Monthly Archives: May 2021

Being Precise About Surprise

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A reader pointed me to Stephen Wolfram’s one-year update of his proposal for a unified theory of physics. I was pretty squeamish about it one year ago, and now I’m even less interested in wading in to the topic. But I thought it would be worth saying something, and rather than say something specific, I realized I could say something general. I thought I’d talk a bit about how we judge good and bad research in theoretical physics.

In science, there are two things we want out of a new result: we want it to be true, and we want it to be surprising. The first condition should be obvious, but the second is also important. There’s no reason to do an experiment or calculation if it will just tell us something we already know. We do science in the hope of learning something new, and that means that the best results are the ones we didn’t expect.

(What about replications? We’ll get there.)

If you’re judging an experiment, you can measure both of these things with statistics. Statistics lets you estimate how likely an experiment’s conclusion is to be true: was there a large enough sample? Strong enough evidence? It also lets you judge how surprising the experiment is, by estimating how likely it would be to happen given what was known beforehand. Did existing theories and earlier experiments make the result seem likely, or unlikely? While you might not have considered replications surprising, from this perspective they can be: if a prior experiment seems unreliable, successfully replicating it can itself be a surprising result.

If instead you’re judging a theoretical result, these measures get more subtle. There aren’t always good statistical tools to test them. Nonetheless, you don’t have to rely on vague intuitions either. You can be fairly precise, both about how true a result is and how surprising it is.

We get our results in theoretical physics through mathematical methods. Sometimes, this is an actual mathematical proof: guaranteed to be true, no statistics needed. Sometimes, it resembles a proof, but falls short: vague definitions and unstated assumptions mar the argument, making it less likely to be true. Sometimes, the result uses an approximation. In those cases we do get to use some statistics, estimating how good the approximation may be. Finally, a result can’t be true if it contradicts something we already know. This could be a logical contradiction in the result itself, but if the result is meant to describe reality (note: not always the case), it might contradict the results of a prior experiment.

What makes a theoretical result surprising? And how precise can we be about that surprise?

Theoretical results can be surprising in the light of earlier theory. Sometimes, this gets made precise by a no-go theorem, a proof that some kind of theoretical result is impossible to obtain. If a result finds a loophole in a no-go theorem, that can be quite surprising. Other times, a result is surprising because it’s something no-one else was able to do. To be precise about that kind of surprise, you need to show that the result is something others wanted to do, but couldn’t. Maybe someone else made a conjecture, and only you were able to prove it. Maybe others did approximate calculations, and now you can do them more precisely. Maybe a question was controversial, with different people arguing for different sides, and you have a more conclusive argument. This is one of the better reasons to include a long list of references in a paper: not to pad your friends’ citation counts, but to show that your accomplishment is surprising: that others might have wanted to achieve it, but had to settle for something lesser.

In general, this means that showing whether a theoretical result is good: not merely true, but surprising and new, links you up to the rest of the theoretical community. You can put in all the work you like on a theory of everything, and make it as rigorous as possible, but if all you did was reproduce a sub-case of someone else’s theory then you haven’t accomplished all that much. If you put your work in context, compare and contrast to what others have done before, then we can start getting precise about how much we should be surprised, and get an idea of what your result is really worth.

Alice Through the Parity Glass

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When you look into your mirror in the morning, the face looking back at you isn’t exactly your own. Your mirror image is flipped: left-handed if you’re right-handed, and right-handed if you’re left-handed. Your body is not symmetric in the mirror: we say it does not respect parity symmetry. Zoom in, and many of the molecules in your body also have a “handedness” to them: biology is not the same when flipped in a mirror.

What about physics? At first, you might expect the laws of physics themselves to respect parity symmetry. Newton’s laws are the same when reflected in a mirror, and so are Maxwell’s. But one part of physics breaks this rule: the weak nuclear force, the force that causes nuclear beta decay. The weak nuclear force interacts differently with “right-handed” and “left-handed” particles (shorthand for particles that spin counterclockwise or clockwise with respect to their motion). This came as a surprise to most physicists, but it was predicted by Tsung-Dao Lee and Chen-Ning Yang and demonstrated in 1956 by Chien-Shiung Wu, known in her day as the “Queen of Nuclear Research”. The world really does look different when flipped in a mirror.

I gave a lecture on the weak force for the pedagogy course I took a few weeks back. One piece of feedback I got was that the topic wasn’t very relatable. People wanted to know why they should care about the handedness of the weak force, they wanted to hear about “real-life” applications. Once scientists learned that the weak force didn’t respect parity, what did that let us do?

