Tag Archives: astronomy

What does Copernicus have to say about String Theory?

Putting aside some highly controversial exceptions, string theory has made no testable predictions. Conceivably, a world governed by string theory and a world governed by conventional particle physics would be indistinguishable to every test we could perform today. Furthermore, it’s not even possible to say that string theory predicts the same things with fewer fudge-factors, as string theory descriptions of our world seem to have dramatically many more free parameters than conventional ones.

Critics of string theory point to this as a reason why string theory should be excluded from science, sent off to the chilly arctic wasteland of the math department. (No offense to mathematicians, I’m sure your department is actually quite warm and toasty.) What these critics are missing is an important feature of the scientific process: before scientists are able to make predictions, they propose explanations.

To explain what I mean by that, let’s go back to the beginning of the 16th century.

At the time, the authority on astronomy was still Ptolemy’s Syntaxis Mathematica, a book so renowned that it is better known by the Arabic-derived superlative Almagest, “the greatest”. Ptolemy modeled the motions of the planets and stars as a series of interlocking crystal spheres with the Earth at the center, and did so well enough that until that time only minor improvements on the model had been made.

This is much trickier than it sounds, because even in Ptolemy’s day astronomers could tell that the planets did not move in simple circles around the Earth. There were major distortions from circular motion, the most dramatic being the phenomenon of retrograde motion.

If the planets really were moving in simple circles around the Earth, you would expect them to keep moving in the same direction. However, ancient astronomers saw that sometimes, some of the planets moved backwards. The planet would slow down, turn around, go backwards a bit, then come to a stop and turn again.

Thus sparking the invention of the spirograph.

In order to take this into account, Ptolemy introduced epicycles, extra circles of motion for the planets. The epicycle would move on the planet’s primary circle, or deferent, and the planet would rotate around the epicycle, like so:

French Wikipedia had a better picture.

These epicycles weren’t just for retrograde motion, though. They allowed Ptolemy to model all sorts of irregularities in the planets’ motions. Any deviation from a circle could conceivably be plotted out by adding another epicycle (though Ptolemy had other methods to model this sort of thing, among them something called an equant). Enter Copernicus.

Enter Copernicus’s hair.

Copernicus didn’t like Ptolemy’s model. He didn’t like equants, and what’s more, he didn’t like the idea that the Earth was the center of the universe. Like Plato, he preferred the idea that the center of the universe was a divine fire, a source of heat and light like the Sun. He decided to put together a model of the planets with the Sun in the center. And what he found, when he did, was an explanation for retrograde motion.

In Copernicus’s model, the planets always go in one direction around the Sun, never turning back. However, some of the planets are faster than the Earth, and some are slower. If a planet is slower than the Earth and it passes by it will look like it is going backwards, due to the Earth’s speed. This is tricky to visualize, but hopefully the picture below will help: As you can see in the picture, Mars starts out ahead of Earth in its orbit, then falls behind, making it appear to move backwards.

Despite this simplification, Copernicus still needed epicycles. The planets’ motions simply aren’t perfect circles, even around the Sun. After getting rid of the equants from Ptolemy’s theory, Copernicus’s model ended up having just as many epicycles as Ptolemy’s!

Copernicus’s model wasn’t any better at making predictions (in fact, due to some technical lapses in its presentation, it was even a little bit worse). It didn’t have fewer “fudge factors”, as it had about the same number of epicycles. If you lived in the 16th century, you would have been completely justified in believing that the Earth was the center of the universe, and not the Sun. Copernicus had failed to establish his model as scientific truth.

However, Copernicus had still done something Ptolemy didn’t: he had explained retrograde motion. Retrograde motion was a unique, qualitative phenomenon, and while Ptolemy could include it in his math, only Copernicus gave you a reason why it happened.

That’s not enough to become the reigning scientific truth, but it’s a damn good reason to pay attention. It was justification for astronomers to dedicate years of their lives to improving the model, to working with it and trying to get unique predictions out of it. It was enough that, over half a century later, Kepler could take it and turn it into a theory that did make predictions better than Ptolemy, that did have fewer fudge-factors.

