what they really seem to be doing is opposing a kind of “reductionist chauvinism”, where people like physicists insist that their perspective is the most valuable one.

And that’s understandable, because physicists can definitely be jerks sometimes. Let it be known I am no fan of jerks.

But I think it’s worth defending reductionism, not as a philosophy, but as an attitude or perspective. Worth arguing not about whether things in practice reduce or not, but about whether reduction is a good goal, about whether science that reduces more successfully is healthier science.

Because I think it is. And the reason boils down to agreement.

Simpler systems are less controversial systems. When we write down the laws that govern subatomic particles, they’re more definite: less heuristic, more precisely specified, with fewer exceptions. That isn’t to say there’s zero controversy in these subjects, there’s even controversy between mathematicians. But the more thoroughly you can boil something down to simple rules, the easier time you have of convincing others you’re right.

In contrast, the laws of the largest scales, like psychology and biology, are deeply heuristic. They thrive on exceptions and guidelines, general tendencies without clearly defined limits. And the problem with such laws is that they can lead to intractable arguments. Different schools of thought in psychology may simply never be able to convince each other, and may just have to wait for one to die off, the aesthetic feel of one set of ideas falling out of fashion as people become preoccupied with different sorts of problems.

Every time you can reduce, you avoid those insoluble disagreements. The simpler a system you can invoke, the more you can cooperate and build off each other’s work, the less time you have to waste disagreeing, the more you can accept people with different aesthetic and philosophical preferences as just different perspectives on what are ultimately the same facts. Reductionism is a technology for peace, and one of the most powerful we have.

So yeah, I’m a bit of a chauvinist about reductionism. That’s typical of an ex-physicist, sure. But it comes from a place of concern. I want a peaceful world, where we can learn from each other and find ways to agree. And reductionism is how I get there.

Cool Asteroid News

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Did you hear about the asteroid?

Which one?

You might have heard that an asteroid named 2024 YR4 is going to come unusually close to the Earth in 2032. When it first made the news, astronomers estimated a non-negligible chance of it hitting us: about three percent. That’s small enough that they didn’t expect it to happen, but large enough to plan around it: people invest in startups with a smaller chance of succeeding. Still, people were fairly calm about this one, and there are a couple of good reasons:

  • First, this isn’t a “kill the dinosaurs” asteroid, it’s much smaller. This is a “Tunguska Event” asteroid. Still pretty bad if it happens near a populated area, but not the end of life as we know it.
  • We know about it far in advance, and space agencies have successfully deflected an asteroid before, for a test. If it did pose a risk, it’s quite likely they’d be able to change its path so it misses the Earth instead.
  • It’s tempting to think of that 3% chance as like a roll of a hundred-sided die: the asteroid is on a random path, roll 1 to 3 and it will hit the Earth, roll higher and it won’t, and nothing we do will change that. In reality, though, that 3% was a measure of our ignorance. As astronomers measure the asteroid more thoroughly, they’ll know more and more about its path, and each time they figure something out, they’ll update the number.

And indeed, the number has been updated. In just the last few weeks, the estimated probability of impact has dropped from 3% to a few thousandths of a percent, as more precise observations clarified the asteroid’s path. There’s still a non-negligible chance it will hit the moon (about two percent at the moment), but it’s far too small to do more than make a big flashy crater.

It’s kind of fun to think that there are people out there who systematically track these things, with a plan to deal with them. It feels like something out of a sci-fi novel.

But I find the other asteroid more fun.

In 2020, a probe sent by NASA visited an asteroid named Bennu, taking samples which it carefully packaged and brought back to Earth. Now, scientists have analyzed the samples, revealing several moderately complex chemicals that have an important role in life on Earth, like amino acids and the bases that make up RNA and DNA. Interestingly, while on Earth these molecules all have the same “handedness“, the molecules on Bennu are divided about 50/50. Something similar was seen on samples retrieved from another asteroid, so this reinforces the idea that amino acids and nucleotide bases in space do not have a preferred handedness.

I first got into physics for the big deep puzzles, the ones that figure into our collective creation story. Where did the universe come from? Why are its laws the way they are? Over the ten years since I got my PhD, it’s felt like the answers to these questions have gotten further and further away, with new results serving mostly to rule out possible explanations with greater and greater precision.

Biochemistry has its own deep puzzles figuring into our collective creation story, and the biggest one is abiogenesis: how life formed from non-life. What excites me about these observations from Bennu is that it represents real ongoing progress on that puzzle. By glimpsing a soup of ambidextrous molecules, Bennu tells us something about how our own molecules’ handedness could have developed, and rules out ways that it couldn’t have. In physics, if we could see an era of the universe when there were equal amounts of matter and antimatter, we’d be ecstatic: it would confirm that the imbalance between matter and antimatter is a real mystery, and show us where we need to look for the answer. I love that researchers on the origins of life have reason right now to be similarly excited.

