Tag Archives: PublicPerception

Hype versus Miscommunication, or the Language of Importance

A fellow amplitudes-person was complaining to me recently about the hype surrounding the debate regarding whether black holes have “firewalls”. New York Times coverage seems somewhat excessive for what is, in the end, a fairly technical debate, and its enthusiasm was (rightly?) mocked in several places.

There’s an attitude I often run into among other physicists. The idea is that when hype like this happens, it’s because senior physicists are, at worst, cynically manipulating the press to further their positions or, at best, so naïve that they really see what they’re working on as so important that it deserves hype-y coverage. Occasionally, the blame will instead be put on the journalists, with largely the same ascribed motivations: cynical need for more page views, or naïve acceptance of whatever story they’re handed.

In my opinion, what’s going on there is a bit deeper, and not so easily traceable to any particular person.

In the articles on the (2, 0) theory I put up in the last few weeks, I made some disparaging comments about the tone of this Scientific American blog post. After exchanging a few tweets with the author, I think I have a better idea of what went down.

The problem here is that when you ask a scientist about something they’re excited about, they’re going to tell you why they’re excited about it. That’s what happened here when Nima Arkani-Hamed was interviewed for the above article: he was asked about the (2, 0) theory, and he seems to have tried to convey his enthusiasm with a metaphor that explained how the situation felt to him.

The reason this went wrong and led to a title as off-base and hype-sounding as “the Ultimate Ultimate Theory of Physics” was that we (scientists and science journalists) are taught to express enthusiasm in the language of importance.

There has been an enormous resurgence in science communication in recent years, but it has come with a very us-vs.-them mentality. The prevailing attitude is that the public will only pay attention to a scientific development if they are told that it is important. As such, both scientists and journalists try to make whatever they’re trying to communicate sound central, either to daily life or to our understanding of the universe. When both sides of the conversation are operating under this attitude, it creates an echo chamber where a concept’s importance is blown up many times greater than it really deserves, without either side doing anything other than communicating science in the only way they know.

We all have to step back and realize that most of the time, science isn’t interesting because of its absolute “importance”. Rather, a puzzle is often interesting simply because it is a puzzle. That’s what’s going on with the (2, 0) theory, or with firewalls: they’re hard to figure out, and that’s why we care.

Being honest about this is not going to lose us public backing, or funding. It’s not just scientists who value interesting things because they are challenging. People choose the path of their lives not based on some absolute relevance to the universe at large, but because things make sense in context. You don’t fall in love because the target of your affections is the most perfect person in the universe, you fall in love because they’re someone who can constantly surprise you.

Scientists are in love with what they do. We need to make sure that that, and not some abstract sense of importance, is what we’re communicating. If we do that, if we calm down and make a bit more effort to be understood, maybe we can win back some of the trust that we’ve lost by appearing to promote Ultimate Ultimate Theories of Everything.

Blackboards

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As a college student, I already knew that theoretical physicists weren’t like how they were portrayed in movies. They didn’t wear lab coats, or have universally frizzy, unkempt white hair. I knew they didn’t have labs, or plot to take over the world. And I was pretty sure that they didn’t constantly use blackboards.

After all, blackboards are a teaching tool. They’re nice for getting equations up so that the guy way in the back can see them. But if you were actually doing a real calculation, surely you’d prefer paper, or a computer, or some other method that doesn’t involve an unkempt scrawl and a heap of loose white dust all over your clothing.

Right?

Over the last few years I’ve come to appreciate the value of blackboards. Blackboards actually can be used for calculations. You don’t want to use them all the time, but there are times when it’s useful to have a lot of room on a page, to be able to make notes and structure the board around concepts. More importantly, though, there is a third function that I didn’t even consider back in college. Between calculation and teaching, there is collaboration.

Go to a physics or math department, and you’ll find blackboards on the walls. You’ll find them not just in classrooms, but in offices, and occasionally in corridors. Go to a high-class physics location like the Perimeter Institute or the Simons Center, and they’ll brag to you about how many blackboards they have strewn around their common areas.

The purpose of these blackboards is to facilitate conversation. If you want to explain your work to someone else and you aren’t using a blog post, you need space to write in a way that you can both see what you’re doing. Blackboards are ideal for that sort of conversation, and as such are essential for collaboration and communication among scientists.

What about whiteboards? Well, whiteboards are just evil, obviously.

Hawking vs. Witten: A Primer

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Have you seen the episode of Star Trek where Data plays poker with Stephen Hawking? How about the times he appeared on Futurama or the Simpsons? Or the absurd number of times he has come up in one way or another on The Big Bang Theory?

Stephen Hawking is probably the most recognizable theoretical physicist to laymen. Wheelchair-bound and speaking through a voice synthesizer, Hawking presents a very distinct image, while his work on black holes and the big bang, along with his popular treatments of science in books like A Brief History of Time, has made him synonymous in the public’s mind with genius.

He is not, however, the most recognizable theoretical physicist when talking to physicists. If Sheldon from The Big Bang Theory were a real string theorist he wouldn’t be obsessed with Hawking. He might, however, be obsessed with Edward Witten.

Edward Witten is tall and has an awkwardly high voice (for a sample, listen to the clip here). He’s also smart, smart enough to dabble in basically every subfield of theoretical physics and manage to make important contributions while doing so. He has a knack for digging up ideas from old papers and dredging out the solution to current questions of interest.

And far more than Hawking, he represents a clear target for parody, at least when that parody is crafted by physicists and mathematicians. Abstruse Goose has a nice take on his role in theoretical physics, while his collaboration with another physicist named Seiberg on what came to be known as Seiberg-Witten theory gave rise to the cyber-Witten pun.

If you would look into the mouth of physics-parody madness, let this link be your guide…

So why hasn’t this guy appeared on Futurama? (After all, his dog does!)

Witten is famous among theorists, but he hasn’t done as much as Hawking to endear himself to the general public. He hasn’t written popular science books, and he almost never gives public talks. So when a well-researched show like The Big Bang Theory wants to mention a famous physicist, they go to Hawking, not to Witten, because people know about him. And unless Witten starts interfacing more with the public (or blog posts like this become more common), that’s not about to change.

Sound Bite Management; or the Merits of Shock and Awe

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First off, for the small demographic who haven’t seen it already (and aren’t reading this because of it), I wrote an article for Ars Technica. Go read it.

After the article went up, a professor from my department told me that he and several others were concerned about the title.

Now before I go on, I’d like to clarify that this isn’t going to be a story about the department trying to “shut me down” or anything paranoid like that. The professor in question was expressing a valid concern in a friendly way, and it deserves some thought.

The concern was the following: isn’t a title like “Earning a PhD by studying a theory that we know is wrong” bad publicity for the field? Regardless of whether the article rebuts the idea that “wrong” is a meaningful descriptor for this sort of theory, doesn’t a title like that give fuel to the fire, sharpening the cleavers of the field’s detractors as one commenter put it? In other words, even if it’s a good article, isn’t it a bad sound bite?

It’s worryingly easy for a catchy sound bite to eclipse everything else about a piece. As one commenter pointed out, that’s roughly what happened with Palin’s fruit fly comment itself. And with that in mind, the claim that people are earning PhDs based on “false” theories definitely sounds like the sort of sound bite that could get out of hand in a hurry if the wrong community picked it up.

There is, at least, one major difference between my sound bite and Palin’s. In the political climate of 2008 it was easy to believe that Sarah Palin didn’t understand the concept of fruit fly research. On the other hand, it’s quite a bit less plausible that Ars would air a piece calling most work in theoretical physics useless.

In operation here is the old, powerful technique of using a shocking, dissonant headline to lure people in. A sufficiently out-of-character statement won’t be taken at face value; rather, it will inspire readers to dig in to the full article to figure out what they’re missing. This is the principle behind provocateurs in many fields, and while there are always risks, often this is the only way to get people to think about complex issues (Peter Singer often seems to exemplify the risks and rewards of this tactic, just to give an example).

What’s the alternative here? In referring to the theory I study as “wrong”, I’m attempting to bring readers face to face with a common misconception: the idea that every theory in physics is designed to approximate some part of the real world. For the physicists in the audience, this is the public perception that everything in theoretical physics is phenomenology. If we don’t bring this perception to light and challenge it, then we’re sweeping a substantial amount of theoretical physics under the rug for the sake of a simpler message. And that’s risky, because if people don’t understand what physics really is then they’re likely to balk when they glimpse what they think is “illegitimate” physics.

In my view, shocking people by describing my type of physics as not “true” is the best way to teach people about what physicists actually do. But it is risky, and it could easily give people the wrong impression. Only time will tell.

