Facts About Math Are Facts About Us

Each year, the Niels Bohr International Academy has a series of public talks. Part of Copenhagen’s Folkeuniversitet (“people’s university”), they attract a mix of older people who want to keep up with modern developments and young students looking for inspiration. I gave a talk a few days ago, as part of this year’s program. The last time I participated, back in 2017, I covered a topic that comes up a lot on this blog: “The Quest for Quantum Gravity”. This year, I was asked to cover something more unusual: “The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences”.

Some of you might notice that title is already taken: it’s a famous lecture by the physicist Wigner, from 1959. Wigner posed an interesting question: why is advanced mathematics so useful in physics? Time and time again, mathematicians develop an idea purely for its own sake, only for physicists to find it absolutely indispensable to describe some part of the physical world. Should we be surprised that this keeps working? Suspicious?

I talked a bit about this: some of the answers people have suggested over the years, and my own opinion. But like most public talks, the premise was mostly a vehicle for cool examples: physicists through history bringing in new math, and surprising mathematical facts like the ones I talked about a few weeks back at Culture Night. Because of that, I was actually a bit unprepared to dive into the philosophical side of the topic (despite it being in principle a very philosophical topic!) When one of the audience members brought up mathematical Platonism, I floundered a bit, not wanting to say something that was too philosophically naive.

Well, if there’s anywhere I can be naive, it’s my own blog. I even have a label for Amateur Philosophy posts. So let’s do one.

Mathematical Platonism is the idea that mathematical truths “exist”: that they’re somewhere “out there” being discovered. On the other side, one might believe that mathematics is not discovered, but invented. For some reason, a lot of people with the latter opinion seem to think this has something to do with describing nature (for example, an essay a few years back by Lee Smolin defines mathematics as “the study of systems of evoked relationships inspired by observations of nature”).

I’m not a mathematical Platonist. I don’t even like to talk about which things do or don’t “exist”. But I also think that describing mathematics in terms of nature is missing the point. Mathematicians aren’t physicists. While there may have been a time when geometers argued over lines in the sand, these days mathematicians’ inspiration isn’t usually the natural world, at least not in the normal sense.

Instead, I think you can’t describe mathematics without describing mathematicians. A mathematical fact is, deep down, something a mathematician can say without other mathematicians shouting them down. It’s an allowed move in what my hazy secondhand memory of Wittgenstein wants to call a “language game”: something that gets its truth from a context of people interpreting and reacting to it, in the same way a move in chess matters only when everyone is playing by its rules.

This makes mathematics sound very subjective, and we’re used to the opposite: the idea that a mathematical fact is as objective as they come. The important thing to remember is that even with this kind of description, mathematics still ends up vastly less subjective than any other field. We care about subjectivity between different people: if a fact is “true” for Brits and “false” for Germans, then it’s a pretty limited fact. Mathematics is special because the “rules of its game” aren’t rules of one group or another. They’re rules that are in some sense our birthright. Any human who can read and write, or even just act and perceive, can act as a Turing Machine, a universal computer. With enough patience and paper, anything that you can prove to one person you can prove to another: you just have to give them the rules and let them follow them. It doesn’t matter how smart you are, or what you care about most: if something is mathematically true for others, it is mathematically true for you.

Some would argue that this is evidence for mathematical Platonism, that if something is a universal truth it should “exist”. Even if it does, though, I don’t think it’s useful to think of it in that way. Once you believe that mathematical truth is “out there”, you want to try to characterize it, to say something about it besides that it’s “out there”. You’ll be tempted to have an opinion on the Axiom of Choice, or the Continuum Hypothesis. And the whole point is that those aren’t sensible things to have opinions on, that having an opinion about them means denying the mathematical proofs that they are, in the “standard” axioms, undecidable. Whatever is “out there”, it has to include everything you can prove with every axiom system, whichever non-standard ones you can cook up, because mathematicians will happily work on any of them. The whole point of mathematics, the thing that makes it as close to objective as anything can be, is that openness: the idea that as long as an argument is good enough, as long as it can convince anyone prepared to wade through the pages, then it is mathematics. Nothing, so long as it can convince in the long-run, is excluded.