Of p and sigma

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Ask a doctor or a psychologist if they’re sure about something, and they might say “it has p<0.05”. Ask a physicist, and they’ll say it’s a “5 sigma result”. On the surface, they sound like they’re talking about completely different things. As it turns out, they’re not quite that different.

Whether it’s a p-value or a sigma, what scientists are giving you is shorthand for a probability. The p-value is the probability itself, while sigma tells you how many standard deviations something is away from the mean on a normal distribution. For people not used to statistics this might sound very complicated, but it’s not so tricky in the end. There’s a graph, called a normal distribution, and you can look at how much of it is above a certain point, measured in units called standard deviations, or “sigmas”. That gives you your probability.

Give it a try: how much of this graph is past the 1\sigma line? How about 2\sigma?

What are these numbers a probability of? At first, you might think they’re a probability of the scientist being right: of the medicine working, or the Higgs boson being there.

That would be reasonable, but it’s not how it works. Scientists can’t measure the chance they’re right. All they can do is compare models. When a scientist reports a p-value, what they’re doing is comparing to a kind of default model, called a “null hypothesis”. There are different null hypotheses for different experiments, depending on what the scientists want to test. For the Higgs, scientists looked at pairs of photons detected by the LHC. The null hypothesis was that these photons were created by other parts of the Standard Model, like the strong force, and not by a Higgs boson. For medicine, the null hypothesis might be that people get better on their own after a certain amount of time. That’s hard to estimate, which is why medical experiments use a control group: a similar group without the medicine, to see how much they get better on their own.

Once we have a null hypothesis, we can use it to estimate how likely it is that it produced the result of the experiment. If there was no Higgs, and all those photons just came from other particles, what’s the chance there would still be a giant pile of them at one specific energy? If the medicine didn’t do anything, what’s the chance the control group did that much worse than the treatment group?

Ideally, you want a small probability here. In medicine and psychology, you’re looking for a 5% probability, for p<0.05. In physics, you need 5 sigma to make a discovery, which corresponds to a one in 3.5 million probability. If the probability is low, then you can say that it would be quite unlikely for your result to happen if the null hypothesis was true. If you’ve got a better hypothesis (the Higgs exists, the medicine works), then you should pick that instead.

Note that this probability still uses a model: it’s the probability of the result given that the model is true. It isn’t the probability that the model is true, given the result. That probability is more important to know, but trickier to calculate. To get from one to the other, you need to include more assumptions: about how likely your model was to begin with, given everything else you know about the world. Depending on those assumptions, even the tiniest p-value might not show that your null hypothesis is wrong.

In practice, unfortunately, we usually can’t estimate all of those assumptions in detail. The best we can do is guess their effect, in a very broad way. That usually just means accepting a threshold for p-values, declaring some a discovery and others not. That limitation is part of why medicine and psychology demand p-values of 0.05, while physicists demand 5 sigma results. Medicine and psychology have some assumptions they can rely on: that people function like people, that biology and physics keep working. Physicists don’t have those assumptions, so we have to be extra-strict.

Ultimately, though, we’re all asking the same kind of question. And now you know how to understand it when we do.

Halloween Post: Superstimuli for Physicists

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For Halloween, this blog has a tradition of covering “the spooky side” of physics. This year, I’m bringing in a concept from biology to ask a spooky physics “what if?”

In the 1950’s, biologists discovered that birds were susceptible to a worryingly effective trick. By giving them artificial eggs larger and brighter than their actual babies, they found that the birds focused on the new eggs to the exclusion of their own. They couldn’t help trying to hatch the fake eggs, even if they were so large that they would fall off when they tried to sit on them. The effect, since observed in other species, became known as a supernormal stimulus, or superstimulus.

Can this happen to humans? Some think so. They worry about junk food we crave more than actual nutrients, or social media that eclipses our real relationships. Naturally, this idea inspires horror writers, who write about haunting music you can’t stop listening to, or holes in a wall that “fit” so well you’re compelled to climb in.

(And yes, it shows up in porn as well.)

But this is a physics blog, not a biology blog. What kind of superstimulus would work on physicists?

Abstruse goose knows what’s up

Well for one, this sounds a lot like some criticisms of string theory. Instead of a theory that just unifies some forces, why not unify all the forces? Instead of just learning some advanced mathematics, why not learn more, and more? And if you can’t be falsified by any experiment, well, all that would do is spoil the fun, right?

But it’s not just string theory you could apply this logic to. Astrophysicists study not just one world but many. Cosmologists study the birth and death of the entire universe. Particle physicists study the fundamental pieces that make up the fundamental pieces. We all partake in the euphoria of problem-solving, a perpetual rush where each solution leads to yet another question.