Thinking about this, I realized this is actually a pretty tricky story to tell. With enough time and background, I could explain that the “handedness” of the Standard Model is a major constraint on attempts to unify physics, ruling out a lot of the simpler options. That’s hard to fit in a short lecture though, and it still isn’t especially close to “real life”.

Then I realized I don’t need to talk about “real life” to give a “real-life example”. People explaining relativity get away with science fiction scenarios, spaceships on voyages to black holes. The key isn’t to be familiar, just relatable. If I can tell a story (with people in it), then maybe I can make this work.

All I need, then, is a person who cares a lot about the world behind a mirror.

Curiouser and curiouser…

When Alice goes through the looking glass in the novel of that name, she enters a world flipped left-to-right, a world with its parity inverted. Following Alice, we have a natural opportunity to explore such a world. Others have used this to explore parity symmetry in biology: for example, a side-plot in Alan Moore’s League of Extraordinary Gentlemen sees Alice come back flipped, and starve when she can’t process mirror-reversed nutrients. I haven’t seen it explored for physics, though.

In order to make this story work, we have to get Alice to care about the weak nuclear force. The most familiar thing the weak force does is cause beta decay. And the most familiar thing that undergoes beta decay is a banana. Bananas contain radioactive potassium, which can transform to calcium by emitting an electron and an anti-electron-neutrino.

The radioactive potassium from a banana doesn’t stay in the body very long, only a few hours at most. But if Alice was especially paranoid about radioactivity, maybe she would want to avoid eating bananas. (We shouldn’t tell her that other foods contain potassium too.) If so, she might view the looking glass as a golden opportunity, a chance to eat as many bananas as she likes without worrying about radiation.

Does this work?

A first problem: can Alice even eat mirror-reversed bananas? I told you many biological molecules have handedness, which led Alan Moore’s version of Alice to starve. If we assume, unlike Moore, that Alice comes back in her original configuration and survives, we should still ask if she gets any benefit out of the bananas in the looking glass.

Researching this, I found that the main thing that makes bananas taste “banana-ish”, isoamyl acetate, does not have handedness: mirror bananas will still taste like bananas. Fructose, a sugar in bananas, does have handedness however: it isn’t the same when flipped in a mirror. Chatting with a chemist, the impression I got was that this isn’t a total loss: often, flipping a sugar results in another, different sugar. A mirror banana might still taste sweet, but less so. Overall, it may still be worth eating.

The next problem is a tougher one: flipping a potassium atom doesn’t actually make it immune to the weak force. The weak force only interacts with left-handed particles and right-handed antiparticles: in beta decay, it transforms a left-handed down quark to a left-handed up quark, producing a left-handed electron and a right-handed anti-neutrino.

Alice would have been fine if all of the quarks in potassium were left-handed, but they aren’t: an equal amount are right-handed, so the mirror weak force will still act on them, and they will still undergo beta decay. Actually, it’s worse than that: quarks, and massive particles in general, don’t actually have a definite handedness. If you speed up enough to catch up to a quark and pass it, then from your perspective it’s now going in the opposite direction, and its handedness is flipped. The only particles with definite handedness are massless particles: those go at the speed of light, so you can never catch up to them. Another way to think about this is that quarks get their mass from the Higgs field, and this happens because the Higgs lets left- and right-handed quarks interact. What we call the quark’s mass is in some sense just left- and right-handed quarks constantly mixing back and forth.

Alice does have the opportunity to do something interesting here, if she can somehow capture the anti-neutrinos from those bananas. Our world appears to only have left-handed neutrinos and right-handed anti-neutrinos. This seemed reasonable when we thought neutrinos were massless, but now we know neutrinos have a (very small) mass. As a result, the hunt is on for right-handed neutrinos or left-handed anti-neutrinos: if we can measure them, we could fix one of the lingering mysteries of the Standard Model. With this in mind, Alice has the potential to really confuse some particle physicists, giving them some left-handed anti-neutrinos from beyond the looking-glass.

It turns out there’s a problem with even this scheme, though. The problem is a much wider one: the whole story is physically inconsistent.

I’d been acting like Alice can pass back and forth through the mirror, carrying all her particles with her. But what are “her particles”? If she carries a banana through the mirror, you might imagine the quarks in the potassium atoms carry over. But those quarks are constantly exchanging other quarks and gluons, as part of the strong force holding them together. They’re also exchanging photons with electrons via the electromagnetic force, and they’re also exchanging W bosons via beta decay. In quantum field theory, all of this is in some sense happening at once, an infinite sum over all possible exchanges. It doesn’t make sense to just carve out one set of particles and plug them in to different fields somewhere else.