If we take this definition seriously, there are some awkward consequences. You could imagine a future in which every mind, everyone you might be able to do mathematics with, is crushed under some tyrant, forced to agree to something false. A real philosopher would dig in to this corner case, try to salvage the definition or throw it out. I’m not a real philosopher though. So all I can say is that while I don’t think that tyrant gets to define mathematics, I also don’t think there are good alternatives to my argument. Our only access to mathematics, and to truth in general, is through the people who pursue it. I don’t think we can define one without the other.

Serial Killers and Grad School Horror Stories

It’s time for my yearly Halloween post. My regular readers know what to expect: a horror trope and a physics topic, linked by a tortured analogy. And this year, the pun is definitely intended.

Horror movies have a fascination with serial killers. Over the years, they’ve explored every possible concept: from gritty realism to the supernatural, crude weapons to sophisticated traps, motivations straightforward to mysterious, and even killers who are puppets.

Yes I know Billy is not actually the killer in the Saw films

One common theme of all fictional serial killers is power. Serial killers are scary because they have almost all the power in a situation, turned to alien and unpredictable goals. The protagonists of a horror film are the underdogs, never knowing whether the killer will pull out some new ability or plan that makes everything they try irrelevant. Even if they get the opportunity to negotiate, the power imbalance means that they can’t count on getting what they need: anything the killer agrees will be twisted to serve their own ends.

Academics tell their own kind of horror stories. Earlier this month, the historian Brett Deveraux had a blog post about graduate school, describing what students go through to get a PhD. As he admits, parts of his story only apply to the humanities. STEM departments have more money, and pay their students a bit better. It’s not a lot better (I was making around $20,000 a year at Stony Brook), but it’s enough that I’ve never heard of a student taking out a loan to make ends meet. (At most, people took on tutoring jobs for a bit of extra cash.) We don’t need to learn new languages, and our degrees take a bit less time: six or seven years for an experimental physicist, and often five for a theoretical physicist. Finally, the work can be a lot less lonely, especially for those who work in a lab.

Still, there is a core in common, and that core once again is power. Universities have power, of course: and when you’re not a paying customer but an employee with your career on the line, that power can be quite scary. But the person with the most power over a PhD student is their advisor. Deveraux talks compellingly about the difference that power can make: how an advisor who is cruel, or indifferent, or just clueless, can make or break not just your career but your psychological well-being. The lucky students, like Deveraux and me, find supportive mentors who help us survive and move forward. The unlucky students leave with scars, even if those scars aren’t jigsaw-shaped.

Neither Deveraux or I have experience with PhD programs in Europe, which are quite different in structure from those in the US. But the power imbalance is still there, and still deadly, and so despite the different structure, I’ve seen students here break down, scarred in the same way.

Deveraux frames his post as advice for those who want to go to grad school, and his first piece of advice is “Have you tried wanting something else?” I try to echo that when I advise students. I don’t always succeed: there’s something exciting about a young person interested in the same topics we’re interested in, willing to try to make a life of it. But it is important to know what you’re getting into, and to know there’s a big world out there of other options. If, after all that, you decide to stick through it, just remember: power matters. If you give someone power over you, try to be as sure as you can that it won’t turn into a horror story.

In Uppsala for Elliptics 2021

I’m in Uppsala in Sweden this week, at an actual in-person conference.

With actual blackboards!

Elliptics started out as a series of small meetings of physicists trying to understand how to make sense of elliptic integrals in calculations of colliding particles. It grew into a full-fledged yearly conference series. I organized last year, which naturally was an online conference. This year though, the stage was set for Uppsala University to host in person.