String theory as a model of the universe doesn’t make novel predictions, it doesn’t have fewer fudge factors. What it does is explain, explaining spectra of particles in terms of shapes of space and time, the existence of gravity and light in terms of closed and open strings, the temperature of black holes in terms of what’s going on inside them (this last really ought to be the subject of its own post, it’s one of the big triumphs of string theory). You don’t need to accept it as scientific truth. Like Copernicus’s model in his day, we don’t have the evidence for that yet. But you should understand that, as a powerful explanation, the idea of string theory as a model of the universe is worth spending time on.

Of course, string theory is useful for many things that aren’t modeling the universe. But that’s the subject of another post.

Breakthrough or Crackpot?

Suppose that you have an idea. Not necessarily a wonderful, awful idea, but an idea that seems like it could completely change science as we know it. And why not? It’s been done before.

My advice to you is to be very very careful. Because if you’re not careful, your revolutionary idea might force you to explain much much more than you expect.

Let’s consider an example. Suppose you believe that the universe is only six thousand years old, in contrast to the 13.772 ± 0.059 billion years that scientists who study the subject have calculated. And furthermore, imagine that you’ve gone one step further: you’ve found evidence!

Being no slouch at this sort of thing, you read the Wikipedia article linked above, and you figure you’ve got two problems to deal with: extrapolations from the expansion of the universe, and the cosmic microwave background. Let’s say your new theory is good enough that you can address both of these: you can explain why calculations based on both of these methods give 14 billion years, while you still assert that the universe is only six thousand years old. You’ve managed to explain away all of the tests that scientists used to establish the age of the universe. If you can manage that, you’re done, right?

Not quite. Explaining all the direct tests may seem like great progress, but it’s only the first step, because the age of the universe can show up indirectly as well. No stars have been observed that are 13.772 billion years old, but every star whose age has been calculated has been found to be older than six thousand years! And even if you can explain why every attempt to measure a star’s age turned out wrong, there’s more to it than that, because the age of stars is a very important part of how astronomers model stellar behavior. Every time astronomers make a prediction about a star, whether estimating its size, it’s brightness, its color, every time they make such a prediction and then the prediction turns out correct, they’re using the fact that the star is (some specific number) much much older than six thousand years. And because almost everything we can see in space either is made of stars, or orbits a star, or once was a star, changing the age of the universe means you have to explain all those results too. If you propose that the age of the universe is only six thousand, you need to explain not only the cosmic microwave background, not only the age of stars, but almost every single successful prediction made in the last fifty years of astronomy, none of which would have been successful if the age of the universe was only six thousand.

Daunting, isn’t it?

Oh, we’re not done yet!

See, it’s not just astronomy you have to contend with, because the age of the Earth specifically is also calculated to be much larger than six thousand years. And just as astronomers use the age of stars to make successful predictions about their other properties, geologists use the age of rock formations to make their own predictions. And the same is true for species of animals and plants, studied through genetic drift with known rates over time, or fossils with known ages. So in proposing that the universe is only six thousand years old, you need to explain not just two pieces of evidence, but the majority of successful predictions made in three distinct disciplines over the last fifty years. Is your evidence that the universe is only six thousand years old good enough to outweigh all of that?

This is one of the best ways to tell a genuine scientific breakthrough from ideas that can be indelicately described as crackpot. If your idea questions something that has been used to make successful predictions for decades, then it becomes your burden of proof to explain why all those results were successful, and chances are, you can’t fulfill that burden.

This test can be applied quite widely. As another example, homeopathic medicine relies on the idea that if you dilute a substance (medicine or poison) drastically then rather than getting weaker it will suddenly become stronger, sometimes with the reverse effect. While you might at first think this could be confirmed or denied merely by testing homeopathic medicines themselves, the principle would also have to apply to any other dilution, meaning that a homeopath needs to explain everything from the success of water treatment plants that wash out all but tiny traces of contaminants to high school chemistry experiments involving diluting acid to observe its pH.

This is why scientific revolutions are hard! If you want to change the way we look at the world, you need to make absolutely sure you aren’t invalidating the success of prior researchers. In fact, the successes of past research constrain new science so much, that it sometimes is possible to make predictions just from these constraints!

So whenever you think you’ve got a breakthrough, ask yourself: how much does this mean I have to explain? What is my burden of proof?