In Defense of Pure Theory

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I’d like to preface this by saying that this post will be a bit more controversial than usual. I have somewhat unconventional opinions about the nature and purpose of science, and what I say below shouldn’t be taken as representative of the field in general.

A bit more than a week ago, Not Even Wrong had a post on the Fundamental Physics Prize. Peter Woit is often…I’m going to say annoying…and this post was no exception.

The Fundamental Physics Prize, for those not in the know, is a fairly recently established prize for physicists, mostly theoretical physicists. Clocking in at three million dollars, the prize is larger than the Nobel, and is currently the largest prize of its sort. Woit has several objections to the current choice of award recipient (Alexander Polyakov). I sympathize with some of these objections, in particular the snarky observation that a large number of the awardees are from Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study. But there is one objection in particular that I feel the need to rebut, if only due to its wording: the gripe that “Viewers of the part I saw would have no idea that string theory is not tested, settled science.”

There are two problems with this statement. The first is something that Woit is likely aware of, but it probably isn’t obvious to everyone reading this. To be clear, the fact that a certain theory is not experimentally tested is not a barrier to its consideration for the Fundamental Physics Prize. Far from it, the purpose of the Fundamental Physics Prize is precisely to honor powerful insights in theoretical physics that have not yet been experimentally verified. The Fundamental Physics Prize was created, in part, to remedy what was perceived as unfairness in the awarding of the Nobel Prize, as the Nobel is only awarded to theorists after their theories have received experimental confirmation. Since the whole purpose of this prize is to honor theories that have not been experimentally tested, griping that the prizes are being awarded to untested theories is a bit like griping that Oscars aren’t awarded to scientists, or objecting that viewers of the Oscars would have no idea that the winners haven’t done anything especially amazing for humanity. If you’re watching the ceremony, you probably know what it’s for.

Has this been experimentally verified?

The other problem is a difference of philosophy. When Woit says that string theory is not “tested, settled science” he is implying that in order to be “settled science”, a theory must be tested, and while I can’t be sure of his intent I’m guessing he means tested experimentally. It is this latter implication I want to address: whether or not Woit is making it here, it serves to underscore an important point about the structure of physics as an institution.

Past readers will be aware that a theory can be valuable even if it doesn’t correspond to the real world because of what it can teach us about theories that do correspond to the real world. And while that is an important point, the point I’d like to make here is a bit more controversial. I would like to argue that pure theory, theory unconnected with experiment, can be important and valuable and “settled science” in and of itself.

First off, let’s talk about how such a theory can be science, and in particular how it can be physics. Plenty of people do work that doesn’t correspond to the experimentally accessible real world. Mathematicians are the clearest example, but the point also arguably applies to fields like literary analysis. Physics is ostensibly supposed to be special, though: as part of science, we expect it to concern itself with the real world, otherwise one would argue that it is simply mathematics. However, as I have argued before, the difference between mathematics and physics is not one of subject matter, but of methods. This makes sense, provided you think of physics not as some sort of fixed school of thought, but as an institution. Physicists train new physicists, and as such physicists learn methods common to other physicists. That which physicists like to do, then, is physics, which means that physics is defined much more by the methods used to do it than by its object of study.

How can such a theory be settled, then? After all, if reality is out, what possible criteria could there be for deciding what is or is not a “good” theory?

The thing about physics as an institution is that physics is done by physicists, and physicists have careers. Over the course of those careers, those physicists need to publish papers, which need to catch the attention and approval of other physicists. They also need to have projects for grad students to do, so as to produce more physicists. Because of this, a “good” theory cannot be worked on alone. It has to be a theory with many implications, a theory that can be worked on and understood consistently by different people. It also needs to constrain further progress, to make sure that not just anyone can create novel results: this is what allows papers to catch the attention of other physicists! If you have all that, you have all of the relevant advantages of reality.

String theory has not been experimentally tested, but it meets all of these criteria. String theory has been a major force in theoretical physics for the past thirty years because it can fuel careers and lead to discussion in a way that nothing else on the table can. It has been tested mathematically in numerous ways, ways which demonstrate its robustness as a theory of quantum gravity. In this sense, string theory is a prime example of tested, settled science.

Why I Study a Theory That Isn’t “True”

4 gravitons

Stories about physics from someone who's been there