I should say mostly in person. It’s a hybrid conference, with some speakers and attendees joining on Zoom. Some couldn’t make it because of travel restrictions, or just wanted to be cautious about COVID. But seemingly just as many had other reasons, like teaching schedules or just long distances, that kept them from coming in person. We’re all wondering if this will become a long-term trend, where the flexibility of hybrid conferences lets people attend no matter their constraints.

The hybrid format worked better than expected, but there were still a few kinks. The audio was particularly tricky, it seemed like each day the organizers needed a new microphone setup to take questions. It’s always a little harder to understand someone on Zoom, especially when you’re sitting in an auditorium rather than focused on your own screen. Still, technological experience should make this work better in future.

Content-wise, the conference began with a “mini-school” of pedagogical talks on particle physics, string theory, and mathematics. I found the mathematical talks by Erik Panzer particularly nice, it’s a topic I still feel quite weak on and he laid everything out in a very clear way. It seemed like a nice touch to include a “school” element in the conference, though I worry it ate too much into the time.

The rest of the content skewed more mathematical, and more string-theoretic, than these conferences have in the past. The mathematical content ranged from intriguing (including an interesting window into what it takes to get high-quality numerics) to intimidatingly obscure (large commutative diagrams, category theory on the first slide). String theory was arguably under-covered in prior years, but it felt over-covered this year. With the particle physics talks focusing on either general properties with perhaps some connections to elliptics, or to N=4 super Yang-Mills, it felt like we were missing the more “practical” talks from past conferences, where someone was computing something concrete in QCD and told us what they needed. Next year is in Mainz, so maybe those talks will reappear.

Outreach Talk on Math’s Role in Physics

Tonight is “Culture Night” in Copenhagen, the night when the city throws open its doors and lets the public in. Museums and hospitals, government buildings and even the Freemasons, all have public events. The Niels Bohr Institute does too, of course: an evening of physics exhibits and demos, capped off with a public lecture by Denmark’s favorite bow-tie wearing weirder-than-usual string theorist, Holger Bech Nielsen. In between, there are a number of short talks by various folks at the institute, including yours truly.

In my talk, I’m going to try and motivate the audience to care about math. Math is dry of course, and difficult for some, but we physicists need it to do our jobs. If you want to be precise about a claim in physics, you need math simply to say what you want clearly enough.

Since you guys likely don’t overlap with my audience tonight, it should be safe to give a little preview. I’ll be using a few examples, but this one is the most complicated:

I’ll be telling a story I stole from chapter seven of the web serial Almost Nowhere. (That link is to the first chapter, by the way, in case you want to read the series without spoilers. It’s very strange, very unique, and at least in my view quite worth reading.) You follow a warrior carrying a spear around a globe in two different paths. The warrior tries to always point in the same direction, but finds that the two different paths result in different spears when they meet. The story illustrates that such a simple concept as “what direction you are pointing” isn’t actually so simple: if you want to think about directions in curved space (like the surface of the Earth, but also, like curved space-time in general relativity) then you need more sophisticated mathematics (a notion called parallel transport) to make sense of it.

It’s kind of an advanced concept for a public talk. But seeing it show up in Almost Nowhere inspired me to try to get it across. I’ll let you know how it goes!

By the way, if you are interested in learning the kinds of mathematics you need for theoretical physics, and you happen to be a Bachelor’s student planning to pursue a PhD, then consider the Perimeter Scholars International Master’s Program! It’s a one-year intensive at the Perimeter Institute in Waterloo, Ontario, in Canada. In a year it gives you a crash course in theoretical physics, giving you tools that will set you ahead of other beginning PhD students. I’ve witnessed it in action, and it’s really remarkable how much the students learn in a year, and what they go on to do with it. Their early registration deadline is on November 15, just a month away, so if you’re interested you may want to start thinking about it.

Congratulations to Syukuro Manabe, Klaus Hasselmann, and Giorgio Parisi!

The 2021 Nobel Prize in Physics was announced this week, awarded to Syukuro Manabe and Klaus Hasselmann for climate modeling and Giorgio Parisi for understanding a variety of complex physical systems.

Before this year’s prize was announced, I remember a few “water cooler chats” about who might win. No guess came close, though. The Nobel committee seems to have settled in to a strategy of prizes on a loosely linked “basket” of topics, with half the prize going to a prominent theorist and the other half going to two experimental, observational, or (in this case) computational physicists. It’s still unclear why they’re doing this, but regardless it makes it hard to predict what they’ll do next!

When I read the announcement, my first reaction was, “surely it’s not that Parisi?” Giorgio Parisi is known in my field for the Altarelli-Parisi equations (more properly known as the DGLAP equations, the longer acronym because, as is often the case in physics, the Soviets got there first). These equations are in some sense why the scattering amplitudes I study are ever useful at all. I calculate collisions of individual fundamental particles, like quarks and gluons, but a real particle collider like the LHC collides protons. Protons are messy, interacting combinations of quarks and gluons. When they collide you need not merely the equations describing colliding quarks and gluons, but those that describe their messy dynamics inside the proton, and in particular how those dynamics look different for experiments with different energies. The equation that describes that is the DGLAP equation.

As it turns out, Parisi is known for a lot more than the DGLAP equation. He is best known for his work on “spin glasses”, models of materials where quantum spins try to line up with each other, never quite settling down. He also worked on a variety of other complex systems, including flocks of birds!

I don’t know as much about Manabe and Hasselmann’s work. I’ve only seen a few talks on the details of climate modeling. I’ve seen plenty of talks on other types of computer modeling, though, from people who model stars, galaxies, or black holes. And from those, I can appreciate what Manabe and Hasselmann did. Based on those talks, I recognize the importance of those first one-dimensional models, a single column of air, especially back in the 60’s when computer power was limited. Even more, I recognize how impressive it is for someone to stay on the forefront of that kind of field, upgrading models for forty years to stay relevant into the 2000’s, as Manabe did. Those talks also taught me about the challenge of coupling different scales: how small effects in churning fluids can add up and affect the simulation, and how hard it is to model different scales at once. To use these effects to discover which models are reliable, as Hasselmann did, is a major accomplishment.

Breaking Out of “Self-Promotion Voice”

What do TED talks and grant applications have in common?

Put a scientist on a stage, and what happens? Some of us panic and mumble. Others are as smooth as a movie star. Most, though, fall back on a well-practiced mode: “self-promotion voice”.

A scientist doing self-promotion voice is easy to recognize. We focus on ourselves, of course (that’s in the name!), talking about all the great things we’ve done. If we have to mention someone else, we make sure to link it in some way: “my colleague”, “my mentor”, “which inspired me to”. All vulnerability is “canned” in one way or another: “challenges we overcame”, light touches on the most sympathetic of issues. Usually, we aren’t negative towards our colleagues either: apart from the occasional very distant enemy, everyone is working with great scientific virtue. If we talk about our past, we tell the same kinds of stories, mentioning our youthful curiosity and deep buzzwordy motivations. Any jokes or references are carefully pruned, made accessible to the lowest-common-denominator. This results in a standard vocabulary: see a metaphor, a quote, or a turn of phrase, and you’re bound to see it in talks again and again and again. Things get even more repetitive when you take into account how often we lean on the voice: a given speech or piece will be assembled from elementary pieces, snippets of practiced self-promotion that we pour in like packing peanuts after a minimal edit, filling all available time and word count.

“My passion for teaching manifests…”

Packing peanuts may not be glamorous, but they get the job done. A scientist who can’t do “the voice” is going to find life a lot harder, their negativity or clumsiness turning away support when they need it most. Except for the greatest of geniuses, we all have to learn a bit of self-promotion to stay employed.

We don’t have to stop there, though. Self-promotion voice works, but it’s boring and stilted, and it all looks basically the same. If we can do something a bit more authentic then we stand out from the crowd.