If we actually wanted to describe a mirror like Alice’s looking glass in physics, we’d want to do it consistently. This is similar to how physicists think of time travel: you can’t go back in time and murder your grandparents because your whole path in space-time has to stay consistent. You can only go back and do things you “already did”. We treat space in a similar way to time. A mirror like Alice’s imposes a condition, that fields on one side are equal to their mirror image on the other side. Conditions like these get used in string theory on occasion, and they have broad implications for physics on the whole of space-time, not just near the boundary. The upshot is that a world with a mirror like Alice’s in it would be totally different from a world without the looking glass: the weak force as we know it would not exist.

So unfortunately, I still don’t have a good “real life” story for a class about parity symmetry. It’s fun trying to follow Alice through a parity transformation, but there are a few too many problems for the tale to make any real sense. Feel free to suggest improvements!

A Week Among the Pedagogues

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Pedagogy courses have a mixed reputation among physicists, and for once I don’t just mean “mixed” as a euphemism for “bad”. I’ve met people who found them very helpful, and I’ve been told that attending a Scandinavian pedagogy course looks really good on a CV. On the other hand, I’ve heard plenty of horror stories of classes that push a jumble of dogmatic requirements and faddish gimmicks, all based on research that if anything has more of a replication crisis going than psychology does.

With that reputation in mind, I went into the pedagogy course last week hopeful, but skeptical. In part, I wasn’t sure whether pedagogy was the kind of thing that could be taught. Each class is different, and so much of what makes a bad or good teacher seems to be due to experience, which one can’t get much of in a one-week course. I couldn’t imagine what facts a pedagogy course could tell me that would actually improve my teaching, and wouldn’t just be ill-justified dogma.

The answer, it turned out, would be precisely the message of the course. A pedagogy course that drills you in “pedagogy facts” would indeed be annoying. But one of those “pedagogy facts” is that teaching isn’t just drilling students in facts. And because this course practiced what it preached, it ended up much less annoying than I worried it would be.

There were hints of that dogmatic approach in the course materials, but only hints. An early slide had a stark quote calling pure lecturing irresponsible. The teacher immediately and awkwardly distanced himself from it, almost literally saying “well that is a thing someone could say”. Instead, most of the class was made up of example lessons and student discussions. We’d be assembled into groups to discuss something, then watch a lesson intended to show off a particular technique. Only then would we get a brief lecture about the technique, giving a name and some justification, before being thrown into yet more discussion about it.

In the terminology we were taught, this made the course dialogical rather than authoritative, and inductive rather than deductive. We learned by reflecting on examples rather than deriving general truths, and discussed various perspectives rather than learning one canonical one.

Did we learn anything from that, besides the terms?

One criticism of both dialogical and inductive approaches to teaching is that students can only get out what they put in. If you learn by discussing and solving examples by yourself, you’d expect the only things you’ll learn are things you already know.

We weren’t given the evidence to refute this criticism in general, and honestly I wouldn’t have trusted it if we had (see above: replication crisis). But in this context, that criticism does miss something. Yes, pretty much every method I learned in this course was something I could come up with on my own in the right situation. But I wouldn’t be thinking of the methods systematically. I’d notice a good idea for one lesson or another, but miss others because I wouldn’t be thinking of the ideas as part of a larger pattern. With the patterns in mind, with terms to “hook” the methods on to, I can be more aware of when opportunities come up. I don’t have to think of dialogical as better than authoritative, or inductive as better than deductive, in general. All I have to do is keep an eye out for when a dialogical or inductive approach might prove useful. And that’s something I feel genuinely better at after taking this course.

Beyond that core, we got some extremely topical tips about online teaching and way too many readings (I think the teachers overestimated how easy it is to read papers from a different discipline…and a “theory paper” in education is about as far from a “theory paper” in physics as you can get). At times the dialogue aspect felt a little too open, we heard “do what works for you” often enough that it felt like the teachers were apologizing for their own field. But overall, the course worked, and I expect to teach better going forward because of it.

At a Pedagogy Course

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I’m at a pedagogy course this week. It’s the first time I’ve taken a course like this, and it has been really interesting learning about different approaches to teaching (which, as I keep being reminded, is very different from outreach!). It’s also really time-consuming: seven hours of class a day, with readings and lecture prep in the evening. As such, I haven’t had time to do a full blog post. Next week I’ll likely post some reflections about the course. Until then, here’s a slide from the practice lecture I gave: