I don’t think people who argue about reductionism are really arguing about reductionism.
Reductionism is the idea that the behavior of big, complicated things (people, economies, ecosystems) boils down to the behavior of their smallest constituents (molecules, atoms, subatomic particles). It’s often contrasted with emergence, the idea that new rules emerge in those big, complicated systems that are more than just the rules that govern the smallest scales.
Emergence can be divided into two kinds: weak and strong. In strong emergence, the big, complicated things have their own causal powers that aren’t due to smaller things at all. This tends to get mystical, with ideas like “lifeforce” and “consciousness”. Weak emergence is much milder, and while the big complicated things are best described by their own laws, in weak emergence they are in principle still caused by laws on smaller scales.
In practice, basically no-one believes in strong emergence: it seems way too much like magic for most scientists. And basically everyone believes in weak emergence: it would be nuts to insist that economists and biologists aren’t discovering important rules that would be almost impossible to find for someone who just had physics and chemistry to work with.
So if everyone agrees, what do people argue about?
Arguments about reductionism are really arguments about attitudes. If you position yourself as a reductionist, or an emergentist, you’re defending a particular way of thinking about the world, one that privileges one scale over another. When people argue for emergence, what they really seem to be doing is opposing a kind of “reductionist chauvinism”, where people like physicists insist that their perspective is the most valuable one.
And that’s understandable, because physicists can definitely be jerks sometimes. Let it be known I am no fan of jerks.
But I think it’s worth defending reductionism, not as a philosophy, but as an attitude or perspective. Worth arguing not about whether things in practice reduce or not, but about whether reduction is a good goal, about whether science that reduces more successfully is healthier science.
Because I think it is. And the reason boils down to agreement.
Simpler systems are less controversial systems. When we write down the laws that govern subatomic particles, they’re more definite: less heuristic, more precisely specified, with fewer exceptions. That isn’t to say there’s zero controversy in these subjects, there’s even controversy between mathematicians. But the more thoroughly you can boil something down to simple rules, the easier time you have of convincing others you’re right.
In contrast, the laws of the largest scales, like psychology and biology, are deeply heuristic. They thrive on exceptions and guidelines, general tendencies without clearly defined limits. And the problem with such laws is that they can lead to intractable arguments. Different schools of thought in psychology may simply never be able to convince each other, and may just have to wait for one to die off, the aesthetic feel of one set of ideas falling out of fashion as people become preoccupied with different sorts of problems.
Every time you can reduce, you avoid those insoluble disagreements. The simpler a system you can invoke, the more you can cooperate and build off each other’s work, the less time you have to waste disagreeing, the more you can accept people with different aesthetic and philosophical preferences as just different perspectives on what are ultimately the same facts. Reductionism is a technology for peace, and one of the most powerful we have.
So yeah, I’m a bit of a chauvinist about reductionism. That’s typical of an ex-physicist, sure. But it comes from a place of concern. I want a peaceful world, where we can learn from each other and find ways to agree. And reductionism is how I get there.

I think there is another contrast similar to reductionism/emergence that feels related.
Mechanism vs. organism.
Mechanism relies on deterministic physical rules which are critical for reductionism to be able claim larger, more complex objects only come from their parts. But even deterministic, physical rules can lead to unpredictable results. When parts get combined in various ways, we end up with emergent properties which the reductionist will say theoretically be explained wholly by the parts but, in practice almost never can be. Some of us prefer to see a more organic nature; some a more mechanical one. But it looks to me like it is both.
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To be a bit more direct, there is another reason for the constant discussion of reductionism. The reason is that when one submits a paper to a glossy journal like Nature, one needs a half-page narrative at the start about why the paper is interesting. For this part, most physicists rely on a small number of traditional narratives, passed down unchanged over decades. For condensed matter (which accounts for ~half of all the papers) the standards are (1) promising imminent technological applications, and (2) handwaving about the wonder of emergence. There are similar narratives for particle physics and atomic physics papers, of course; just because something is cliched doesn’t make it wrong.
After publication, the paper is filtered through popular science journalism, which typically focuses on just the narrative part and strips out some of the nuance. Even more information gets stripped out when the popsci articles get tweeted, and eventually it trickles down to random people in one’s Twitter replies saying “your work is worthless because emergence”. I don’t even think this is the most annoying example. The situation with AMO papers reliably getting filtered down to “quantum mechanics lets you signal faster than light and rewrite the past” is worse.
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