I’ve been learning this more and more lately. My blog posts have always run the gamut: some are pure formula, but the ones I’m most proud of have a voice all their own. Over the years, I’ve been pushing my applications in that direction. Each grant and job application has a bit of the standard self-promotion voice pruned away, and a bit of another voice (my own voice?) sneaking in. This year, as I send out applications, I’ve been tweaking things. I almost hope the best jobs come late in the year, my applications will be better then!

Why Can’t I Pay Academics to Do Things for Me?

A couple weeks back someone linked to this blog with a problem. A non-academic, he had done some mathematical work but didn’t feel it was ready to publish. He reached out to a nearby math department and asked what they would charge to help him clean up the work. If the price was reasonable, he’d do it, if not at least he’d know what it would cost.

Neither happened. He got no response, and got more and more frustrated.

For many of you, that result isn’t a big surprise. My academic readers are probably cringing at the thought of getting an email like that. But the guy’s instinct here isn’t too off-base. Certainly, in many industries that kind of email would get a response with an actual quote. Academia happens to be different, in a way that makes the general rule not really apply.

There’s a community called Effective Altruists that evaluate charities. They have a saying, “Money is the Unit of Caring”. The point of the saying isn’t that people with more money care more, or anything like that. Rather, it’s a reminder that, whatever a charity wants to accomplish, more money makes it easier. A lawyer could work an hour in a soup kitchen, but if they donated the proceeds of an hour’s work the soup kitchen could hire four workers instead. Food banks would rather receive money than food, because the money lets them buy whatever they need in bulk. As the Simpsons meme says, “money can be exchanged for goods and services”.

If you pay a charity, or a business, it helps them achieve what they want to do. If you pay an academic, it gets a bit more complicated.

The problem is that for academics, time matters a lot more than our bank accounts. If we want to settle down with a stable job, we need to spend our time doing things that look good on job applications: writing papers, teaching students, and so on. The rest of the time gets spent resting so we have the energy to do all of that.

(What about tenured professors? They don’t have to fight for their own jobs…but by that point, they’ve gotten to know their students and other young people in their sub-field. They want them to get jobs too!)

Money can certainly help with those goals, but not personal money: grant money. With grant money we can hire students and postdocs to do some of that work for us, or pay our own salary so we’re easier for a university to hire. We can buy equipment for those who need that sort of thing, and get to do more interesting science. Rather than “Money is the Unit of Caring”, for academics, “Grant Money is the Unit of Caring”.

Personal money, in contrast, just matters for our rest time. And unless we have expensive tastes, we usually get paid enough for that.

(The exception is for extremely underpaid academics, like PhD students and adjuncts. For some of them money can make a big difference to their quality of life. I had quite a few friends during my PhD who had side gigs, like tutoring, to live a bit more comfortably.)

This is not to say that it’s impossible to pay academics to do side jobs. People do. But when it works, it’s usually due to one of these reasons:

  1. It’s fun. Side work trades against rest time, but if it helps us rest up then it’s not really a tradeoff. Even if it’s a little more boring that what we’d rather do, if it’s not so bad the money can make up the difference.
  2. It looks good on a CV. This covers most of the things academics are sometimes paid to do, like writing articles for magazines. If we can spin something as useful to our teaching or research, or as good for the greater health of the field (or just for our “personal brand”), then we can justify doing it.
  3. It’s a door out of academia. I’ve seen the occasional academic take time off to work for a company. Usually that’s a matter of seeing what it’s like, and deciding whether it looks like a better life. It’s not really “about the money”, even in those cases.

So what if you need an academic’s help with something? You need to convince them it’s worth their time. Money could do it, but only if they’re living precariously, like some PhD students. Otherwise, you need to show that what you’re asking helps the academic do what they’re trying to do: that it is likely to move the field forward, or that it fulfills some responsibility tied to their personal brand. Without that, you’re not likely to hear back.