Do I actually think that string theory is a superstimulus, that astrophysics or particle physics is a superstimulus? In a word, no. Much as it might look that way from the news coverage, most physicists don’t work on these big, flashy questions. Far from being lured in by irresistible super-scale problems, most physicists work with tabletop experiments and useful materials. For those of us who do look up at the sky or down at the roots of the world, we do it not just because it’s compelling but because it has a good track record: physics wouldn’t exist if Newton hadn’t cared about the orbits of the planets. We study extremes because they advance our understanding of everything else, because they give us steam engines and transistors and change everyone’s lives for the better.

Then again, if I had fallen victim to a superstimulus, I’d say that anyway, right?

*cue spooky music*

Congratulations to Arthur Ashkin, Gérard Mourou, and Donna Strickland!

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The 2018 Physics Nobel Prize was announced this week, awarded to Arthur Ashkin, Gérard Mourou, and Donna Strickland for their work in laser physics.

nobel2018Some Nobel prizes recognize discoveries of the fundamental nature of reality. Others recognize the tools that make those discoveries possible.

Ashkin developed techniques that use lasers to hold small objects in place, culminating in “optical tweezers” that can pick up and move individual bacteria. Mourou and Strickland developed chirped pulse amplification, the current state of the art in extremely high-power lasers. Strickland is only the third woman to win the Nobel prize in physics, Ashkin at 96 is the oldest person to ever win the prize.

(As an aside, the phrase “optical tweezers” probably has you imagining two beams of laser light pinching a bacterium between them, like microscopic lightsabers. In fact, optical tweezers use a single beam, focused and bent so that if an object falls out of place it will gently roll back to the middle of the beam. Instead of tweezers, it’s really more like a tiny laser spoon.)

The Nobel announcement emphasizes practical applications, like eye surgery. It’s important to remember that these are research tools as well. I wouldn’t have recognized the names of Ashkin, Mourou, and Strickland, but I recognized atom trapping, optical tweezers, and ultrashort pulses. Hang around atomic physicists, or quantum computing experiments, and these words pop up again and again. These are essential tools that have given rise to whole subfields. LIGO won a Nobel based on the expectation that it would kick-start a vast new area of research. Ashkin, Mourou, and Strickland’s work already has.

Different Fields, Different Worlds

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My grandfather is a molecular biologist. When we meet, we swap stories: the state of my field and his, different methods and focuses but often a surprising amount of common ground.

Recently he forwarded me an article by Raymond Goldstein, a biological physicist, arguing that biologists ought to be more comfortable with physical reasoning. The article is interesting in its own right, contrasting how physicists and biologists think about the relationship between models, predictions, and experiments. But what struck me most about the article wasn’t the content, but the context.

Goldstein’s article focuses on a question that seemed to me oddly myopic: should physical models be in the Results section, or the Discussion section?

As someone who has never written a paper with either a Results section or a Discussion section, I wondered why anyone would care. In my field, paper formats are fairly flexible. We usually have an Introduction and a Conclusion, yes, but in between we use however many sections we need to explain what we need to. In contrast, biology papers seem to have a very fixed structure: after the Introduction, there’s a Results section, a Discussion section, and a Materials and Methods section at the end.

At first blush, this seemed incredibly bizarre. Why describe your results before the methods you used to get them? How do you talk about your results without discussing them, but still take a full section to do it? And why do reviewers care how you divide things up in the first place?

It made a bit more sense once I thought about how biology differs from theoretical physics. In theoretical physics, the “methods” are most of the result: unsolved problems are usually unsolved because existing methods don’t solve them, and we need to develop new methods to make progress. Our “methods”, in turn, are often the part of the paper experts are most eager to read. In biology, in contrast, the methods are much more standardized. While papers will occasionally introduce new methods, there are so many unexplored biological phenomena that most of the time researchers don’t need to invent a new method: just asking a question no-one else has asked can be enough for a discovery. In that environment, the “results” matter a lot more: they’re the part that takes the most scrutiny, that needs to stand up on its own.

I can even understand the need for a fixed structure. Biology is a much bigger field than theoretical physics. My field is small enough that we all pretty much know each other. If a paper is hard to read, we’ll probably get a chance to ask the author what they meant. Biology, in contrast, is huge. An important result could come from anywhere, and anyone. Having a standardized format makes it a lot easier to scan through an unfamiliar paper and find what you need, especially when there might be hundreds of relevant papers.

The problem with a standardized system, as always, is the existence of exceptions. A more “physics-like” biology paper is more readable with “physics-like” conventions, even if the rest of the field needs to stay “biology-like”. Because of that, I have a lot of sympathy for Goldstein’s argument, but I can’t help but feel that he should be asking for more. If creating new mathematical models and refining them with observation is at the heart of what Goldstein is doing, then maybe he shouldn’t have to use Results/Discussion/Methods in the first place. Maybe he should be allowed to write biology papers that look more like physics papers.