Four Gravitons and a…What Exactly Are You Now?

I cleaned up my “Who Am I?” page this week, and some of you might notice my title changed. I’m no longer a Postdoc. As of this month, I’m an Assistant Professor.

Before you start congratulating me too much, saying I’ve made it and so on…to be clear, I’m not that kind of Assistant Professor.

Universities in Europe and the US work a bit differently. The US has the tenure-track system: professors start out tenure-track, and have a fixed amount of time to prove themselves. If they do, they get tenure, and essentially permanent employment. If not, they leave.

Some European countries are starting to introduce a tenure track, sometimes just university by university or job-by-job. For the rest, professors are divided not into tenured and tenure-track, but into permanent and fixed-term. Permanent professors are permanent in the way a normal employee of a company would be: they can still be fired, but if not their contract continues indefinitely. Fixed-term professors, then, have contracts for just a fixed span of time. In some cases this can be quite short. In my case, it’s one year.

Some US readers might be thinking this sounds a bit like an Adjunct. In a very literal sense that’s right, in Danish my title is Adjunkt. But it’s not the type of Adjunct you’re thinking of. US universities employ Adjuncts primarily for teaching. They’re often paid per class, and re-hired each year (though with no guarantees, leading to a lot of stress). That’s not my situation. I’m paid a fixed salary, and my primary responsibility is research, not teaching. I also won’t be re-hired next year, unless I find a totally different source of funding. Practically speaking, my situation is a lot like an extra year of Postdoc.

There are some differences. I’m paid a little more than I was as a Postdoc, and I have a few more perks. I’m getting more pedagogy training in the spring, I don’t know if I would have gotten that opportunity if I was still just a Postdoc. It’s an extra level of responsibility, and that does mean something.

But it does also mean I’m still looking for a job. Once again I find myself in application season: polishing my talks and crossing my fingers, not knowing exactly where I’ll end up.

Stop Listing the Amplituhedron as a Competitor of String Theory

The Economist recently had an article (paywalled) that meandered through various developments in high-energy physics. It started out talking about the failure of the LHC to find SUSY, argued this looked bad for string theory (which…not really?) and used it as a jumping-off point to talk about various non-string “theories of everything”. Peter Woit quoted it a few posts back as kind of a bellwether for public opinion on supersymmetry and string theory.

The article was a muddle, but a fairly conventional muddle, explaining or mis-explaining things in roughly the same way as other popular physics pieces. For the most part that didn’t bug me, but one piece of the muddle hit a bit close to home:

The names of many of these [non-string theories of everything] do, it must be conceded, torture the English language. They include “causal dynamical triangulation”, “asymptotically safe gravity”, “loop quantum gravity” and the “amplituhedron formulation of quantum theory”.

I’ve posted about the amplituhedron more than a few times here on this blog. Out of every achievement of my sub-field, it has most captured the public imagination. It’s legitimately impressive, a way to translate calculations of probabilities of collisions of fundamental particles (in a toy model, to be clear) into geometrical objects. What it isn’t, and doesn’t pretend to be, is a theory of everything.

To be fair, the Economist piece admits this:

Most attempts at a theory of everything try to fit gravity, which Einstein describes geometrically, into quantum theory, which does not rely on geometry in this way. The amplituhedron approach does the opposite, by suggesting that quantum theory is actually deeply geometric after all. Better yet, the amplituhedron is not founded on notions of spacetime, or even statistical mechanics. Instead, these ideas emerge naturally from it. So, while the amplituhedron approach does not as yet offer a full theory of quantum gravity, it has opened up an intriguing path that may lead to one.

The reasoning they have leading up to it has a few misunderstandings anyway. The amplituhedron is geometrical, but in a completely different way from how Einstein’s theory of gravity is geometrical: Einstein’s gravity is a theory of space and time, the amplituhedron’s magic is that it hides space and time behind a seemingly more fundamental mathematics.

This is not to say that the amplituhedron won’t lead to insights about gravity. That’s a big part of what it’s for, in the long-term. Because the amplituhedron hides the role of space and time, it might show the way to theories that lack them altogether, theories where space and time are just an approximation for a more fundamental reality. That’s a real possibility, though not at this point a reality.

Even if you take this possibility completely seriously, though, there’s another problem with the Economist’s description: it’s not clear that this new theory would be a non-string theory!

The main people behind the amplituhedron are pretty positively disposed to string theory. If you asked them, I think they’d tell you that, rather than replacing string theory, they expect to learn more about string theory: to see how it could be reformulated in a way that yields insight about trickier problems. That’s not at all like the other “non-string theories of everything” in that list, which frame themselves as alternatives to, or even opponents of, string theory.

It is a lot like several other research programs, though, like ER=EPR and It from Qubit. Researchers in those programs try to use physical principles and toy models to say fundamental things about quantum gravity, trying to think about space and time as being made up of entangled quantum objects. By that logic, they belong in that list in the article alongside the amplituhedron. The reason they aren’t is obvious if you know where they come from: ER=EPR and It from Qubit are worked on by string theorists, including some of the most prominent ones.

The thing is, any reason to put the amplituhedron on that list is also a reason to put them. The amplituhedron is not a theory of everything, it is not at present a theory of quantum gravity. It’s a research direction that might shed new insight about quantum gravity. It doesn’t explicitly involve strings, but neither does It from Qubit most of the time. Unless you’re going to describe It from Qubit as a “non-string theory of everything”, you really shouldn’t describe the amplituhedron as one.

The amplituhedron is a really cool idea, one with great potential. It’s not something like loop quantum gravity, or causal dynamical triangulations, and it doesn’t need to be. Let it be what it is, please!

Sandbox Collaboration

In science, every project is different. Sometimes, my collaborators and I have a clear enough goal, and a clear enough way to get there. There are always surprises along the way, of course, but nonetheless we keep a certain amount of structure. That can mean dividing tasks (“you find the basis, I’ll find the constraints”), or it can mean everyone doing the same work in parallel, like a group of students helping each other with homework.

Recently, I’ve experienced a different kind of collaboration. The goals are less clear, and the methods are more…playful.

Oh, are you building a sandcastle? Or a polylogarithm?

A big task improves with collaboration: you can divide it up. A delicate task improves with collaboration: you can check each other’s work. An unclear task also improves with collaboration: you can explore more ground.

Picture a bunch of children playing in a sandbox. The children start out sitting by themselves, each digging in the sand. Some are building castles, others dig moats, or search for buried treasure, or dinosaur bones. As the children play, their games link up: the moat protects the castle, the knights leave for treasure, the dinosaur awakens and attacks. The stories feed back on one another, and the game grows.

The project I’m working on now is a bit like that sandbox. Each of us has our own ideas about what we’d like to build, and each experiments with them. We see what works and what doesn’t, which castles hold and which fall over. We keep an eye on what each other are doing, and adjust: if that castle is close to done, maybe a moat would improve the view. Piece by piece, the unclear task becomes clearer. Our individual goals draw us in different directions, but what we discover in the end brings us back together, richer for our distant discoveries.

Working this way requires a lot of communication! In the past, I was mystified when I saw other physicists spend hours talking at a blackboard. I thought that must be a waste of time: surely they’d get more done if they sat at their desks and worked things out, rather than having to talk through every step. Now I realize they were likely part of a different kind of collaboration: not dividing tasks or working in parallel on a clear calculation, but exploring different approaches. In these collaborations, those long chats are a kind of calibration: by explaining what you’re trying to do, you see whether it makes sense to your collaborators. You can drop the parts that don’t make sense and build in some of your collaborators’ ideas. In the end you begin to converge, to something that everyone can endorse. Your sandcastles meet up, your stories become one story. When everything looks good, you’re ready to call over your mom (or in this case, the arXiv) and show it off.